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General Introduction 
 
 
In this PhD dissertation, I investigate the use and consequences of subjective performance 
evaluation in supervisor-employee relationships from a management control perspective. The 
first section of this introduction describes the general research motivation. The second section 
discusses the research method used in this dissertation. The third section provides an overview 
of the different chapters in this dissertation and their interrelatedness.  
 
Research Motivation 
Management control systems (MCS) include all systems internal decision makers in 
organizations use to help ensure that organizational strategies and goals are implemented 
(Horngren et al., 2015; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Salterio, 2015). Amongst others, 
MCS measure, analyze and report financial as well as nonfinancial information that is meant 
to be useful to managers in order to perform their job well (Horngren et al., 2015; Otley. 1999; 
Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). In this dissertation, we focus on a specific type 
of management control, results control, and more particularly on subjective performance 
evaluation.  
Results control concerns the measurement and evaluation of performance aimed to motivate 
employees to generate the outcomes the organization wants (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). 
Performance evaluation and rewarding are essential control instruments for organizations to 
increase employee productivity and goal congruence between employee and organization 
(Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Höppe & Moers, 2011). More and more firms 
introduce employee incentive programs (WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting, 2012), but it is 
hard to capture employees’ individual contribution to firm value based on only objective 
performance measures generated by the accounting system (Bol, 2008; Maas et al., 2012). 
Subjective performance evaluation is a common practice in organizations in which a manager 
receives the decision-making power to evaluate and reward the performance of an employee 
subjectively (Choi et al., 2016; Murphy & Oyer, 2003; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). Managers 
can then complement objective measures with subjective assessments of performance (Baker 
et al., 1994) or they can determine subjectively the specific weightings placed on the various 
performance dimensions (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). The correctness of a subjective evaluation 
cannot be verified by a third party, because it entails subjective judgment, personal impressions 
or opinions or additional, private performance information that is not easily contractible, 
controllable or foreseeable (Ahn et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2011; Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Baker 
et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011; Choi et al., 2016; Gibbs et al., 2004; Rajan & 
Reichelstein, 2009). Next to the benefits, there are some disadvantages attached to subjectivity 
in performance contracts as well (Bol, 2008). Judgment biases – or perceptions of them – , 
favoritism and evaluation uncertainty may harm employee motivation and productivity and 
may cause conflicts between managers and employees (Ahn et al., 2010; Bol, 2011; Ferreira & 
Otley, 2009; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Ittner et al., 2003; Lipe & Slaterio, 2000; Moers, 2005; 
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Prendergast & Topel, 1993). Furthermore, subjective performance evaluations can be time-
consuming and manager’s time is scarce and costly (Bol, 2011; Ferreira & Otley, 2009).1  
This doctoral research project aims to provide further insights into how managers make use 
of their decision-making power to evaluate and reward the performance of an employee 
subjectively. We start this doctoral dissertation with an extensive overview of academic 
research on subjective performance evaluation (chapter 1). Next, we research how managers 
use their decision-making power depending on MCS design elements such as: manager-
employee compensation inequality and managerial discretion to freely decide on the bonus size 
(chapter 2); the accuracy of the performance information on which managers base their 
evaluations and whether (or not) managers get the opportunity to write a justification on how 
they allocated employee bonuses (chapter 3), and relative performance information that 
measures performance of an employee in relation to that of one or more other employees 
(chapter 4). We further aim to advance knowledge on the consequences of managers’ use of 
their decision-making power for employee performance, employees’ trust in the manager, 
managers’ fairness perceptions and managers’ bonus allocations as well.  
This research is highly relevant for practice, as a recent survey indicates that two-thirds of 
the private companies use subjectivity in their bonus plans (WorldatWork & Vivient 
Consulting, 2012). The dissertation is relevant for academia as well. Salterio reviewed and 
compared management accounting research over the periods 1990-1993 and 2010-2013 in six 
major accounting journals (Salterio, 2015). He concluded that “Areas of emerging knowledge 
interest in management accounting include performance measures, performance evaluation 
systems,[…]. Areas of ongoing interest, which suggest that the knowledge base has not yet 
satisfied demand for knowledge, include effects of incentives (both empirically and via 
modeling in principal-agent models) and control systems (both in the effects on decision 
makers and the development of such systems).” (Salterio, 2015). This dissertation aims to 
contribute to these areas of management accounting literature. Further, scholars indicate the 
importance of empirical studies on how (elements of) the MCS and information produced by 
the MCS affect the behavior and decisions of individuals (Sprinkle, 2003) and how the MCS 
might help to improve judgments and decisions (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). The effect of 
MCS elements on judgments, decisions and performance can be moderated by various 
individual, task and environmental variables (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Luft & Shields, 2003).  
Theoretical agency models on performance evaluations assume decision-makers are 
perfectly rational creatures seeking for optimal decisions serving their self-interest (Baiman & 
Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Budde, 2007; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 
2003; Prendergast & Topel, 1996; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006, 2009), but there is a lot of 
evidence that indicates decisions made by actual, ‘real’ users of information deviate from 
rationality (Bonner, 1999; Krishnan et al., 2005; Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 
2007). Subjective performance evaluations are subject to plenty of judgement biases such as 
common measure bias, compression bias, gender and race biases, leniency bias,…(Ahn et al., 
2010; Biernat & Sesko, 2013; Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Elvira & Town, 2001; Golman & 
                                                     
1 We refer to chapter 1 of this dissertation for a more extensive review of the academic research related to 
subjective performance evaluation and its benefits and costs. 
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Bhatia, 2012; Lipe & Salterio, 2000, 2002; Moers, 2005; Prendergast, 1993) and simple 
heuristics such as anchoring (Bailey et al., 2011). It is vital for organizations to understand how 
managers weigh and combine various performance measures into an overall subjective 
performance evaluation, but it is unclear how this process works and which elements influence 
the weights placed on the various performance measures (Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & 
Williamson, 2007). Understanding these elements and processes is important in order to 
improve judgment and decision-making (Bonner, 1999).  
Decision-makers follow, next to economic incentives, ethical, social and moral principles 
such as honesty, fairness, equity or reciprocity (Adams, 1963, 1965; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; 
Cox, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999, 2004; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Itoh, 2004; Luft, 1997; Maas et al., 2012; 
Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Rabin, 1993; Smith, 2011). Other-regarding preferences or 
reputational considerations could increase or reduce the need for certain management 
accounting practices and thus they may have implications for MCS design and practices and 
the use of MCS information (Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). Previous research 
indicates that formal control systems can enhance cooperation and reciprocity (Coletti et al., 
2005), but they can reduce reciprocal co-operation as well (Tenbrunsel & Messick,1999). 
Additional research is needed on when formal control systems amplify or demolish reciprocity 
and cooperation and which elements of the MCS might improve judgments and decisions, 
might increase or decrease the occurrence of judgment biases and might elicit other-regarding 
preferences (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). One of the main goals of MCS is to temper the 
conflict of interest between employees and managers and to motivate employees to maximize 
firm value. Current research overly focuses on employee moral hazard and neglects managerial 
moral hazard (Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). However, due to subjective 
performance evaluations, employees are very vulnerable to managers that misinterpret 
performance measures and that allocate bonuses to their own advantage (Fisher et al., 2005). 
An important avenue for future research lies in understanding whether or when individuals act 
opportunistically and how other-regarding (social, ethical,…) motives interact with formal 
MCS in order to help mitigate conflicts between managers and employees (Fisher et al., 2005; 
Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007).2  
Finally, experimental research in management accounting typically focuses on simple one-
period settings, with single, one-dimensional tasks performed by a single person (Sprinkle & 
Williamson, 2007). Additional research is wanted given the more complex nature of many 
decision-making situations in practice. Research could focus on the dynamic (multi-period) 
effects of MCS and manager’s subjective performance evaluation on employee motivation and 
effort. Reputational considerations in multi-period settings may substitute or complement 
formal management accounting practices (Kreps et al., 1982; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). 
Additionally, research could focus on how MCS motivate their employees to allocate high 
levels of effort to multiple tasks, responsibilities or performance dimensions without inducing 
disproportionate effort allocations to certain tasks, responsibilities or performance dimensions 
                                                     
2 We refer to Luft (1997) for a thorough discussion regarding how other-regarding preferences such as fairness 
and ethical concerns affect management accounting practices (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). 
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(Brüggen & Moers, 2007; Hannan et al., 2013; Hecht et al., 2012; Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & 
Williamson, 2007). Lastly, research could look at how MCS motivate cooperation and 
competition among different employees (Hannan et al., 2013; Luft, 2016; Sprinkle, 2003). In 
our three research studies we aim to contribute to the research issues discussed above.  
 
Research Method: Laboratory Experiments 
In all three research papers we conducted laboratory experiments in order to answer our 
research questions. “An experiment is a scientific investigation in which (independent) 
variables are manipulated and their effects on (dependent) variables are observed.” (Sprinkle, 
2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). Experiments are frequently used in management 
accounting research. Interested readers can consult Luft & Shields (2003) for an extensive 
overview of this extant literature (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). Experiments allow to create 
a research setting and generate data fit for the particular research question. They allow for a 
ceteris paribus change in particular aspects of the performance evaluation system which allows 
to isolate specific causes in order to investigate their theoretical effects (Sprinkle, 2003; 
Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). Researchers can control for alternative explanations present in 
the natural environment through the manipulation of the independent variables, through 
keeping constant some elements in the research setting, through the randomization of 
participants over experimental treatments or through the collection of a rich set of alternative 
explaining variables measured as required by the experiment (Bonner, 1999; Sprinkle & 
Williamson, 2007). This research method is especially capable of measuring and documenting 
the process through which decisions are made (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). This is essential 
for organizations that want to understand how managers weigh and combine various 
performance measures into an overall subjective performance evaluation. So far it is unclear 
how this process works and which elements influence the weights placed on the various 
performance measures (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007).  
Well-conducted experiments allow for a thorough test of theoretical predictions, because 
they have strong internal validity. Therefore, experiments are particularly useful to investigate 
cause-effect relations between independent and dependent variables (Sprinkle & Williamson, 
2007). Experiments even allow to conduct research on issues that do not exist yet in the “real 
world” (Bonner, 1999). However, this is experiments’ weakness at the same time. Experiments 
often lack external validity. The stylized, simplified research settings do not take into account 
all relevant aspects of reality and by doing so they sacrifice some external validity. The 
representativeness and generalizability of experiments is often questioned (Bonner, 1999; 
Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007).  
Archival or survey data contains more mundane realism. However, archival or survey data 
on management accounting issues such as a manager’s individual decision-making process is 
often difficult or impossible to obtain (Bonner, 1999; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). 
Furthermore, participants featuring in these data sets are not random; these data sources suffer 
from self-selection or sample-selection biases. Next, dependent and independent variables 
under investigation may be measured imprecisely, which can generate measurement error. 
Further, the results may be confound by other alternative explanations that cannot be unraveled, 
because there was no data collected on those alternative explanations (omitted variables bias) 
 5 
 
and the researcher was not able to control or observe the environment. As such, archival or 
survey data allows only to make correlational interferences about the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables instead of causal interferences (Bonner, 1999). All these 
issues with archival or survey data can endanger the internal validity, construct validity and 
statistical conclusion validity of the research (Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). 
The strength of experiments lies in their internal validity, their capability to make causal 
interferences and to rigorously test theoretical predictions and to refine theory. Experiments 
are well-suited to provide evidence regarding why actual behavior differs from behavior 
predicted by economic agency models (Sprinkle, 2003). 
 
Overview of the Four Chapters 
To advance the literature on subjective performance measurement, this doctoral project 
consists of a literature review on this topic (chapter 1) as well as three experimental papers 
(chapters 2-4). These empirical papers provide better insights and concrete recommendations 
to organizations on how to design their performance evaluation and rewarding system in order 
to stimulate employee productivity and goal congruence. 
 
Chapter 1 
The first chapter of this dissertation consists of an extensive literature review we undertook 
during the first year of the PhD. project. The article was published in the Review of Business 
and Economics (Hermans et al., 2013). It provides an overview of the academic literature on 
subjective performance measurement in high-impact journals during the period 1977–2013 and 
identifies a number of research opportunities, which we address in the papers of the doctoral 
research project.  
 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter investigates, within manager-employee dyads, how managerial 
discretion to freely decide on the bonus size of an employee (high, low) and manager-employee 
compensation inequality (high, low) affect employee effort, managers’ bonus allocation and 
the extent to which a manager is concerned about a fair bonus allocation. Using a 2x2 
experiment, we develop and find support for a causal model that explains how managers 
subjectively allocate a bonus within this context. More specifically, management control 
systems that limit managerial discretion prevent that managers act overly opportunistic and 
therefore cause higher bonuses for the employee compared to control systems that do not limit 
managerial discretion. Furthermore, control systems that limit managerial discretion improve 
employee effort, and managers reciprocate to this extra employee effort by offering a higher 
bonus to the employee. However, in case of manager-employee compensation inequality the 
presence of a control system that limits managerial discretion provides a manager with a 
legitimate excuse to act within the boundaries of the control system. As a result, focusing on 
long-term self-interest becomes justifiable, in contrast to paying more attention to fairness. This 
increased focus on long-term self-interest instead of fairness will ultimately lead to lower bonus 
allocations to the employee. 
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Chapter 3 
The third chapter examines, in a multi-employee setting, how the accuracy of the 
performance information on which managers base their evaluations (high, low) and whether 
managers get the opportunity to write a justification on how they allocated employee bonuses 
(present, absent) affect managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and 
acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations and managers’ compression in bonus 
allocations. Using a 2x2 experiment, we elaborate and provide evidence for a causal model that 
explains how managers subjectively allocate a bonus within this context. Higher (perceived) 
information accuracy increases differentiation in bonus allocations compared to lower 
(perceived) information accuracy. Furthermore, managers estimate employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations as higher when the 
performance information accuracy is (perceived as) high and when they are allowed to justify 
the bonus allocation to the employees compared to situations where either information 
accuracy or a possibility for justification is missing. Managers will consequently differentiate 
more in their bonus allocations to employees, in line with their estimates of employees’ 
perceived procedural fairness.  
 
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter examines, in a multi task context, how task complexity (high, low) and 
employees distortion of effort allocations across tasks away from the firm-preferred equal 
effort allocation affect employee performance. Additionally, we investigate how a management 
control system consisting of detailed relative performance information and a discretionary 
bonus system affects employees’ effort allocation across tasks. Using two experiments, we 
demonstrate that a distorted allocation of effort across tasks reduces employee overall 
performance. However, the negative effect of the distorted allocation of effort across tasks on 
overall employee performance is less negative for complex tasks than for simple tasks. 
Concerning employees’ effort allocation across tasks, we find that, in the first period, 
employees will focus on the task for which they have the highest skills. Employees will focus 
on the easiest task in order to perform at least well on that task. However, after the provision 
of relative performance information and the allocation of the discretionary bonus, employees 
reallocate their time across tasks such that they focus more (less) on tasks for which they 
under(out)performed relative to their colleague. 
 
Relation between chapters 
As indicated earlier, management control systems (MCS) include all systems internal 
decision makers in organizations use to help ensure that organizational strategies and goals are 
implemented (Horngren et al., 2015; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Salterio, 2015). Any 
assessment of the role of MCS information starts from considering how managers make use of 
the information being provided to them (Otley. 1999). The particular use of the control 
information can be more important than the formal design of the control system itself (Ferreira 
& Otley. 2009). In this dissertation, we therefore focus on how decision makers make use of 
the information in a performance evaluation context and how this information and the MCS 
influence the behavior of the decision maker. 
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One of the main goals of MCS is to temper the conflict of interest between employees and 
managers and to motivate employees to maximize firm value. Chapters 2-4 focus on issues in 
manager-employee relationships that obstruct a good implementation of organizational 
strategies and goals and how a deliberate choice for particular elements of the management 
control system can improve that implementation. Chapter 2 and 3 focus on two important 
problems with managers’ behavior that negatively affect employee and organizational 
performance: managers that act opportunistically and managers that do not differentiate in their 
bonus allocations. Chapter 4 focuses on the potential lack of goal congruence between 
organization and employee which might lead to problematic employee behavior that negatively 
affects employee and organizational performance. We identify MCS elements that enable 
managers (chapter 2 and 3) and employees (chapter 4) to make better decisions (Sprinkle, 
2003). 
Furthermore, it is important for organizations to understand how managers come to their 
overall subjective performance evaluation in order to improve judgment and decision-making. 
The evaluation process and the elements that influence managers’ decision are still unclear 
(Bonner, 1999; Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). In chapters 2 and 3 we try to 
disentangle the managers’ evaluation process by means of a path model. We demonstrate for 
instance that managers follow both economic incentives and ethical, social and moral principles 
such as fairness, equity or reciprocity in their decision making. Furthermore, the extent to 
which managers consider ethical, social or moral principles depends on the specific 
combination of management control elements such as manager-employee compensation 
inequality and managerial discretion to freely decide on the bonus size (chapter 2) or the 
accuracy of the performance information on which managers base their evaluations and 
whether managers get the opportunity to write a justification on how they allocated employee 
bonuses (chapter 3). 
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Chapter 1 
Subjective Performance Measurement: 
A Literature Review 
 
Tim Hermans3, Martine Cools and Alexandra Van den Abbeele 
 
Abstract 
This article provides an overview of academic research on subjective performance 
measurement, a practice that intends to remedy the weaknesses of evaluations solely based on 
objective quantitative performance measures. The literature on subjective performance 
measurement mainly focuses on four research streams: optimal contracting, discretionary 
bonus pools, judgment biases and debiasing, and perceived fairness. We discuss these four 
research streams as encountered in 67 articles published in 20 high-impact journals over the 
period 1977 to 2013. In addition, this article identifies several research gaps and avenues for 
future research. 
 
Keywords: literature review; management control; subjective performance measurement 
JEL codes: J33, M52 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This article provides an overview of the academic literature on subjective performance 
measurement. This research field captures the common practice in organizations that a manager 
or supervisor evaluates the performance of an employee or subordinate subjectively. The 
subjectivity in performance evaluation can be present in several ways. Supervisors can use 
subjective performance measures, they can ex post adjust the weighting of objective 
performance measures and/or they can make discretional adjustments based on factors different 
from the performance measures specified ex ante (Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011). The 
subjective evaluations are based on personal impressions or opinions (Bol & Smith, 2011) or 
information not explicitly contracted on because it represents unforeseen circumstances that 
would not be contractible in objective, formula-based performance evaluations (Ahn et al., 
2010; Baily et al., 2011; Baiman & Rajan, 1995). Bommer et al. (1995) indicate that the 
correlation between objective performance measures and subjective ratings of employee 
performance is only 0.39. Subjective performance measures are thus clearly distinct from 
objective performance measures and as such sufficient attention needs to be paid to their design 
and use. This paper therefore offers an extensive overview of existing research on subjective 
performance measurement.4 
                                                     
3 Corresponding author, KU Leuven, Campus Antwerp, Korte Nieuwstraat 33, 2000 Antwerp.  
E-mail: Tim.Hermans@KULeuven.be, Tel. +32 16 37 62 50. 
4 Our study is not the first one to offer an overview of the subjective performance measurement literature. Bol 
(2008) examines the role of subjectivity in compensation contracts. She describes optimal contracting in a 
traditional agency context and thereby depicts the benefits and costs related to subjectivity in compensation 
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As a research method for this literature review we searched for published articles on 
subjective performance measurement in the Web of Science. The following search terms were 
used: ‘subjective performance’, ‘subjective evaluation’, ‘subjective measurement’, ‘subjective 
measure’, ‘subjective judgment’, ‘subjective assessment’, ‘subjective review’, ‘performance 
ratings’ and ‘evaluation’. We investigated whether these search terms occurred either in the 
topic or in the title of published articles. Publications in journals with an impact factor larger 
than 1 were retained for further analysis. Afterwards, we screened all obtained articles to make 
sure they were relevant for the purpose of this literature review.5 This led to our final sample 
of 67 articles published in 20 high-impact journals over the period 1977 to 2013. We grouped 
these 67 articles in 4 research streams already defined in the literature based on the keywords 
of the most highly cited papers. For instance, Maas et al. (2012) deals with ‘optimal 
contracting’, ‘discretionary bonus pools’ and ‘perceived fairness’. Baiman & Rajan (1995) 
examines ‘optimal contracting’ and ‘discretionary bonus pools’. MacLeod (2003) researches 
‘optimal contracting’ and ‘judgment biases and debiasing’. Baker et al. (1994), Ke et al. (1999) 
and Levin (2003) investigate ‘optimal contracting’, Gibbs et al. (2004) research ‘discretionary 
bonus pools’ and Dulebohn & Ferris (1999) and McFarlin & Sweeney (1992) look into 
‘perceived fairness’. Libby et al. (2004), Lipe & Salterio (2000, 2002), Moers (2005) and 
Prendergast & Topel (1993) focus on ‘judgment biases and debiasing’. The topics of those 
highly cited papers resulted in 4 research streams: ‘optimal contracting’, ‘discretionary bonus 
pools’, ‘judgment biases and debiasing’ and ‘perceived fairness’. Afterwards, we were able to 
fit the remaining papers of our sample in this structure based on their topic or keyword. Some 
papers address multiple research streams and they therefore reappear in one or more of the 
subsequent sections discussing each research stream separately. The remaining of this article 
is organized as follows. In the next sections, we discuss the four broad research streams on 
subjective performance measurement: optimal contracting (section 2), discretionary bonus 
pools (section 3), judgment biases and debiasing (section 4) and perceived fairness (section 5). 
Subsequently, we deal with a number of research opportunities identified through this literature 
review in section 6 and we end with a conclusion in section 7. 
 
1.2 Optimal Contracting 
Traditional academic research in agency theory focuses on objective performance 
measurement and optimal contracting. In these classical principal-agent models, a principal 
designs an optimal contract inducing an agent to exert effort that maximizes the value relevant 
                                                     
contracts. Our analysis differs from the analysis of Bol (2008) because we collected a more extensive amount of 
papers touching more aspects of subjectivity in performance evaluation than contracting alone. Franco-Santos et 
al. (2012) provide a framework to classify contemporary performance measurement systems and apply this to 
their review of 76 empirical studies. They discuss perceptions of subjectivity, justice and trust, and judgment 
biases. In contrast to their general and high-level classification framework for ‘all’ contemporary performance 
measurement systems, we provide a more in-depth overview and discussion of the subjective performance 
measurement literature only. Prendergast & Topel (1993) discuss potential pitfalls of subjective performance 
evaluations: they review supervisors’ preferences and biases such as leniency bias, favoritism and compression 
bias. We update their observations and extend the scope. 
5  Although our literature review is quite extensive, we focus on subjective performance measurement and 
therefore do not discuss articles dealing with feedback, performance appraisal, relative performance evaluation, 
self-evaluation or peer-evaluation. 
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to the principal. The agent gets rewarded for his effort, but he is effort-averse. The principal 
cannot fully observe or verify the actions undertaken by the agent and must rely on a number 
of objective performance measures. Appropriately designed incentive contracts can provide the 
agent with incentives to act in the interest of the principal and as such optimal incentive 
contracts mitigate or resolve agency problems (Bol, 2008; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2013). 
With an optimal incentive contract, the principal does not have to monitor the agent’s 
behavior. He can just rely on the objective outcome measures that measure the agent’s 
performance. In other words, an agent’s incentive contract provides the principal with a 
substitute for monitoring the agent’s behavior (Morse et al., 2011). At the same time, these 
incentive contracts transfer risk from the principal to the agent as the objective performance 
measures used in these contracts do not capture the agent’s effort completely and accurately. 
Indeed, performance in most jobs cannot be measured objectively because joint production 
makes individual output not readily quantifiable (Baker et al., 1988; Levin, 2003). In addition, 
the range of possible actions that the agent can take is too extensive to contract upon ex ante 
(Baker et al., 1988). As such, high-uncertainty environments warrant greater reliance on 
subjective performance criteria (Keeley, 1977). In practice, objective performance measures 
are therefore often complemented with subjective performance measures. Table 1.1 provides 
an overview of published articles on optimal contracting including subjective performance 
evaluations.6  The first article by Bol (2008) is a literature review examining the role of 
subjectivity in compensation contracts. In Table 1.1 we update and extend Bol et al.’s 
overview. We first discuss the articles that extend the traditional agency theory models to 
account for subjectivity in performance measurement. Next we include articles revealing the 
benefits of subjectivity in performance contracts, to end with the articles dealing with the costs 
related to subjectivity in optimal contracts. 
  
                                                     
6 The tables in this article are divided into several topics. The papers in the tables are alphabetically ordered by 
author name(s) within these topics. 
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Table 1.1 Optimal contracting with subjective performance evaluations 
Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Introduction to optimal contracting 
Bol (2008) Optimal contracting in traditional agency 
context: benefits and costs related to 
subjectivity. 
Literature review 
Optimal contracting models including subjectivity 
Baiman & Rajan 
(1995) 
Discretionary bonus pools are an efficient way 
to incorporate non-contractible information in a  
two-agent setting. 
Analytical model 
Budde (2007) Researches a BSC with contractible and not-
contractible scorecard measures: a combination 
of a formal contract and a subjective 
performance evaluation may outperform a 
purely formal contract.  
Analytical model 
Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach 
(2013) 
Private equity sponsors (strong principals) use 
less subjective performance measures, but some 
subjective performance evaluation to 
compensate the CEO. 
Field study (CEO contract data on 
leveraged buyouts of 20 large, 
American listed firms, 2005-2007) 
Höppe & Moers 
(2011) 
Different types of subjectivity are used for 
different purposes: “discretionary bonuses” are 
used for risk-reduction, “subjective weights” 
for congruity-improvement. 
Archival study (1,753  
firm-year-observations for 424 
American, publicly listed firms, 
1998-2002) 
Ke, Petroni & 
Safieddine (1999) 
Privately held insurers (strong principals) use 
more subjective performance measures to 
compensate the CEO. 
Archival data (45 privately-held and 
18 publicly-held American insurers, 
1994-1996) 
MacLeod (2003) Extends standard principal-agent model with a 
single agent with subjective evaluations. 
Analytical model 
Rajan & 
Reichelstein 
(2006) 
When the bonus pool covers many agents 
and/or the principal’s subjective information is 
precise, discretionary bonus pools are nearly as 
efficient as explicit contracts. 
Analytical model 
Rajan & 
Reichelstein 
(2009) 
In the single-agent case it might be optimal to 
ignore the subjective signal with discretionary 
bonus pools. 
Analytical model 
Benefits of subjectivity in optimal contracts 
Baker, Gibbons & 
Murphy (1994) 
A combination of objective and subjective 
measures sometime outperforms an explicit or 
an implicit contract alone. 
Analytical model 
Baker, Jensen & 
Murphy (1988) 
Discusses several benefits and costs related to 
objective and subjective performance 
measurement. 
Literature review 
Gibbs, Merchant, 
Van der Stede & 
Vargus (2004) 
Subjective bonuses are used to complement 
perceived weaknesses in quantitative 
performance measures and to provide 
employees insurance against downside risk in 
their pay. 
Archival study (526 department 
managers in 250 American car 
dealerships in 1998-1999) and 1050 
surveys in 326 different dealerships 
Höppe & Moers 
(2011) 
“discretionary bonuses” are used for  
risk-reduction, “subjective weights” for 
congruity-improvement. 
Archival study (1,753 firm-year-
observations for 424 American, 
publicly listed firms, 1998-2002) 
Indjejikian & 
Matejka (2012) 
Nonfinancial measures or subjective 
evaluations are more used for bonuses when the 
recipients have greater influence over the 
internal accounting systems design. 
Survey (242 BU-managers and 
controllers of 121 BUs of 7 Dutch 
multinationals and 48 additional 
interviews) 
Ke, Petroni & 
Safieddine (1999) 
Privately held insurers (strong principals) use 
more subjective performance measures to 
compensate the CEO. 
Archival data (45 privately-held and 
18 publicly-held American insurers, 
1994-1996) 
Keeley (1977) High-uncertainty environments warrant greater 
reliance on subjective performance criteria. 
Questionnaire (106  
supervisor-subordinate pairs) 
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Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Costs of subjectivity for optimal contracts  
Ahn, Hwang & 
Kim (2010) 
Subjective measures provide less incentive than 
objective measures because of the lack of 
variation in scores (compression bias).  
Archival (13 government-invested 
companies, Republic of Korea, 
1990-2006) 
Baker, Jensen & 
Murphy (1988) 
Discusses several benefits and costs related to 
objective and subjective performance 
measurement. 
Literature review 
Golman & Bhatia 
(2012) 
Subjective performance evaluation leads to 
leniency bias, and associated with that reduced 
employee effort. 
Analytical model 
Krishnan, Luft & 
Shields (2005) 
Individuals do not weigh measures 
appropriately in a two-measure incentive 
system. 
Experiment (32 accounting and 
MBA students) 
Levin (2003) Self-enforced relational contracts with moral 
hazard result in compression bias.  
Analytical model 
MacLeod (2003) Optimal contracts with subjective evaluations 
can result in compression bias and leniency. 
Analytical model 
Morse, Nanda & 
Seru (2011) 
Powerful CEOs can shift the weight on 
performance measures toward the better 
performing measures. This affects future firm 
performance negatively. 
Archival study with 2348 firms over 
the period 1992-2003 
Prendergast & 
Topel (1996) 
Subjectivity leads to favoritism. Analytical model 
Prendergast (1993) With subjective evaluation procedures, 
subordinates have an incentive to conform to 
what they feel their superiors want to hear.  
Analytical model 
 
The first eight articles extend traditional agency theory knowledge with one or several 
aspects of subjectivity. MacLeod (2003) allows for subjective performance evaluations in the 
standard principal-agent model by including subjective performance measures. With this 
analytical model, he shows that if the principal’s and the agent’s subjective evaluations 
correspond (or equivalently if there is trust and perceived fairness between principal and agent), 
one can implement the optimal contract just as if subjective evaluations were objective and 
verifiable. Budde (2007) provides a theoretical model for a combination of objective and 
subjective performance measures in a balanced scorecard (BSC) setting. The model shows that 
when all objective performance measures are perfectly verifiable, a properly designed BSC can 
perfectly align the interests of the principal and the agents with an explicit contract. 
When not all BSC measures are contractible7, the first-best solution, a contract in which the 
agent exerts the optimal level of effort that provides the optimal value relevant to the principal, 
may still be obtained through a combination of a formal contract and a subjective performance 
evaluation (Budde, 2007). Höppe & Moers (2011) undertook an archival study in which they 
focus on the use of two different types of subjectivity: “subjective weights” and “discretionary 
bonuses”. “Subjective weights” concern the option whereby supervisors can ex post adjust the 
weighting of objective performance measures, while “discretionary bonuses” refer to the case 
where supervisors can make discretional adjustments based on factors different from the 
performance measures specified ex ante. According to optimal contracting considerations, their 
                                                     
7 A performance measure is contractible if its value is observable both by the principal, the agent and an unrelated 
third party. In this case the performance measure can be explicitly incorporated in a contract (Baiman & Rajan, 
1995). 
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results show that “subjective weights” are used to improve goal congruence between the agent 
and the principal, while “discretionary bonuses” are used to reduce risk for the agent due to 
uncertainty. 
Baiman & Rajan (1995) and Rajan & Reichelstein (2006, 2009) provide analytical models 
on the use of discretionary bonus pools. For a discretionary bonus pool, the bonus pool is based 
on an explicit formula involving objective performance measures agreed-upon ex ante. 
Afterwards, the bonus pool is allocated amongst the agents at the principal’s discretion. The 
entire bonus pool is paid out regardless of the subjective information observed by the principal, 
but in case of unfavorable subjective information the principal withholds part of the bonus of 
one agent to give it to other, better-performing agents. Baiman & Rajan (1995) prove that 
discretionary bonus pools result in a strict Pareto improvement compared to the optimal 
contract that does not use non-contractible information by enabling a principal to exploit non-
contractible information to motivate agents. Furthermore, Rajan & Reichelstein (2006) show 
that discretionary bonus pools are optimal when a principal must rely solely on non-verifiable, 
subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents. They find that bonus pools 
are nearly as efficient as explicit contracts, provided that the bonus pool covers a large number 
of agents and/or the principal’s subjective information is fairly precise. In addition, when no 
other agent is present, the principal incurs an additional cost when the agent shirks. The model 
of Rajan & Reichelstein (2009) indicates that in the single-agent case it might be optimal to 
ignore the subjective signal. When both objective and subjective measures are used, the optimal 
contract results in less divergent performance scores relative to the number of performance 
levels on the different performance measures than when only objective measures are used. 
Furthermore, they show that the single-agent bonus pool results in less divergent performance 
scores relative to the number of possible performance scores on the different performance 
measures than a multiple-agent bonus pool (Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). 
In agency models extended with subjective performance measures, strong principals have 
greater incentives to observe and monitor agents’ effort and to base agents’ reward on those 
subjective observations. Consequently, agent’s compensation is less likely based on an explicit 
contract with objective performance measures (Ke et al., 1999). Ke et al. (1999) confirm this 
theoretic reasoning empirically via an archival study amongst privately-held and publicly-held 
property-liability insurers. They find that within privately-held insurers (called strong 
principals) CEO compensation is less based on objective measures like accounting information 
and presumably more on subjective measures compared to the publicly-held insurers (called 
weak principals). Consequently, their findings are consistent with optimal contracting (Ke et 
al., 1999). Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2013) come to the opposite conclusion in their study of 
CEO contracts within large American firms moving from public ownership with dispersed 
owners (weak principal) to private ownership with strong principals. They find that strong 
principals redesign contracts away from qualitative, nonfinancial measures, but they introduce 
subjective performance evaluation instead. Baker et al. (1994) assume objective performance 
measures are imperfect and cause incentive distortions, which can be mitigated by the inclusion 
of subjective performance assessments. The authors prove that in some circumstances, neither 
an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but a combination of objective 
and subjective measures can. 
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Next, we discuss seven articles on the benefits of subjectivity in optimal contracts. Gibbs et 
al. (2004) use archival and survey data on compensation of managers in car dealerships to 
examine when firms make greater use of subjectivity in bonus payments. It turns out that 
subjective bonuses are used to respond to perceived weaknesses in quantitative formulaic 
bonuses such as incompleteness, short-term focus and susceptibility to manipulation. Using – 
only imperfect – objective performance measures may lead to suboptimal actions taken by the 
agents (Baker et al., 1994). Agents tend to focus their effort on the directly rewarded activities 
and away from the unrewarded activities. The misspecification of an objective performance 
measurement system thus may result in agents “gaming the system” by optimizing actual 
instead of intended measures (Baker et al., 1988). As such, contracts based solely on objective 
performance measures are imperfect and cause incentive distortions. This problem can be 
mitigated by including (additional) subjective performance assessments (Baker et al., 1994; 
Höppe & Moers, 2011). Indjejikian & Matejka (2012) involved business unit managers and 
controllers in a survey study supplemented with in-depth interviews. They find that principals 
rely more on nonfinancial measures or subjective evaluations in determining local managers’ 
bonuses when local managers have a greater influence on the design of internal accounting 
systems. This is consistent with principals protecting themselves against agents’ asymmetric 
information or agents’ manipulation of objective, accounting measures. Baker et al. (1994) 
theorize that in some circumstances a combination of objective and subjective measures 
outperforms an explicit or an implicit contract alone. Moreover, the subjective bonuses provide 
employees insurance against downside risk in their pay e.g. by filtering out the effect of 
uncontrollable factors due to interdependencies (Gibbs et al., 2004) or uncertainty (Keeley, 
1977; Höppe & Moers, 2011), recalculating incentives when performance targets are too 
challenging or when the department is facing losses. Subjectivity improves incentive 
contracting when there is greater trust between the subordinate and the supervisor. This is 
because the positive effects of subjective bonuses on pay satisfaction and firm performance are 
larger the longer the supervisor’s tenure due to mutual trust (Gibbs et al., 2004). In sum, 
principals use subjectivity to resolve contracting problems such as incentive distortions 
(congruity issues) (Höppe & Moers, 2011; Baker et al., 1994), risk concerns (Höppe & Moers, 
2011), environmental uncertainty (Keeley, 1977), moral hazard (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 
2013; Ke et al., 1999), asymmetric information or agents “gaming” (Indjejikian & Matejka, 
2012) or manipulating the system (Gibbs et al., 2004). 
However, allowing subjectivity in performance evaluations also has its downsides, as 
described in the nine articles discussed next. Levin (2003) argues that the use of subjective 
performance measures necessarily leads to costly disputes and conflicts between the agent and 
the principal. When agents feel their evaluation is unfair, fairness and conflict concerns will 
lead to compressed and above average subjective performance evaluations (and thus to higher 
compensation for the agent) (Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003). This 
compressed and above average rating behavior in turn lowers employee performance and firm 
productivity (Ahn et al., 2010; Golman & Bhatia, 2012). Another concern related to (un)fair 
rating behavior is favoritism. Subjectivity leads to favoritism where evaluators act on personal 
preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others beyond their true 
performance. This reduces incentives for the other agents because of increased risk / 
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uncertainty in evaluations (Prendergast & Topel, 1996). In addition, individuals seem 
insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one subjective measure has spillover 
effects on the optimal weighting of the other subjective measure in a two-measure incentive 
system. Consequently, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to 
result in misallocations of agent effort (Krishnan et al., 2005). Morse et al. (2011) provide 
archival evidence that powerful agents are able to shift the weight on performance measures 
toward the better performing measures. This manipulation practice harms future firm 
performance. In addition, Prendergast (1993) theorizes that agents have an incentive to 
conform to what they feel their superior wants to hear. The agent distorts his opinion towards 
the anticipated opinion of the supervisor. As such, too much weight is put on the opinion of the 
supervisor, which leads to inefficiencies. Another difficulty in subjective performance 
measurement is due to principals reneging, i.e. they assess the agent’s final performance 
untruthfully in order to pay less reward to the agent. This is possible because the subjective 
performance information in the optimal contract is not enforceable (Ahn et al., 2010; Baily et 
al., 2011; Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011; MacLeod, 
2003; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). This evidently undermines the credibility of subjective 
performance evaluations in optimal contracts. Therefore, it is important to install mechanisms 
to enforce the subjective performance measurement. Baker et al. (1994) for example cite that 
implicit contracts are self-enforcing as principals are concerned with their reputation in the 
labor market for keeping their promises. Levin (2003) remarks that each party has the option 
to walk away in a relational contract. To prevent that the principal reneges, the payable reward 
must not exceed the net present value of the benefits the principal realizes under an ongoing 
contract. This is the case if the principal’s discount rate is small enough. The credibility of 
optimal contracts with subjectivity added can be considerably improved by restricting 
subjective incentives to that part of the first-best action that cannot be induced by an explicit 
contract (Budde, 2007). In addition, “discretionary bonus pools” could prevent the principal 
from reneging in a situation with multiple agents, because the bonus pool amount is agreed 
upon ex ante and afterwards the total bonus pool is allocated amongst the agents according to 
the principal’s discretion (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006, 2009).  
 
1.3 Discretionary Bonus Pools 
In this section, we first discuss a number of theoretical articles on the characteristics and 
benefits of discretionary bonus pools, after which we discuss the experimental articles 
challenging the predictions in the theoretical articles. Next, we discuss articles investigating 
the use of discretionary bonus pools in practice. Table 1.2 follows the structure of this section. 
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Table 1.2 Discretionary bonus pools 
Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Analytical models on discretionary bonus pools 
Baiman & Rajan 
(1995) 
Discretionary bonus pools are an efficient way to 
incorporate non-contractible information in a  
two-agent setting. 
Analytical model 
Baker, Jensen & 
Murphy (1988) 
Free-rider problem associated with ordinary profit-
sharing plans: employees receive only 
approximately 1/n of the increased profits related to 
their effort (where n is the number of participants in 
the plan). 
Literature review 
Rajan & 
Reichelstein 
(2006) 
When the bonus pool covers many agents and/or the 
principal’s subjective information is precise, 
discretionary bonus pools are nearly as efficient as 
explicit contracts. 
Analytical model 
Rajan & 
Reichelstein 
(2009) 
In the single-agent case it might be optimal to 
ignore the subjective signal with discretionary 
bonus pools. 
Analytical model 
Experimental papers on discretionary bonus pools 
Bailey, Hecht & 
Towry (2011) 
Managers incorporate noncontractible information 
to a lesser extent than theoretically expected. 
Managers who can only allocate a part of the bonus 
pool incorporate noncontractible information to a 
greater extent than participants with full discretion. 
Experiment (170 business school 
students) 
Fisher, Maines, 
Peffer & Sprinkle 
(2005) 
Subordinate’s performance and compensation is 
larger when the employer has no discretion over 
total employee compensation, but discretion over 
allocation of the compensation pool.  
Experiment (237 undergraduate 
business students) 
Maas, van 
Rinsum & Towry 
(2012) 
Supervisors are more willing to obtain costly 
performance information on individual agents as it 
becomes more difficult to distinguish individual 
contributions to group performance.  
Experiment (126 undergraduate 
business students) 
Field studies on discretionary bonus pools 
Gibbs, Merchant, 
Van der Stede & 
Vargus (2004) 
Discretionary bonuses are used to complement 
perceived weaknesses in quantitative performance 
measures and to provide employees insurance 
against downside risk in their pay. 
Archival study (526 department 
managers in 250 American car 
dealerships in 1998-1999) and 
1050 surveys in 326 different 
dealerships 
Ittner, Larcker & 
Meyer (2003) 
Discretion in weighting the measures in a BSC 
bonus plan led to a focus on quantitative, outcome-
oriented financial performance measures that were 
used in earlier non-discretionary bonus plans.  
Field study (a large American 
retail bank) 
Ivancevich (1983) The more unsatisfactory performing engineers in a 
team, the more favorable ratings are for satisfactory 
performing engineers. For scientists no such effect 
was identified. 
Field study with 104 supervisors 
of 624 engineers and 66 
supervisors of 404 scientists 
working in an American 
company 
Merchant, Chow 
& Wu (1995) 
Incentive plans in Taiwanese and US firms are very 
similar. In both countries, firms make use of 
discretionary bonus pools. 
Field study (open-ended 
interviews in 2 US and 2 
Taiwanese companies) 
 
Baiman & Rajan (1995) and Rajan & Reichelstein (2006, 2009) theoretically discuss the 
characteristics and benefits of discretionary bonus pools. As indicated above, subjective 
performance information is complex and subtle, and therefore difficult to observe and verify 
by a third party. Since this information is not enforceable (Ahn et al., 2010; Baily et al., 2011; 
Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011; MacLeod, 2003; 
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Prendergast & Topel, 1993), it harms the credibility of subjective performance measurement 
in optimal contracts. Supervisors can assess a subordinate’s final performance untruthfully in 
order to pay less reward to that subordinate (Bol, 2008). In this context, a discretionary bonus 
pool is an appealing instrument. The magnitude of the bonus pool is based on an explicit 
formula agreed-upon ex ante and involving objective performance measures. The entire bonus 
pool is paid out regardless of the subjective information observed by the supervisor (Baiman 
& Rajan, 1995). Supervisors cannot change the magnitude of the reward by assessing agent’s 
performance falsely and they have consequently no incentive to do so (Rajan & Reichelstein, 
2006). Afterwards, the bonus pool is allocated amongst different subordinates at the 
supervisor’s discretion. Based on subjective information the supervisor can shift a part of the 
bonus of one subordinate to another, better-performing colleague. Accordingly, a supervisor 
can use non-contractible information to encourage subordinates (Baiman & Rajan, 1995). The 
supervisor discretion solves the free-rider problem associated with ordinary profit-sharing 
plans in large organizations described by Baker et al. (1988). With ordinary profit-sharing 
plans, employees bear the full cost of exerting effort and yet receive only 1/n of the increased 
profits (where n is the number of participants in the plan). Discretionary bonus pools take 
individual effort into account (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006, 2009). The 
use of non-contractible information to motivate subordinates results in a strict Pareto 
improvement compared to the optimal contract that does not use non-contractible information 
(Baiman & Rajan, 1995). Discretionary bonus pools are even optimal if a supervisor can only 
rely on non-verifiable subjective information to create incentives for a group of subordinates. 
Provided the bonus pool covers a large number of subordinates and/or the supervisors’ 
subjective information is fairly precise, bonus pools based solely on subjective information 
should be nearly as efficient as explicit contracts based on objective and verifiable information 
(Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). When no other subordinate is present, the supervisor incurs an 
additional cost when the subordinate shirks. In the single-subordinate case it might be optimal 
to ignore the subjective signal (Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). The reasoning above explains the 
popularity of discretionary bonus pools both in practice and in research. 
Three experimental articles challenge the predictions made by the theoretical articles 
discussed above. Fisher et al. (2005) undertook an experiment to examine situations in which 
the supervisor either has full discretion or no discretion over the magnitude of the bonus pool 
and/or the allocation of this bonus pool among subordinates. A compensation scheme in which 
a supervisor has full discretion to use private information may reduce subordinate opportunism, 
but allows for supervisor opportunism. The researchers measured the total group output of the 
subordinates, the bonus allocated to the subordinates and the residual supervisor profit. Both 
total group output and subordinate compensation appeared to be greater when the supervisor 
had no discretion over the magnitude of the bonus pool, but discretion over the allocation of 
the bonus pool. The supervisor’s residual profit was higher when he had discretion over the 
allocation of compensation, while discretion over the magnitude of the bonus pool had no effect 
on residual profit. So, in general, the discretionary bonus pool outperforms the other 
experimental situations. This is consistent with Baiman & Rajan (1995). Bailey et al. (2011) 
experimentally examine situations in which the supervisor has full or partial discretion to 
allocate the bonus pool and/or he is confronted with positive or negative noncontractible 
 18 
 
information. The findings show that managers incorporate noncontractible information to a 
lesser extent than theoretically expected by Rajan & Reichelstein (2006) when allocating a 
bonus pool. When processing performance information, managers in the experiment tended to 
choose an anchor point and then subsequently adjusted for noncontractible information. This 
anchoring approach is in contrast to the theoretical approach in Rajan & Reichelstein (2006) in 
which a manager is supposed to integrate all contractible and noncontractible information into 
a single, comprehensive performance measure (integrative approach). Managers who use an 
anchoring approach incorporate noncontractible information into bonus pool allocations to a 
lesser extent than those who use an integrative approach. In practice, this leads to a reduction 
in the intended, theoretical benefits of managerial discretion in bonus allocation proclaimed by 
Rajan & Reichelstein (2006). Participants who can only allocate a part of the bonus pool 
incorporate noncontractible information to a greater extent than participants with full discretion 
(Bailey et al., 2011). The third experimental article, by Maas et al., starts from the observation 
that joint production and unobservability make individual output not readily quantifiable in 
most jobs (Baker et al., 1988; Levin, 2003; Maas et al., 2012). This impedes the bonus pool 
allocation discretion of the supervisor in a discretionary bonus pool setting. Maas et al. (2012) 
investigate the willingness of supervisors to obtain additional, costly information to more 
accurately assess individual contributions to team output. In their experiment, the aggregate 
team output is readily available and the individual output can be obtained at an additional cost. 
The results indicate that supervisors are willing to incur a cost to prevent potential unfairness. 
Supervisors are more willing to obtain the costly information as it becomes more difficult to 
distinguish individual contributions to group performance. Additionally, this willingness 
appeared to be greater for relatively high versus relatively low levels of group performance. 
Four articles investigate the functioning of discretionary bonus pools in practice. Ivancevich 
(1983) provides evidence that a supervisor shifting a part of the bonus from one subordinate to 
another, better-performing colleague (supervisor allocation discretion) follows a natural reflex. 
In a field study, Ivancevich (1983) instructed supervisors to evaluate each member of their 
team individually. Team size ranged from 9 to 44 engineers per team. The supervisors were 
instructed not to force themselves to come up with distributed evaluations. Despite this 
instruction, the study shows contrast effects that are very similar to situations where supervisors 
use allocation discretion in discretionary bonus pools. The more unsatisfactory performing 
engineers in a team, the more favorable the ratings are for the well performing engineers. Well 
performing employees are thus the beneficiaries of higher performance ratings and more 
rewards when unsatisfactory performers are part of the supervisor’s team (Ivancevich, 1983). 
Merchant et al. (1995) investigate the use of discretionary bonus pools in practice. They show 
that incentive plans in Taiwanese and US firms are very similar in terms of the extent of 
individual performance-dependent monetary rewards, the extent of group-rewards compared 
to individual rewards and the amount of subjectivity in evaluations.8 
Subsequently, Gibbs et al. (2004) find in the car dealership context that discretionary 
bonuses are used to complement perceived weaknesses in quantitative performance measures 
                                                     
8  While no cultural differences were found, we should be cautious when interpreting these results as the 
researchers only investigated 2 US companies and 2 Taiwanese companies (Merchant et al., 1995). 
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(incompleteness, short-term focus and susceptibility to manipulation) and to provide 
employees with an insurance against downside risk in their pay (by filtering out uncontrollables 
due to interdependencies, recalculating incentives when performance targets are too 
challenging or when department is facing losses). In addition, they find that the use of 
discretionary bonus pools is positively related to pay satisfaction and firm performance when 
the manager has long tenure. Finally, Ittner et al. (2003) undertake a field study on the 
introduction of a subjective BSC-based bonus plan containing six categories of financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures in a large American retail bank. The supervisor could 
subjectively decide on the weighting of the different performance measures. Ittner et al. (2003) 
were confronted with a number of downsides of this practice. The discretion in weighting the 
measures in the bonus plan led the supervisors to ignore many performance measures, to 
change weightings from period to period and to include factors that were not even performance 
measures, although this was not allowed. In other words, quantitative, outcome-oriented 
financial performance measures as used in earlier non-discretionary bonus plans remain 
dominant. The high level of discretion and the related uncertainty in the criteria used for bonus 
determination made many subordinates complain about favoritism. Afterwards, the firm chose 
for a non-discretionary, formulaic bonus plan based solely on revenues. This field study points 
out that psychology may be more important in explaining firm’s measurement practices than 
optimal contracting. 
 
1.4 Judgment Biases & Debiasing 
Rating inaccuracy caused by performance evaluation biases is perceived as one of the main 
problems of introducing subjectivity into compensation contracts (Bol, 2011). Supervisors 
need to invest time and effort in gathering accurate information on employee performance (Bol, 
2011) and are not the residual claimants of subordinates’ output, which leaves room for 
supervisors’ preferences (Prendergast & Topel, 1993). This section provides an overview of 
different judgment biases by supervisors. These judgment biases may impede or reinforce the 
proclaimed benefits of subjectivity in performance measurement discussed in the previous 
section on optimal contracting. Table 1.3 provides an overview of the articles on judgment 
biases and debiasing. Debiasing concerns practices to resolve judgment biases. It lists the 
articles discussing compression bias or centrality bias, the articles focusing on biases related to 
the BSC, the articles concerning biases related to personal characteristics, and a number of 
articles about biases related to accompanying or competitive information. 
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Table 1.3 Judgment biases and debiasing in subjective performance evaluations 
Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Leniency bias and compression bias 
Ahn, Hwang & 
Kim (2010) 
Subjective measures provide less incentive than 
objective measures because of the lack of variation in 
scores (compression bias).  
Archival (13  
government-invested companies, 
Republic of Korea, 1990-2006) 
Baker, Jensen 
& Murphy 
(1988) 
Biased and inaccurate performance evaluations reduce 
effectiveness of incentives and productivity.  
Literature review 
Bol (2011) Information-gathering costs and strong subordinate-
supervisor relationships increase centrality bias and 
leniency bias. Centrality bias decreases performance 
improvement and leniency bias increases future 
performance. 
Archival study (5 branch offices 
of a Dutch financial service 
provider, 2003-2004, 198 
employees 
Duarte, 
Goodson & 
Klich (1994) 
Subjective performance ratings in high-quality 
supervisor-subordinate relationships are always high. 
Ratings in low-quality relationships are consistent with 
objective performance measures in the short run, but 
high in the long run. 
Questionnaire (261  
supervisor-subordinate pairs in 
an American telephone 
company) 
Golman & 
Bhatia (2012) 
Noise in the performance signal and a stronger 
aversion to unfairly low ratings than to overly high 
ones result in leniency bias. Noise in the performance 
signal results in compression bias. Both biases hurt 
agent’s performance.  
Analytical model 
Judge & Ferris 
(1993) 
 
Greater opportunity to observe a subordinate’s job 
performance resulted in higher performance ratings. 
Questionnaire (81 nurses and 
their supervisors in an American 
hospital) 
Kane, 
Bernardin, 
Villanova & 
Peyrefitte 
(1995) 
Leniency is a relatively stable response tendency by 
individual raters.  
 
3 field studies: one: 328 patrol 
officers, 38 sergeants and 14 
lieutenants in a police 
department, two: 243 nurses and 
31 head nurses, three: 44 
supervisors of 376 social 
workers 
Levin (2003) Self-enforced relational contracts with moral hazard 
result in compression bias.  
Analytical model 
MacLeod 
(2003) 
Optimal contracts with subjective evaluations can 
result in compression bias and leniency bias. 
Analytical model 
Moers (2005) The use of multiple objective performance measures 
and the use of subjective performance measures are 
related to compression and leniency bias. 
Archival study (124 subordinates 
in a Dutch, maritime industrial 
firm, 1998) 
Prendergast & 
Topel (1993) 
Supervisors are not the residual claimants of 
subordinates’ output, which makes supervisors’ 
preferences and biases such as leniency bias, 
favoritism and compression bias possible. 
Literature review 
Biases observed in a BSC context 
Banker, Chang 
& Pizzini 
(2004) 
Evaluators focus more on common measures than on 
unique measures. Evaluators focus more on 
strategically linked measures than non-linked measures 
only when evaluators are provided with detailed 
information about BU-strategy. 
Experiment (480 MBA students) 
Cardinaels & 
van Veen-
Dirks (2010) 
When there are performance differences in the 
financial performance measures, evaluators that use a 
BSC-format place more weight on the financial 
performance measures than evaluators using an 
unformatted scorecard. When there are performance 
differences in the non-financial performance measures, 
evaluators evaluate similarly in both formats. 
2 experiments (144 business 
program students) 
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Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Choi, Hecht & 
Tayler (2012) 
Surrogation: managers forget that performance 
measures are imperfect representations of the 
underlying strategic construct.  
Experiment (79 graduate 
business students) 
Ding & 
Beaulieu 
(2011) 
Participants who were induced to feel good (bad) gave 
higher (lower) evaluation scores to divisional 
managers. 
Experiment 1 (104 MBA 
students) and Experiment 2 ( 32 
MBA students) 
Humphreys & 
Trotman 
(2011) 
When all the performance measures are strategically 
linked, but no strategy information is provided, 
common measure bias exists. When strategy 
information is present and all performance measures 
are strategically linked, then common measure bias 
disappears. 
Experiment ( 92 executive MBA 
students) 
Libby, Salterio 
& Webb 
(2004) 
Either the requirement to justify a performance 
evaluation to a superior or improving perceived quality 
of the BSC measures via an independent third-party 
report decreases common measure bias. 
Experiment ( 227 MBA 
students) 
Lipe & Salterio 
(2000) 
Superiors use only the common performance measures 
to evaluate performance of the business unit in a  
BSC-context. 
Experiment ( 58 MBA students) 
Lipe & Salterio 
(2002) 
Performance evaluations are affected by organizing the 
measures into the BSC categories when multiple 
below-target (or above-target) measures are contained 
within a category but those evaluations are not affected 
when the above/below-target measures are distributed 
across the scorecard’s four categories or when the 
same measures are presented without the organizing 
BSC categories. 
Experiment ( 78 MBA students) 
Tayler (2010) Managers who are involved in selecting strategic 
initiatives perceive those initiatives afterwards as more 
successful than managers who are not involved in the 
initiative-selection process. Simply framing the 
scorecard as a causal chain is not sufficient to mitigate 
these effects, but framing the scorecard as a causal 
chain and involving managers in the selection of 
scorecard measures, mitigates the effects. 
Experiment (132 MBA students) 
Biases related to personal characteristics  
Biernat & 
Sesko (2013) 
Evaluations of mixed-sex work teams’ performance: 
women were solely judged lower in a white pair work 
team. Black women were not affected by gender bias. 
2 experiments (142 and 283 
undergraduate students 
respectively) 
Elvira & Town 
(2001) 
Racial differences between subordinate and supervisor 
lead to lower ratings for both black and white 
subordinates. 
Field study (316 salespersons in 
a large, American company) 
Judge & Ferris 
(1993) 
 
Demographic similarity and the supervisor-subordinate 
relationship significantly influenced performance 
rating. 
Questionnaire (81 nurses and 
their supervisors in an American 
hospital) 
Pulakos & 
Wexley (1983) 
 
Supervisors appraise dissimilar subordinates 
significantly lower. 
 
Questionnaire (171  
supervisor-subordinate 
relationships in manufacturing, 
retailing, government and service 
organizations) 
Varma & Stroh 
(2001) 
Both male and female supervisors rate subordinates of 
the same sex higher.  
220 surveys of supervisors in the 
communications industry 
Wayne & 
Liden (1995) 
Demographic similarity and subordinates’ impression 
management influence performance ratings. 
Survey (111  
supervisor-subordinate pairs in 
nonacademic jobs at 2 American 
universities)  
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Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Biases related to accompanying or competitive information 
Bol & Smith 
(2011) 
Supervisors bias their subjective evaluations of performance 
to be consistent with an accompanying objective performance 
measure.  
Experiment ( 216 
supervising employees at 
an university) 
Dossett & 
Greenberg 
(1981) 
A worker who initially suggested a high goal received a 
significantly higher performance score than a worker who 
suggested a low goal. 
Experiment with 80 
undergraduate students 
Ghosh & 
Lusch (2000) 
Unfavorable outcomes negatively influence subjective 
performance evaluations. 
Archival study in 204 
stores of an American 
retailer 
Heneman & 
Wexley (1983) 
Performance ratings are less accurate when rating is delayed 
and when only a small amount of information is observed. 
Experiment (180 
undergraduate business 
students) 
Hogan (1987) Ratings will be lower when a subordinate’s actual 
performance disappoints a supervisor’s expectations about 
that performance.  
Questionnaire (49 
subordinate-supervisor 
pairs in an American 
bank) 
Ittner, Larcker 
& Meyer 
(2003) 
Supervisors focus on quantitative, outcome-oriented financial 
performance measures. 
Field study (a large 
American retail bank) 
Jacobs & 
Kozlowski 
(1985) 
As raters have more opportunity to observe ratee behavior, the 
magnitude of halo error increases. 
3 consecutive ratings 
(1031, 976 and 876 
students respectively). 
Tan & Jamal 
(2001) 
Average superiors evaluate work done by outstanding 
subordinates more favorably than work done by average 
subordinates when they know the identity of the work 
preparer. Outstanding superiors are not affected by the halo 
effect. 
Experiment (40 audit 
seniors and 20 audit 
managers) 
 
Compression bias or centrality bias refers to the tendency to compress performance ratings, 
which results in less variance in ratings than justified by the variance in actual performance. 
Leniency bias is the tendency to inflate subordinate’s performance rating such that 
subordinate’s performance is assessed to be above average (Baker et al., 1988; Bol, 2011). 
These important forms of performance evaluation bias have received quite some research 
attention. According to the theoretical articles on optimal contracting, supervisor’s subjective 
performance evaluations will be compressed and rated above average if the supervisor and 
subordinate disagree upon the subjective performance evaluation or when moral hazard is 
present (Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003). This is due to the tradeoff between reducing the cost 
of conflict between subordinate and supervisor ex post (Bol, 2011; MacLeod, 2003) and 
providing incentives to the subordinate ex ante (MacLeod, 2003). Supervisors need to invest 
time and effort in gathering accurate information on employee performance (Bol, 2011). They 
bear all of the monitoring costs but receive little of the benefit from conducting more accurate 
evaluations (Baker et al., 1988). Whenever information-gathering costs increase, they invest 
less time and effort in gathering accurate information on employee performance. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that empirical evidence indicates that centrality bias and leniency bias are 
positively related to information-gathering costs (Bol, 2011), to the use of multiple objective 
performance measures and to the use of subjective performance measures (Moers, 2005). 
Additionally, uncertainty about subordinate performance leads to compressed ratings. The 
analytical model by Golman & Bhatia (2012) indicates that when a supervisor is uncertain 
about subordinate performance and he has a stronger aversion to unfairly low ratings than to 
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overly high ratings (due to fairness or conflict concerns), he will inflate performance ratings 
according to his preferences. Kane et al. (1995) provide empirical evidence that inflating 
performance ratings is a relatively stable rater tendency. 
In contrast to the reasoning above, Duarte et al. (1994) and Judge & Ferris (1993) provide 
empirical evidence about the presence of leniency in a different way: they found that a greater 
opportunity to observe a subordinate’s job performance actually resulted in higher performance 
ratings. Along this reasoning, the supervisor-subordinate relationship significantly influences 
supervisors’ affection toward subordinates and consequently influences performance ratings 
indirectly through supervisors’ affection (Judge & Ferris, 1993). Strong subordinate-supervisor 
relationships increase centrality bias and leniency bias (Bol, 2011). Both in the short run and 
the long run, subjective performance ratings in high-quality supervisor-subordinate 
relationships are high, regardless of objective performance measures. Ratings in low-quality 
relationships are consistent with objective performance measures in the short run, but high in 
the long run, regardless of objective measures (Duarte et al., 1994). 
The literature shows mixed results on the effect of centrality bias and leniency bias on 
subordinate performance. Ahn et al. (2010) examine the effect of discriminability (variation in 
performance scores) on subordinate performance empirically. Their findings show that 
subordinate performance improvement increases with the degree of discriminability. 
Subjective measures provide less incentive than objective measures because of the lack of 
discriminability (compression bias). This results in a decrease in performance improvement 
(Ahn et al., 2010; Bol, 2011). Biased and inaccurate performance evaluations reduce 
productivity by reducing effectiveness of incentives (Baker et al., 1988). In other words, 
leniency bias and centrality bias hurt the agent’s performance (Golman & Bhatia, 2012). In 
contrast, Bol (2011) reveals that leniency bias increases future performance due to increased 
perceived fairness of the incentive system. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss a number of experiments investigating judgment 
biases in the context of the BSC or another strategic performance evaluation framework. The 
BSC is a framework devised by Kaplan & Norton (1992) containing a large set of performance 
measures that capture the drivers of the firm’s desired business strategy along four categories: 
financial performance, customer relations, internal business processes and the organization’s 
learning and growth activities. The distinctive feature of the BSC is that the performance 
measures are linked with each other, and that they express cause-and-effect relationships that 
lead to the implementation of the intended strategy. The BSC can be used to evaluate the 
performance of a business unit or a business unit manager (Lipe & Salterio, 2000, 2002). Lipe 
& Salterio (2000) point out that BSCs include some performance measures common to multiple 
business units and other performance measures that are unique to a particular business unit. 
Based on an experiment, they discover that supervisors make only use of the common measures 
when evaluating the performance of different business units i.e. common measure bias is 
present (Lipe & Salterio, 2000). Banker et al. (2004) confirm this result in an experiment in 
which some measures are strategically linked and others are not: evaluators focus more on 
common performance measures than on unique measures. However, this result does not hold 
when a number of the BSC performance measures are strategically linked and detailed 
information on the strategic linkages is provided. In that case, evaluators focus more on 
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strategically linked unique measures than on non-linked measures that are common (Banker et 
al., 2004). In contrast, when strategy information is provided to managers and only some 
measures are strategically linked, common linked measures get more attention than unique 
linked measures (Banker et al., 2004; Humphreys & Trotman, 2011). Humphreys & Trotman 
(2011) further experimentally demonstrate that common measure bias exists when only some 
or all the performance measures are strategically linked, but no strategy information is 
provided. However, when strategy information is present and all performance measures are 
strategically linked, common measure bias disappears, but Libby et al. (2004) propose two 
methods to overcome common measure bias. The first one is to introduce a requirement to 
justify the performance evaluation to a superior. An alternative is to improve the perceived 
quality of the BSC performance measures via the provision of an independent third-party report 
(Libby et al., 2004). 
Other experimental studies focus on how BSC framing affects performance evaluations. 
Lipe & Salterio (2002) find that when multiple below-target (or above-target) measures are 
contained within a single BSC category, performance evaluations are different from 
performance evaluations using the same measures, but without the BSC categories framework. 
However, when the above/below-target performance measures are distributed across the four 
categories of the BSC, evaluations are not different from evaluations using these same 
measures, but without the BSC categories framework. The reason is that when performance on 
measures within a group is consistent (e.g. consistently above-target), the decision maker may 
perceive that the measures are related. Consequently, he reduces the impact of the individual 
performance measures on his or her judgment. In contrast, when the same measures are 
presented without the organizing BSC categories (or are scattered across BSC categories), the 
perception of relations among these measures and the resulting reduction in decision weights 
are less likely. Also Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks (2010) investigate the effect of the 
presentation of performance measures on performance evaluations of two business unit 
managers, especially how evaluators weight financial and non-financial measures. When the 
performance difference between the two managers is located in performance measures in the 
financial category, evaluators that use a BSC-format place more weight on the financial 
category performance measures than evaluators using an unformatted scorecard. In contrast, 
when the performance difference is located in performance measures of one of the three non-
financial categories, the weight placed upon these non-financial category measures is similar 
for the BSC-format and the unformatted scorecard. In a subsequent experiment, Cardinaels & 
van Veen-Dirks (2010) use performance markers to indicate above- target, on-target or below-
target performance. In this setting, evaluators that use a BSC-format weight financial and non-
financial performance differences more heavily than evaluators using an unformatted 
scorecard. Managers who are involved in selecting strategic initiatives perceive those 
initiatives afterwards as having been more successful than managers who are not involved in 
the initiative-selection process. Simply framing the scorecard as a causal chain is not sufficient 
to mitigate these effects, but framing the scorecard as a causal chain and involving managers 
in the selection of scorecard measures, mitigates the effects of manager involvement in 
initiative selection on initiative performance evaluation (Tayler, 2010). 
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Two more studies undertaken in a BSC context investigate how incentive payment affects 
the evaluation of performance by managers. Choi et al. (2012) remark that firms develop 
strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) that translate strategy into imperfect 
performance measures of the true strategic construct. Unfortunately, managers fail to 
acknowledge that performance measures are imperfect representations of the strategic 
construct and act as if the performance measures are the constructs of interest (surrogation). 
Surrogation is increased by incentive compensation. This effect is larger when compensation 
is based on a single measure of the strategic construct compared to when it is based on multiple 
measures of a strategic construct (Choi et al., 2012). Ding & Beaulieu (2011) show that 
participants who were induced to feel good (bad) gave higher (lower) evaluation scores to 
divisional managers both in a setting with only two performance measures and in a setting with 
a 16-measure BSC. Financial incentives eliminated the mood congruency bias in the two-
performance-measure- condition and in the condition with a simplified BSC with only eight 
measures, but not in the 16-measure-BSC-condition. Financial incentives thus can reduce the 
bias if the BSC is not too extensive (Ding & Beaulieu, 2011). 
The literature links judgment biases also to personal characteristics of the subordinate and/or 
the supervisor. Social and situational influences are important in the performance-rating 
process. Demographic similarity and the supervisor-subordinate relationship significantly 
influence supervisors’ affection for subordinates and influence performance rating indirectly 
through supervisors’ affection (Judge & Ferris, 1993; Wayne & Liden, 1995). Supervisors 
appraise the performance of subordinates whom they perceive as being dissimilar to themselves 
significantly lower (Pulakos & Wexley, 1983) e.g. after controlling for performance, racial 
differences between subordinate and supervisor lead to lower ratings for both black and white 
subordinates (Elvira & Town, 2001) and both male and female supervisors rate subordinates 
of the same sex higher (Varma & Stroh, 2001). Black subordinates get lower subjective 
performance ratings than whites (Elvira & Town, 2001). Biernat & Sesko (2013) investigates 
the evaluations of mixed-sex work teams’ performance after having performed a masculine 
task. A mixed-sex team consists of a white pair, a black pair or a mixed-race pair. Women’s 
competence was solely judged lower in a white pair work team. Black women were not affected 
by gender bias (Biernat & Sesko, 2013). 
Finally, this section discusses the literature on biases related to accompanying or 
competitive information about the subordinate’s performance, i.e. the outcome effect, the 
assimilation/spillover effect and the halo effect. The outcome effect captures that when an 
objective outcome measure is positive (negative), supervisors tend to evaluate the subordinate 
positively (negatively), regardless of the actual appropriateness of the decision resulting in that 
outcome. For instance, Ghosh & Lusch (2000) document how subjective performance 
evaluations of store managers were negatively influenced by unfavorable objective outcome 
knowledge. Similarly, Ittner et al. (2003) document how supervisors tend to focus on outcome-
oriented financial performance measures when evaluating subordinates. Taking outcomes into 
account that do not reflect subordinates’ performance will affect not only the quality of the 
subjective performance evaluation but will also incorrectly reward/penalize subordinates 
(Ghosh & Lusch, 2000). The assimilation or spillover effect is a bias very similar to the 
outcome effect. In this case, supervisors bias their subjective evaluations of performance on 
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one dimension to be consistent with an objective measure of performance on a separate and 
unrelated dimension (Bol & Smith, 2011). Likewise, Duarte et al. (1994) document that ratings 
are consistent with objective performance measures, however only with low-quality 
relationships in the short run. The halo effect relates to the observation that the supervisor’s 
prior expectations about a subordinate’s performance have an effect on later ratings of that 
performance. When a subordinate’s actual performance disappoints a supervisor’s expectations 
about that performance, subsequent ratings will be lower, regardless whether the actual 
performance is better or worse than expected. The more often supervisors must use objective 
measures like rating formats or strict procedures, the more likely ratings are to be accurate 
(Hogan, 1987). A supervisor’s general impression formed from prior interactions may impair 
the supervisor’s ability to objectively assess the subordinate’s current work (Tan & Jamal, 
2001). More specifically, Tan & Jamal (2001) show in an audit-context that average superiors 
evaluate work done by outstanding subordinates more favorably than work done by average 
subordinates when they know the identity of the work preparer, but not when the identity of 
the work preparer is unknown. Outstanding superiors are not affected by the perceived 
competence of the subordinate preparing the work. Dossett & Greenberg (1981) investigate 
how employees can steer this halo effect. They examine the effect of who sets the performance 
goal (self-set, participative or assigned) and performance outcome on employee’s performance 
evaluation. Their findings indicate that a worker who initially suggested a high goal received a 
significantly higher performance score than a worker who suggested a low goal, consistent 
with the halo effect. Besides, as raters have more opportunity to observe ratee behavior (i.e. 
higher familiarity between supervisor and subordinate), the magnitude of halo error increases 
(Jacobs & Kozlowski, 1985). Performance ratings are less accurate when rating is delayed 
(instead of immediate rating) and when only a small amount of information is observed 
(Heneman & Wexley, 1983). 
 
1.5 Perceived Fairness 
Whether a performance evaluation is perceived as ‘fair’ depends amongst others on 
influence activities (i.e. attempts of subordinates to influence the evaluation of the supervisor) 
(Du et al., 2012), favoritism (i.e. supervisors acting on personal preferences toward 
subordinates to favor some subordinates over others beyond their true performance) (Du et al., 
2012; Prendergast & Topel, 1996), procedural justice (i.e. the perceived fairness of the means 
and procedures used to determine the subjective performance evaluations) (Dulebohn & Ferris, 
1999; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992) and whether supervisors adjust their subjective performance 
evaluations when uncontrollable factors affect subordinates results (Bol & Smith, 2011; Ghosh 
& Lusch, 2000). Perceived fairness is of utmost importance in subjective performance 
evaluations. Table 1.4 summarizes the articles dealing with perceived fairness in subjective 
performance evaluations. The majority of these articles deal with influence activities, 
favoritism and procedural justice, while some also deal with controllability. 
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Table 1.4 Perceived fairness in subjective performance evaluations 
Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Influence activities, favoritism and procedural justice 
Burney, Henle & 
Widener (2009) 
The higher organizational justice, the higher 
employee performance.  
Survey (242 persons, in 47 
branches of a large American 
financial services organization 
Du, Tang & 
Young (2012) 
Both influence activities and government 
favoritism affect the evaluation positively. 
Archival study (63 state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), 2005-2007) 
and interviews (6 CFOs of SOEs) 
Dulebohn & 
Ferris (1999) 
Supervisor-focused influence tactics are associated 
with positive procedural justice evaluations, but 
job-focused influence tactics were associated with 
negative evaluations. 
Field study (128 subordinates and 
23 supervisors in a food service 
department) 
Hartmann & 
Slapnicar (2009) 
Subordinate’s trust in the superior depends on the 
formality of the performance evaluation procedure. 
Survey (160 departmental 
managers in 11 Slovenian 
commercial banks) 
Hartmann & 
Slapnicar (2012) 
The amount of subordinate’s voice in the 
performance evaluation process has a positive 
effect on justice perceptions. 
Survey (178 upper-middle 
managers in 12 Slovenian 
commercial banks) 
Hartmann, 
Naranjo-gil & 
Perego (2010) 
Initiating structure-leaders and consideration-
leaders both enhance evaluation fairness in their 
own way.  
Survey ( 196 middle-level 
managers in 11 Dutch 
organizations) 
McFarlin & 
Sweeney (1992) 
Procedural justice is an important predictor of 
organizational commitment. 
Survey (675 employees of an 
American bank) 
Prendergast & 
Topel (1996) 
Favoritism causes firms to use bureaucratic rules in 
pay decisions and firms place too little weight on 
supervisor appraisals. Favoritism reduces 
incentives because of increased risk in evaluations. 
Analytical model 
Prendergast 
(1993) 
Subordinates have an incentive to conform to what 
they feel their superiors want to hear.  
Analytical model 
Wayne & Liden 
(1995) 
Demographic similarity and subordinates’ 
impression management influence performance 
ratings. 
Survey (111 supervisor-
subordinate pairs in nonacademic 
jobs at 2 American universities)  
Woods (2012) Supervisors use downward adjustments to 
performance evaluations to encourage the 
departure of certain subordinates. 
Field study (272 observations and 
66 surveys in an internal audit 
organization in 2006) 
Controllability 
Bol & Smith 
(2011) 
Supervisors adjust their evaluations when an 
uncontrollable factor decreases the subordinate's 
objective measure, but they do not adjust the 
evaluations when the uncontrollable factor 
increases subordinate's objective measure. 
Experiment (216 non-academic 
supervising employees at a 
university) 
Ghosh & Lusch 
(2000) 
(Un)controllable outcomes (do not) influence 
performance evaluations, but central management 
determinants of outcome, which are uncontrollable 
, influence evaluations. 
Archival study in 204 stores of an 
American retailer 
Gibbs, Merchant, 
Van der Stede & 
Vargus (2004) 
Subjective bonuses are used to provide employees 
insurance against downside risk in their pay.  
Archival study (526 department 
managers in 250 American car 
dealerships in 1998-1999) and 
1050 surveys in 326 different 
dealerships 
Giraud, Langevin 
& Mendoza 
(2008) 
For uncontrollable factors external to the company, 
managers do not prefer the controllability 
principle, but for internal, uncontrollable factors, 
managers prefer the principle. 
Survey (265 French managers) 
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Article Focus/Results Research Set-up 
Govindarajan 
(1984) 
Superiors of BUs with higher environmental uncertainty 
will use a more subjective performance appraisal and 
superiors of BUs with lower environmental uncertainty 
will use a more formula-based performance evaluation. 
Interviews (managers of 
business units within 8 
Fortune 500 firms and 58 
surveys) 
Höppe & Moers 
(2011) 
Discretionary bonuses are used for risk-reduction 
purposes. 
Archival study (1,753 
firm-year-observations for 
424 American, publicly 
listed firms, 1998-2002) 
Wong-On-Wing, 
Guo, Li & Yang 
(2007) 
Top managers do not automatically take into account the 
quality of strategy (uncontrollable factor for divisional 
managers) in performance evaluation of divisional units 
using BSC. Divisional managers automatically consider 
the quality of strategy without being asked to do so.  
Experiment (68 MBA 
students) 
 
Subjectivity leads to favoritism when evaluators act on personal preferences toward 
subordinates to favor some employees over others beyond their true performance (Prendergast 
& Topel, 1996). When other employees discover the favoritism, it leads to a decrease in 
procedural justice, and associated with that, it results in a decrease in employees’ motivation 
and organizational commitment (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Prendergast & Topel, 1996). 
Woods (2012) even provides evidence of how supervisors appear to use downward 
performance adjustments in order to encourage the departure of certain subordinates. As such, 
subordinates have an incentive to conform to what they feel their superiors want to hear 
(Prendergast, 1993). In order to constrain favoritism and to induce subordinates to report 
information honestly, analytic results show that firms will deemphasize incentive pay for 
subordinates, increase the use of bureaucratic rules in pay decision and place too little weight 
on supervisor appraisals, giving too much weight to noncorruptible, objective measures such 
as seniority (Prendergast, 1993; Prendergast & Topel, 1996). Employees’ perceptions of justice 
in an organizational context increase with the degree to which employees think that the 
strategic performance measurement system (SPMS) reflects a strategic causal model, the 
degree to which the SPMS is technically valid9  (Burney et al., 2009) and the amount of 
subordinate’s voice in the performance evaluation process (Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2012). 
Subordinate’s trust in the superior depends on the formality of the performance evaluation 
procedure (i.e. procedural justice, represented by explicit targets, clear metrics and clear bonus 
allocation rules) as well. This is because formality increases the perceived quality of feedback 
and perceptions of procedural justice. Formality matters more for trust formation to those 
managers that are in functions with less contractible outputs (Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2009). 
Supervisors that score high on consideration leadership style, i.e. supervisors concerned with 
the promotion of subordinates’ well-being through supportive and pleasant relationships, 
significantly affect procedural fairness directly. Supervisors high on initiating structure 
leadership style, i.e. supervisors clearly indicating the roles of their subordinates toward the 
attainment of organizational goals, by in detail deciding what will be done and how it should 
                                                     
9  A technically valid SPMS provides employees with performance measures information that is accurate, 
accessible, understandable, reliable and timely. Employees have access to the performance measures information, 
understand what it means and how to use it in carrying out their job. If this information is used to define 
employee’s incentive compensation, employees will likely think that their evaluations accurately reflect their 
effort and their expectations (Burney et al., 2009). 
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be done, are effective in enhancing fairness towards their subordinates by clearly 
communicating expectations and setting objective standards in performance evaluation 
procedures (Hartman et al., 2010). Burney et al. (2009) show that firms do not necessarily need 
to introduce subjectivity into the incentive contracts to improve performance. If firms clearly 
communicate the characteristics of the SPMS incentive plan such that employees perceive this 
plan has a high degree of technical validity and it highly reflects the organization’s strategic 
causal model, this will enhance employees’ perceptions of justice in an organizational context, 
which will in turn affect employees’ performance positively as well (Burney et al., 2009). 
Evidence in the context of a Chinese government agency evaluating the performance of 
different state-owned enterprises reveals that both influence activities and favoritism affect 
performance evaluation positively (Du et al., 2012). Wayne & Liden (1995) develop and test a 
theoretical model to understand the effect of subordinate impression management 10  (i.e. 
influence activities) on supervisor performance ratings. They find that demographic similarity 
and subordinates’ impression management influence performance ratings through supervisors’ 
liking of and perceived similarity to subordinates (Wayne & Liden, 1995). Dulebohn & Ferris 
(1999) investigate the impact of employees’ use of influence tactics on their evaluations of the 
fairness of the performance evaluation process. They distinguish between two categories of 
influence tactics: supervisor-focused tactics, tactics used by employees to be better liked by 
their supervisors such as flattery and doing favors, and job-focused tactics, tactics used to self-
promote and appear competent. Supervisor-focused influence tactics are associated with 
positive employee evaluations of procedural justice, but job-focused influence tactics were 
associated with negative employee evaluations of procedural justice. 
The literature on optimal contracting (see section 2) revealed that fairness considerations of 
supervisors lead to optimal contracts whereby supervisor’s subjective performance evaluations 
are compressed and above average (compression bias and leniency bias) (MacLeod, 2003; 
Golman & Bhatia, 2012). Bol (2011) empirically investigates the effect of leniency bias on 
future performance in a financial service provider. She shows that leniency bias increases 
future performance. This is explained by the fact that subordinates overestimate their abilities 
relative to their supervisors. As such, leniency bias results in an increase in congruence between 
the rating the employee thinks to deserve and the rating the subordinate actually receives. 
Lenient ratings are more in line with the expectations of self-over-estimating employees and 
consequently improve perceived fairness of the incentive system and, in turn, employee 
motivation (Bol, 2011). Moreover, empirical research in a retailer (Ghosh & Lusch, 2000), 
publicly-listed companies (Höppe & Moers, 2011) and car dealerships (Gibbs et al., 2004) 
indicates that supervisors take factors uncontrollable to the subordinate but affecting 
subordinate’s performance into account when evaluating subordinate’s performance (Ghosh & 
Lusch, 2000; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Gibbs et al., 2004). Research in eight Fortune 500 firms 
reveals that superiors of business units which face higher environmental uncertainty will use a 
more subjective performance appraisal approach and superiors of business units which face 
                                                     
10 Impression management are those behaviors individuals employ to protect their self-images, influence the way 
they are perceived by significant others, or both. The individuals try to look more appealing/favorable to their 
superior or to peers. This can be accomplished with smiling, eye contact, touching, verbally agreeing, flattery, 
favor-doing, opinion conformity with the superior or the peer etc. (Wayne & Liden, 1995). 
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lower environmental uncertainty will use a more formula-based performance evaluation 
approach (Govindarajan, 1984). In the experimental setting of Bol & Smith (2011), supervisors 
adjust their subjective performance evaluations when an uncontrollable factor decreases the 
subordinate’s unrelated, objective measure (i.e. they compensate for bad luck), but they do not 
adjust the evaluations when the uncontrollable factor increases subordinate’s objective measure 
(i.e. they do not punish for good luck). This is consistent with fairness considerations (Bol & 
Smith, 2011). Supervisors provide employees insurance against downside risk in their pay 
(filtering out uncontrollable factors due to interdependencies, recalculating incentives when 
performance targets are too challenging or when department is facing losses) (Gibbs et al., 
2004). In their field study, Ghosh & Lusch (2000) document how outcome determinants over 
which subordinates have control influence their subjective performance evaluations and 
environmental determinants of outcome over which they have no control do not influence their 
evaluations. However, inconsistent with the reasoning above, Ghosh & Lusch (2000) find that 
determinants of outcome decided by central management also influence subordinate’s 
performance evaluations, although they have no influence over those determinants. Wong-On-
Wing et al. (2007) find a similar result: they find that supervisors do not take into account the 
quality of strategy, an uncontrollable factor for their subordinates, when evaluating the 
subordinates unless they are explicitly required to do so. In contrast, subordinates automatically 
consider the effect of the quality of strategy on their performance without being prompted to 
do so. When the uncontrollable factors are internal (interdependencies due to decisions made 
by colleagues or superiors), managers prefer that their supervisors take these uncontrollable 
factors into account. Yet, at the same time, when the uncontrollable factors are external to the 
company, managers do not want their supervisors to adjust for these uncontrollable factors. 
They fear that the procedure to neutralize the effect of the uncontrollable factors may result in 
subjectivity in an unfair way (Giraud et al., 2008). 
 
1.6 Avenues for Future Research 
Based on our literature review, we can identify several avenues for future research. The 
structure of this section follows the structure of this paper. We start with possible extensions 
related to optimal contracting. Afterwards we discuss avenues for future research dealing with 
discretionary bonus pools and we end with sections discussing research opportunities related 
to ‘biases and debiasing’ and ‘perceived fairness’ respectively. 
The current state of the literature indicates a number of research opportunities in optimal 
contracting with subjective performance evaluations. First, older studies such as Gibbs et al. 
(2004) or Govindarajan (1984) discuss subjectivity in a very general way. These studies just 
state ‘the use of subjectivity’ in a broad, general sense without distinguishing between the 
different forms of subjectivity such as subjective weightings of objective performance 
measures, the use of subjective performance measures, a subjective performance evaluation by 
the supervisor or the possibility to take into account non-prespecified factors in the 
performance evaluation ex post. This research area would benefit from acknowledging that 
many different types of subjectivity exist. Researchers can extend the classification of different 
types of subjectivity and investigate the use of more specific types of subjectivity to broaden 
our understanding of the use, costs, benefits and consequences of different types of subjectivity 
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(Bol, 2008; Du et al., 2012; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003; Ke et al., 1999; Woods, 
2012). Second, subjectivity does not occur in isolation; firms make use of both objective and 
subjective performance measures. Nonetheless, many studies do not take the total incentive 
contract into account when examining subjectivity. The relationships among the various 
compensation package elements and the specific situations, in which the reward packages are 
used, could be investigated (Gibbs et al., 2004). For example, future research could examine 
whether subjective and objective performance measurement act as complements or substitutes 
(Bol, 2008). How does rating behavior or the optimal contract of the supervisor differ when 
both objective and subjective performance measures are used? Research, thus far, has not been 
able to answer these questions. Third, all agency theoretical models described earlier in this 
paper are quite simplistic. They can be adapted such that they describe a more realistic setting. 
E.g., MacLeod (2003) deals with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent and Budde 
(2007) only investigates the case with a risk neutral principal and agent. The models of 
MacLeod (2003) and Budde (2007) would be improved if the principal could be risk-averse as 
well or when principals and agents could transfer risk from one to the other by making use of 
their private information (MacLeod, 2003). Also, these models could be extended to the case 
with multiple subjective evaluators (Baker et al., 1994). Finally, the agency literature has 
focused extensively on the determinants of optimal weights from the supervisor perspective, 
but has paid little attention to the implications of those optimal weights on subordinate 
motivation (Ahn et al., 2010). 
Future research can also build on the literature on discretionary bonus pools. According to 
agency theory, a principal/supervisor designs a contract that maximizes firm value. However, 
most firms are multi-layered and the principal/supervisor designing the contract is not the 
residual claimant. As such, he has little incentive to aim for the optimal, value-maximizing 
contract. Instead, to some extent personal preferences will introduce subjectivity in the contract 
design phase (Baker et al., 1988; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). In addition, the discretionary 
bonus pool optimal contracting literature assumes that the principal agrees ex-ante to optimally 
allocating the bonus pool and ex post he has no incentive to do otherwise. However, in real-
life the principal might not make the optimal bonus pool allocation due to favoritism, influence 
activities, collusion among agents or sabotage of the performance of one agent by another 
agent, which distorts the performance information of that other agent (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; 
Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006, 2009). Future research could explore the conditions under which 
these implementation problems arise. For example, future research could investigate what 
effect the supervisor, being the residual claimant or not, has on the structure of the optimal 
contract. 
In general, researchers could further examine how incentive structures of both principal and 
agent affect research outcomes (Maas et al., 2012). Research focusing on the circumstances 
under which we would expect to find positive and negative consequences of performance 
measurement systems on managerial performance would be beneficial (Franco-Santos et al., 
2012). Researchers could also investigate employees’ responses (i.e., effort and ⁄ or 
performance) to managers’ use of allocation discretion. Employees may be proactive in 
providing favorable noncontractible information to their superiors, and such behavior may vary 
across different levels of discretion and ⁄ or given their perceptions of managers’ allocation 
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processes (Bailey et al., 2011). Additionally, present research focuses on the performance of 
discretionary bonus pools in a single period. These studies can be extended to a setting with 
repeated interaction over multiple periods (Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). In this context 
supervisors’ reputation of trustworthiness might become relevant. Next, we discuss future 
research opportunities related to the ‘biasing & debiasing’ stream. In general, there is a need 
for further research into the role of social and contextual factors in the performance evaluation 
process (Duarte et al., 1994; Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999; Franco-Santos et al., 2012). The 
question whether superiors’ evaluative behavior could be explained in terms of the context 
remains unanswered (Hartman et al., 2010). Judge & Ferris (1993) consider the effects of 
several key aspects of social contexts, such as supervisor-subordinate demographic similarity, 
supervisor-subordinate work relationship, supervisor’s span of control, supervisor’s 
experience, supervisor’s affection for the subordinate and supervisor’s opportunity to observe 
subordinate’s job performance, on the performance-ratings process. Future research could 
expand the variables studied and provide a deeper assessment of the causal relationships among 
those variables, and thus a more informed understanding of the performance-rating process 
(Judge & Ferris, 1993). Especially research integrating a full range of social context variables 
with the cognitive processes of supervisors in observing, storing, and recalling data about 
subordinates is lacking. How do situational variables such as organizational level, work group 
size, technology and task interdependence influence the processing of information (Wayne & 
Liden, 1995)? Future research could also take a look at how different levels of the time delay 
of the rating and/or of the amount of information provided, affect performance rating accuracy 
(Heneman & Wexley, 1983). Research could investigate whether a particular bias is influenced 
by person-specific characteristics (Kane et al., 1995; Moers, 2005; Maas et al., 2012; Pulakos 
& Wexley, 1983) or social context factors (Duarte et al., 1994; Wayne & Liden, 1995), or both. 
Both internal factors like cognitive consistency, ego enhancement, commitment, and external 
ones like organization systems, rewards, and social pressures may explain judgment biases 
(Hogan, 1987). Given equal circumstances, differences in the tendency to rate could reflect 
personality or information-processing differences among supervisors. Additional research may 
reveal that personality factors such as neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness are potential predictors of some rating bias (Kane et al., 1995). In addition, 
researchers should more closely examine how supervisors’ affection for a subordinate, dyadic 
quality, expectations and history of working together influence the performance appraisal 
process (Bol & Smith, 2011; Duarte et al., 1994; Hogan, 1987; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Maas et 
al., 2012). Although several authors have stressed the need to examine gender as an important 
attribute of social context, only a few field studies have modeled and tested the effects of gender 
and race composition and supervisor-subordinate similarity on dyadic quality and performance 
appraisal (Duarte et al., 1994; Elvira & Town, 2001; Varma & Stroh, 2001). Additional work 
is needed to more fully understand how being a member of a social category produces 
differential performance evaluation outcomes (Biernat & Sesko, 2013). Minorities are more 
likely to have supervisors of a different race. So, if differences exist in the performance-
evaluation process, ratings may disproportionately disadvantage minority employee outcomes 
(Elvira & Town, 2001). Until now, little attention has been paid to how a judgment bias can be 
controlled or reduced as well (Kane et al., 1995; Wong-On-Wing, et al., 2007). The following 
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debiasing suggestions are left for future research. One might examine whether an education in 
debiasing strategies during training programs for supervisors reduces judgment biases. Such 
an education would make the supervisors alert for this potential problem in their evaluations 
of subordinates and may help to overcome, at least to some extent, their biased judgments 
(Ghosh & Lusch, 2000; Tan & Jamal, 2001; Tayler, 2010). Also the subjective performance 
measurement literature in the context of the BSC might be extended. Future research might 
focus on judgment biases when evaluating based on the BSC: how can employees gain a better 
appreciation for the measures if they are involved in the selection of those measures and the 
design of the units’ scorecard. This might increase the reliance on all BSC measures, including 
the unique measures and as such the common measure bias might reduce (Lipe & Salterio, 
2000; Libby et al., 2004). Future research could also investigate how different presentation 
formats and features, such as graphs or traffic lights, facilitate the processing of performance 
information (Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010). Researchers could examine whether the 
effects of framing the scorecard as a causal chain are stronger when managers are provided 
with additional causal-chain-related data (e.g., correlations), or when managers are given 
additional training on using the causal chain (Tayler, 2010). In addition, if supervisors have to 
justify their evaluation judgments, this accountability could potentially moderate judgment 
biases (Bol & Smith, 2011). Another fruitful avenue is to look at the consequences of biased 
performance ratings on subordinate performance (Bol, 2011; Varma & Stroh, 2001). Future 
empirical research could, for example, examine whether supervisors rate leniently because they 
expect that leniency bias positively affects subordinate performance or whether they do so to 
avoid rating costs (Bol, 2011). Studies that focus on common measure bias can explore whether 
unique non-financial measures are more easily ignored than unique financial measures in a 
BSC- format. Evaluators surely tend to focus more strongly on financial measures when 
measures are organized in a BSC-format (Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010). If managers 
tend to ignore non-financial, unique measures in a BSC-format, these performance measures 
should not be included in the BSC-framework. As subjective performance measures are often 
non- financial and unique, companies including these subjective performance measures in the 
BSC may falsely assume managers take those subjective measures into account. 
Finally, we discuss future research opportunities related to perceived fairness. Also in this 
research area there is a need for further research into the role of social, contextual and person-
specific factors (Duarte et al., 1994; Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999; Franco-Santos et al., 2012). 
Researchers should determine which personal and organizational factors impact procedural 
justice and how procedural justice, in turn, affects organizational outcomes (McFarlin & 
Sweeney, 1992). Researchers could analyze the effect of different combinations of 
performance evaluation system design and use on trust and justice perceptions (Hartmann & 
Slapnicar, 2009, 2012). Does a superior’s reputation of trustworthiness have an impact on 
employee performance in a subjective performance evaluation setting and does this impact 
differ depending on the specific subjective performance evaluation system design? Or 
researchers could explore controllability in more detail. Do evaluators respond differently 
depending on the type of uncontrollable factor (external or internal factor, economic or 
competitive factor, natural catastrophe, …) (Giraud et al., 2008)? Do subordinates in a 
subjective performance evaluation setting respond differently to uncontrollable factors if their 
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superior has a reputation of trustworthiness? Furthermore, future research is needed to define 
which factors cause favorable or unfavorable supervisor reactions towards influence activities 
(Wayne & Liden, 1995). Future research could also examine the effects of employees’ use of 
influence tactics on their justice evaluations of the performance evaluation system (Dulebohn 
& Ferris, 1999). 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
In this article we review academic research on subjective performance measurement in high-
impact journals. The final selection consists of 67 articles published in 20 high-impact journals 
during the period 1977 to 2013. We classified this final selection of 67 articles in four research 
streams: ‘optimal contracting’, ‘discretionary bonus pools’, ‘judgment biases and debiasing’, 
and ‘perceived fairness’ and discussed each stream in detail. In the section on optimal 
contracting benefits and costs related to subjectivity in performance contracts are discussed. 
Subjectivity can tackle perceived weaknesses in quantitative formulaic bonuses such as 
incompleteness, short-term focus, susceptibility to manipulation, incentive distortions 
(congruity issues), risk concerns, environmental uncertainty, uncontrollable factors, moral 
hazard, asymmetric information or agents “gaming” or manipulating the performance 
evaluation system. However, subjectivity in performance contracts may cause conflicts and 
disputes between subordinate and supervisor and judgment biases and evaluation uncertainty 
may harm employee motivation and productivity. The section on discretionary bonus pools 
makes clear that this specific type of bonus pools (the magnitude of the bonus pool is based on 
an explicit formula agreed-upon ex ante and the allocation of the bonus amongst the 
subordinates is based on supervisor’s discretion) can face many of the downsides related to 
subjectivity in performance contracts, while incorporating the benefits related to subjectivity. 
The section on judgment biases and debiasing discusses that the introduction of subjectivity in 
performance measurement introduces different judgment biases by supervisors such as 
compression bias, centrality bias, biases related to the balanced scorecard, biases related to 
personal characteristics or biases related to accompanying or competitive information. These 
judgment biases have an effect on subordinate performance and the perceived fairness of the 
subjective performance evaluation. The section on perceived fairness shows that perceived 
fairness is of utmost importance in subjective performance evaluation and that influence 
activities, favoritism, procedural justice and the (non)-existence of adjustments for 
uncontrollable factors affect perceived fairness. This article ends with a section on avenues for 
future research, in which we discuss that more research is needed to uncover the use, benefits 
and costs related to specific types of subjectivity. Furthermore, we stress that subjectivity 
should not be studied in isolation, but rather as a part of the whole performance measurement 
system taking into account the interaction between objective and subjective parts of a 
compensation contract. Also more research on the role of social, contextual and person-specific 
factors in the performance evaluation process is needed. 
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Chapter 2 
The role of managerial discretion and  
manager-employee compensation inequality 
in manager-employee dyads 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines managers’ allocation of a bonus to their employees, in terms of their 
discretion to freely decide on the bonus size and manager-employee compensation inequality 
in manager-employee dyads. We conduct a 2*2 between-subjects experiment, a multi-period 
modification of the investment game of Berg et al. (1995) in which we manipulate discretion 
(low, high) and inequality (low, high). We test and find support for a causal model, in which 
managerial discretion is negatively associated with the proportion of the bonus pool that a 
manager allocates to her employee (directly). Furthermore, managerial discretion also 
indirectly affects the proportion of the bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee, as 
it is negatively associated with employee effort and employee effort, in turn, is positively 
related to the proportion of the bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee. 
Additionally, our results suggest that the way in which managers decide is asymmetric due to 
the presence of manager-employee compensation inequality. Specifically, when compensation 
inequality is high, managers with high managerial discretion tend to be concerned for fairness, 
whereas those with low managerial discretion are led by long-term self-interest. This focus on 
fairness (long-term self-interest) is positively (negatively) associated with the proportion of the 
bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee. 
 
Keywords: bonus allocations, managerial discretion, compensation inequality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate how a manager (as evaluator and residual claimant) and an 
employee (being evaluated) experience subjective bonus allocations in manager-employee 
dyads in environments in which managers have different levels of discretion in determining 
employee bonus size, and manager-employee inequality varies. 11,12 ,13  Employee contracts 
often entail managerial discretion (Choi et al., 2016; Maas et al., 2012; Murphy & Oyer, 2003). 
                                                     
11 Subjective bonus allocation concerns the common practice in organizations that a manager evaluates and 
rewards the performance of an employee subjectively (Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). The correctness of a 
subjective evaluation cannot be verified by a third party, because it entails subjective judgment (Bol, 2008; Bol 
& Smith, 2011). Therefore it differs from formula-based bonus allocations.  
12 In this paper we will refer to the manager as female, and to the employee as male in order to improve readability 
of the paper. 
13 The term ‘manager-employee compensation inequality’ is a synonym for the term ‘vertical pay dispersion’ 
(Guo et al., 2017).  
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Discretion allows managers to exploit additional, private performance information that is not 
easily contractible, controllable or foreseeable (Ahn et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2011; Baiman & 
Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011; Choi et al., 2016; Gibbs et al., 
2004; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). It therefore complements objective, formula-based 
performance evaluation systems (Baker et al., 1994). It reduces dysfunctional incentives, such 
as employees gaming the evaluation system (Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008), and risk for 
employees (Bol & Smith, 2011; Gibbs et al., 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011), which consequently 
leads to better employee incentives (Gibbs et al., 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011). However, 
employees’ trust in the manager is essential in order to incentivize employee effort (Christ et 
al., 2012; Gibbs et al., 2004). Managers sometimes act opportunistically by underestimating 
employee performance in order to pay less reward to the employee or by paying less than the 
promised reward (Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Christ et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2005). This 
potential manager opportunism causes employees to exert less effort because they fear their 
effort will not be rewarded (Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016; Fisher et al., 2005). In order to protect 
employees against manager opportunism, firms can commit themselves allocating a fixed 
bonus pool determined by contractible, objective performance measures (Baiman & Rajan, 
1995; Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016; Fisher et al., 2005). Employee effort and employee bonuses are 
greater if managerial discretion over the size of the total employee compensation pool is 
restricted (Fisher et al., 2005). However, at the same time employee effort and employee 
bonuses are greater if managerial discretion over the allocation of the total employee 
compensation pool amongst the employees is unrestricted as it reduces employee freeriding 
(employee opportunism) (Fisher et al., 2005). In this paper we focus on managerial discretion 
over the size of employees’ bonus. 
Additionally, compensation inequality is an important phenomenon to take into account 
when investigating subjective performance evaluation. Excessive executive remunerations 
during the financial crisis, for instance, have provoked a public and political debate on relative 
pay, social justice and compensation inequality (Bloomberg, 2013, 2014; Reuters, 2013, 2014; 
The Economist, 2009). In Sweden, The Netherlands and the US, there was a public call for 
more transparency on the disclosure of compensation inequality e.g. the Dodd-Frank act of 
2010 (Bloomberg, 2013; Guo et al., 2017; OECD, 2011b). Guo et al. (2017) show in a 
budgeting setting that managers are inequity-averse, and therefore more lenient towards 
employees in a context of manager-employee compensation inequality. It is therefore relevant 
to investigate how compensation inequality affects subjective bonus allocations and whether 
managers respond leniently towards their employees in a bonus allocation setting as well. 
In this study, we argue that managerial discretion over employee bonus size can have 
beneficial effects in situations with high levels of compensation inequality between the 
manager and the employee under evaluation, which may amongst others explain why this 
practice is dominant in organizations. More specifically, we argue that in the presence of 
compensation inequality, formally limiting managerial discretion reduces the extent to which 
a manager is concerned for fairness. The reason is that the limited managerial discretion 
provides the manager with a legitimate excuse to act within the boundaries of these limitations, 
and therefore makes it more justifiable to behave in a long-term self-interested way, thereby 
caring less for fairness or inequity-aversion (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999). We thereby 
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contribute to the literature on subjective performance evaluation indicating how social 
preferences influence managers’ use of discretion in bonus allocations (Abernethy et al., 2013; 
Maas et al., 2012). We also contribute to the literature by further examining the effects of 
managerial discretion on manager opportunism and employee effort (Fisher et al., 2005). 
In our experiment, 140 students interact in pairs of two in a multi-period investment game 
(Berg et al., 1995). They assume the role of a manager or an employee. The employee exerts 
effort for the manager by investing experimental units, which determines the size of a bonus 
pool. Afterwards the manager can divide the bonus pool between the employee and herself. 
The experiment employs a 2*2 between-subjects design. We manipulate the managerial 
discretion in determining employee bonus size (Managerial Discretion; low, high) and 
manager-employee compensation inequality (Compensation Inequality; low, high). We define 
Employee Effort as the average number of experimental units invested by the employee in the 
investment game, Manager Bonus Allocation as the proportion of the bonus given to the 
employee and Manager Fairness as the extent to which the manager considers a fair bonus 
allocation. Our experimental results support our hypotheses. Managerial Discretion is 
negatively associated with Employee Effort and positively associated with manager 
opportunism (expressed as the proportion of the bonus kept by the manager). In the high 
discretion conditions (where employees are not protected against manager opportunistic 
behavior), employees exert less effort than in the low discretion conditions (under which the 
employees are protected against manager opportunistic behavior to some extent), which is in 
line with Fisher et al. (2005). Furthermore, Employee Effort is positively associated with the 
proportion of the bonus given to the employee, as expected along reciprocity theory or  
tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod, 1981; Cox, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr et al., 1997; 
Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 2004; Kreps et al., 1982; Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002; Ockenfels, 2015; Rabin, 1993). Lastly, in case of high manager-employee compensation 
inequality, managers with high managerial discretion are more concerned about fairness than 
managers with low managerial discretion. Next, managers that consider fairness allocate a 
bigger proportion of the bonus to their employee. These finding are important as they show 
that providing a manager with high managerial discretion over employee bonus size can be 
worthwhile in case of high fixed manager-employee compensation inequality. In this context, 
it induces managers to care more about fairness and to consequently reward their employees 
more generously.  
The next section presents the relevant literature and the development of the hypotheses. 
Section III explains the experimental design and section IV presents the results. In section V 
we provide the discussion and conclusion. 
 
2.2 Literature & Hypotheses 
 
Compensation Inequality 
People frequently have a reasonable good idea about relative compensation inequality 
between different parties (Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013). Recent public outrage over 
compensation packages of executives (Bloomberg, 2013, 2014; Reuters, 2013, 2014; The 
Economist, 2009) and academic research (Anderson et al., 2006; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; 
 38 
 
Greiner et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2017; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; 
Smith, 2011) suggest that manager-employee compensation inequality may affect employee 
effort and the relationship between manager and employee. Excessive executive remunerations 
have initiated a public and political debate on relative pay and compensation inequality. In a 
response to the fury of their inhabitants, governments installed regulation and corporate 
governance policies limiting compensation inequality. In Sweden and the Netherlands the code 
of good governance dictates that managers should consider the wage gap between themselves 
and blue-collar workers. Those countries advise to state executive salaries in terms of a multiple 
of industrial worker salaries (OECD, 2011b). The American counterpart, the Dodd-Frank 
provision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, forces American public companies to 
disclose their CEOs’ total compensation as a multiple of median total worker pay (Bloomberg, 
2013; Guo et al., 2017). Recent initiatives even go beyond simply stating the difference 
between CEO and average employee compensation. The Swiss could recently vote in a 
referendum to limit executive pay to maximum 12 times the wage of the least paid employee 
in the company. Although the referendum was not adopted, legislators clearly think about 
formally limiting income inequality (BBC, 2013; The Guardian, 2013; The US News, 2013). 
Given the outlined tendencies, more governmental interventions related to compensation 
inequality are expected (Daily mail, 2013; OECD, 2011a; Harvard Business Review, 2009).  
Academic research addresses compensation inequality as well. According to inequity 
aversion theory or equity theory, people dislike unfair distribution of wealth relative to the 
effort each party exerts, the task each party performs or the responsibility each party takes 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Festinger, 1954; Hargreaves Heap et al., 
2013; Itoh, 2004; Smith, 2011). Rewards should be allocated proportionally to different parties’ 
inputs or work contributions (Adams, 1963, 1965) and people should not perceive any 
difference between their rewards-to-input ratio and the rewards-to-input ratio of any relevant 
other (Adams, 1963, 1965; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Walster et al., 1973).14 An inequity-averse 
party feels guilty when his relative payoff is above others’ relative payoffs, while that party 
feels envious when his relative payoff is below that of the others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Itoh, 
2004; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Manager-employee compensation inequality (relative to the 
task each party performs15) may create a social distance (Greiner et al., 2012) and may make 
an employee envious, which reduces his willingness to exert effort (Dur & Glazer, 2008; 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011). However, at the same time a manager feels guilty when her payoff 
is overly large compared to the payoff of her employee and thus with high manager-employee 
compensation inequality managers are motivated to offer a larger reward to the employee in 
order to reduce the inequity. Employees might anticipate this inequity averse behavior of the 
manager and will exert extra effort in order to optimally benefit from the inequity aversion of 
their manager (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Smith, 2011). Therefore 
                                                     
14 Equitable reward allocations therefore differ from equal reward allocations, in which the allocated rewards to 
each employee are the same or similar, irrespective of employees’ input or work contributions (Reis & Gruzen, 
1976). 
15 In experimental research, participants have been randomly assigned to their roles, they perform similar tasks 
and they have the same work history or responsibilities. So as these experiments control for the justified reasons 
for fixed compensation inequality, the presence of a fixed compensation inequality may create a feeling of inequity 
with the employee (Greiner et al., 2012). 
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academic findings are mixed: some papers on compensation inequality find a negative effect 
of compensation inequality on trust or employee effort (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), others find 
no effect (Anderson et al., 2006; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Greiner et al., 2012) and still others 
find a positive effect (Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Smith, 2011). In the typical accounting 
setting of a budgeting process, Guo et al. (2017) show that managers act indeed more leniently 
towards employees because of inequity-aversion resulting from manager-employee 
compensation inequality. Furthermore, employees are more motivated to misreport costs 
because of compensation inequality. 
 
Managerial Discretion 
Firms often allow for managerial discretion in determining employee bonuses (Choi et al., 
2016; Maas et al., 2012; Murphy & Oyer, 2003; WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting, 2012). 
A recent survey indicates that managerial discretion is present in the bonus program of a 
majority of organizations (WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting, 2012). There are benefits as 
well as costs related to managerial discretion in the performance evaluation (Bailey et al., 2011; 
Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016).16 Discretion allows managers to use additional, private information 
that is not easily contractible or quantified in order to adequately incentivize employees (Ahn 
et al., 2010; Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Gibbs et al., 2004). It allows 
to incorporate unforeseeable and uncontrollable events that affect employee performance (Bol 
& Smith, 2011) and it can be used to reward value-enhancing actions that are not easily 
quantified or measured (Gibbs et al., 2004). With objective performance measures, employees 
might overly focus on the objectively measured performance dimensions ignoring other, 
unmeasured performance dimensions or long-term goals (Baker et al., 1994; Gibbs et al., 2004; 
Ittner et al., 2003). Discretion can protect employees from (downside) risk in their 
compensation (Bol & Smith, 2011; Gibbs et al., 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Woods, 2012). 
However, there are downsides to managerial discretion as well. It might introduce favoritism 
and bias in the performance evaluation (Bol, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003; Lipe & Slaterio, 2000; 
Moers, 2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). Therefore in order to incentivize employee effort it 
is important that employees trust their managers (Christ et al., 2012; Gibbs et al., 2004), 
knowing that they might act opportunistically. They can underestimate employee performance 
in order to pay less reward to the employee or they can be unwilling to pay a promised reward 
(Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Christ et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2005). Employees exert less 
effort if they fear their effort will not be rewarded (Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016; Fisher et al., 2005). 
Managers’ reputational concerns can alleviate manager opportunism (Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 
2008; Fisher et al., 2005; Kreps et al., 1982; Moers, 2005). Furthermore, firms can limit 
managerial discretion over the size of the bonus pool in order to protect the employee against 
manager opportunism as well (Fisher et al., 2005). Firms often commit themselves to a fixed 
bonus pool determined by contractible, objective performance measures (Baiman & Rajan, 
1995; Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016; Fisher et al., 2005; Maas et al., 2012; Moers, 2005). Bonus 
pools that do not allow for managerial discretion over the size of the bonus pool result in more 
                                                     
16 We refer to Bol (2008) and Ewing (2016) for a more extensive discussion of the benefits and costs related to 
managerial discretion. 
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employee effort and employee bonuses than bonus pools that have complete discretion over 
the size of the bonus pool (Fisher et al., 2005). However, the allocation of the bonus pool across 
employees is often left at managers’ discretion in order to reduce employee opportunism and 
in order to allow the manager to use her private, non-contractible performance information 
(Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Bol, 2008; Ewing, 2016; Fisher et al., 2005; Maas et al., 2012; Moers, 
2005). Bonus pools that allow managers discretion over the allocation of the bonus pool 
amongst different employees result in more employee effort and employee bonuses (Fisher et 
al., 2005).  
 
Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality: Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
The theoretical model of our study is presented in Figure 2.1. In the context of bonus 
allocations attached to performance evaluation in manager-employee dyads, this model 
predicts that the managers’ bonus allocation decision is determined jointly by the managers’ 
discretion in determining employee bonus size (hypothesis 1), by employee effort (hypothesis 
3) and by managers’ concerns for fairness (hypothesis 5). 
 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model 
 
 
________________ 
a Managerial Discretion equals 0 in the low managerial discretion conditions, and 1 in the high discretion 
conditions.  
b Compensation Inequality equals 0 in the low compensation inequality conditions, and 1 in the high compensation 
inequality conditions. 
c Employee Effort refers to the average number of experimental units of the 100 units endowment the employee 
invested in the investment project over the 12 periods.  
d Manager Fairness refers to the extent to which a manager is concerned about a fair bonus allocation. Using a 
seven-point Likert scale, managers rated how important it is for them to be fair. 
e Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the average proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager 
to the employee over the number of periods in which there was a bonus pool. If an employee did not invest any 
experimental units in a particular period, there was no bonus pool and the manager could not allocate any 
experimental units back to the employee from the bonus pool in that particular period, which happened for 20 
manager-employee pairs. We exclude those particular periods as in Smith (2011), because the manager had no 
choice regarding the amount she offered as a reward to the employee in that particular period. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
More specifically, we argue that managers who have limited managerial discretion in 
determining employee bonus size will offer higher bonus allocations to their employees 
because the management control system prevents them from acting opportunistically 
(hypothesis 1). Next, when managers have limited managerial discretion in determining 
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employee bonus size, these employees will exert more effort because they fear managers’ 
opportunistic behavior to a lesser extent (hypothesis 2). Their managers will reciprocate their 
higher effort with higher bonus allocations (hypothesis 3). Additionally, a manager who has 
limited managerial discretion adopts a relatively narrow interpretation of the management 
control system and is more motivated in her decision-making by long-term self-interest instead 
of fairness when compensation inequality is high (hypothesis 4), which in turn leads to lower 
bonus allocations (hypothesis 5). The following paragraphs provide the development of these 
hypotheses. 
 
Managerial Discretion, Manager Bonus Allocation and Employee Effort 
Hypothesis 1 in our model captures the effect of managers’ discretion in determining 
employee bonus size (low vs. high) on the proportion of the bonus pool that a manager allocates 
to her employee and hypothesis 2 captures the effect of managers’ discretion in determining 
employee bonus size (low vs. high) on employee effort. Managerial discretion falls onto a 
continuum depending on how vulnerable employees are to the managers’ decisions (Ewing, 
2016). Even in the absence of formal control systems (such as in the situation of high 
discretion), managers and employees may cooperate (Abernethy et al., 2013; Baiman & Rajan, 
1995; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Bull, 1987; Fisher et al., 2005; Kreps et al., 1982; MacLeod, 
2003). Research on investment games shows that individuals are willing to trust other 
individuals will not follow long-term self-interest, although there are no control systems 
preventing individuals from acting opportunistically (Anderson et al., 2006; Berg et al. 1995; 
Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Ciriolo, 2007; Cox, 2004; Fisher et al., 2005; Greiner et al., 2012; 
Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Smith, 2011). However, firms can still 
choose to install systems that discourage or prevent opportunistic behavior by the manager and 
that reduce employees’ risk of being exploited or betrayed. Strong control systems (Coletti et 
al., 2005), binding contracts to promote or mandate cooperation (Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002), insurance against betrayal (Lenton & Mosley, 2011), the right to veto managers’ bonus 
allocation (Kanagaretnam et al., 2012) or a limitation of managerial discretion over the size of 
the bonus pool (Fisher et al., 2005) increase employee effort, trust and cooperation amongst 
collaborating parties. This experience of control-induced cooperation again has a positive 
effect on the subsequent level of cooperation, thereby reinforcing the positive effects of the 
control systems (Coletti et al., 2005).  
In conclusion, limiting managerial discretion provides an employee protection against the 
risk of managers’ overly opportunistic behavior i.e. a manager with limited discretion has to 
provide at least the non-discretionary part of the bonus and therefore cannot act as 
opportunistically as a manager with high managerial discretion who can freely decide on the 
bonus allocation. As such, limited managerial discretion leads to more employee effort and 
higher bonus allocations (Fisher et al., 2005). We therefore formulate our hypotheses as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The proportion of the bonus the manager allocates to her employee is higher 
when managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is low than when managers’ 
discretion in determining employee bonus size is high. 
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Hypothesis 2: Employee effort is higher when managers’ discretion in determining employee 
bonus size is low than when managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high. 
 
Employee Effort and Manager Bonus Allocation 
Hypothesis 3 in our model captures the effect of effort exerted by the employee on the 
proportion of the bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee. According to reciprocity 
theory, people reward kind actions and punish unkind actions (Cox, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 2004; Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002; McCabe et al., 2003; Rabin, 1993). Reciprocity is thereby considered as a conditional 
other-regarding preference (Cox, 2004). Generous behavior often induces a reciprocal response 
e.g. recipients of a gift frequently respond by being generous to those who gave the gift (Fehr 
et al., 1997; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 2004). Similarly, if an employee exerts 
effort for a manager, the manager will appreciate this kind behavior and she will likely 
reciprocate by being more generous in her bonus allocation. This reciprocal response is caused 
by the cooperative action of the employee as well as the benevolent intentions the manager 
attributes to this cooperative action (Cox, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; McCabe et al., 
2003). However, when managerial discretion is limited an employee may cooperate due to the 
existence of the strong control mechanism instead of due to benevolent intentions (Coletti et 
al., 2005; Fisher et al., 2005; Lenton & Mosley, 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2012). The manager 
can then attribute the cooperation either to employees’ kind intentions (dispositional 
characteristic) or to the strong control system (situational characteristic). Yet, due to the 
fundamental attribution error, managers will at least partially attribute the control-induced 
cooperation to the strong control system (low managerial discretion) instead of to employees’ 
kind intentions, but even in the absence of kind intentions, the control-induced cooperation can 
elicit mutual cooperation and trust (Coletti et al., 2005). This is in line with the tit-for-tat 
strategy, which is the winner in Axelrod’s prisoners’ dilemma tournament (Axelrod, 1980, 
1981; Kreps et al., 1982) and which only takes into account people’s actions, not their 
intentions (Rand et al., 2013). “I’ll do to you as you do to me” is a principle embedded in human 
nature (Ockenfels, 2015, P. 13). The reasoning above leads us to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Employee effort is positively associated with the proportion of the bonus pool 
the manager allocates to her employee. 
 
Managerial Discretion, Compensation Inequality and Manager Fairness 
Hypothesis 4 in our model captures the joint effect of managers’ discretion in determining 
employee bonus size (low vs. high) and the manager-employee compensation inequality (low 
vs. high) on the extent to which the manager considers fairness in the bonus allocation. Here, 
we argue that managers with high managerial discretion will respond differently to manager-
employee compensation inequality than managers with limited managerial discretion. Fairness 
is an other-regarding preference that is not conditional on the behavior of the other (Cox, 2004). 
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When managers care about fairness (or think according to self-centered17 inequity aversion), 
they are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more fair outcomes, 
as indicated earlier in the paragraph on inequity-aversion theory and equity theory (Adams, 
1963, 1965; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; 
Itoh, 2004; Smith, 2011). When manager-employee compensation inequality is high, a 
manager with high managerial discretion will be concerned for fairness (Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr 
& Gächter, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 2004). However, a manager with limited managerial 
discretion will be concerned for fairness to a much lesser extent. Johnson & Mislin (2011) 
identified different elements that influence the level of responsibility that a trusted party may 
feel toward her counterpart. Here we argue that a control system (such as limited discretion) 
causes a manager to feel less responsible for her employee. The presence of this control system 
changes the way the manager mentally frames the situation, causing her to perceive the 
situation as a business decision rather than an ethical decision (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999). 
Control systems may increase cooperation (Coletti et al., 2005) but the basis for this 
cooperation (i.e., it is economically rational) is different from the basis for cooperation when 
no control systems are present (i.e. it is the ‘right thing’ to do) (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). 
The presence of a control system provides a manager with a legitimate excuse to act within the 
boundaries of the control system, and therefore induces more focus on long-term self-interest 
and lowers the concern for fairness. We therefore formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: When manager-employee compensation inequality is high, managers with low 
discretion in determining employee bonus size are less concerned for fairness in the bonus 
allocation than managers with high discretion in determining employee bonus size. 
 
Manager Fairness and Manager Bonus Allocation 
Hypothesis 5 in our model captures the effect of the extent to which the manager is 
concerned for fairness in the bonus allocation on the proportion of the bonus pool she allocates 
to her employee. Managers that are concerned for fairness will feel guilty when their relative 
payoff is above the relative payoff of their employee (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Itoh, 2004; 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011) and therefore these managers will give up material payoff to move in 
the direction of more equitable outcomes (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Managers that are concerned 
for fairness, will respond by offering a larger bonus to their employee, because they cannot 
stand inequitable outcomes, whereas managers that are focused on long-term self-interest will 
keep a larger part of the bonus for themselves (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). We therefore formulate 
our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: The extent to which managers consider fairness in the bonus allocations is 
positively associated with the proportion of the bonus pool the manager allocates to her 
employee. 
                                                     
17 Inequity aversion is self-centered if people are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff 
relative to the payoff of others and do not care per se about the existence of inequity among others (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). 
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2.3 Method 
 
Experimental task and design  
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2*2 between subjects experiment. 18 
Participants conducted a multi-period variant of the investment game of Berg et al. (1995). We 
randomly assigned participants to the role of employee (investor or sender in the investment 
game) and manager (investee or receiver in the investment game) and participants kept their 
role throughout the experiment.19 Participants played the variant of the investment game for 12 
periods whereby each employee anonymously interacted during each period with the same 
manager. 20 , 21  We manipulated two variables between subjects: ‘Manager-Employee 
Compensation Inequality’ (Low Inequality or High Inequality) and ‘Managerial Discretion in 
determining employee bonus size’ (Low Discretion or High Discretion). 
 
Experimental Procedures 
Each period the employee received an endowment of 100 experimental units. He could 
decide to invest some (or all) of those experimental units in an investment project or he could 
decide to keep them. The number of experimental units invested was then tripled. Afterwards 
the manager decided how many of the tripled experimental units to return to her employee. The 
employee’s payoff then consisted of the experimental units that were not invested and the 
tripled experimental units that were returned by the manager. The manager’s payoff consisted 
of the tripled experimental units that were not returned to the employee. Additionally, each 
period the manager and the employee earned experimental units as their fixed compensation. 
At the end of each period manager and employee got an overview of their own and each other’s 
decisions, payoffs and fixed compensation. The goal for manager and employee was to obtain 
as many experimental units as possible. Participants were compensated based on the number 
of experimental units they earned in the experiment. They earned 1.5 euro per thousand 
experimental units earned in the experiment.  
 
Dependent variables 
In this research we focus on managers’ and employees’ tendency to cooperate. The number 
of units invested in the investment project represented employees’ cooperative behavior. 
Employee Effortit measured how much of the 100 experimental units each employee invested 
each period. Afterwards, the number of units invested by the employee was tripled representing 
the return on investment.22 The manager could then divide the revenues of the investment 
                                                     
18 We conducted the experiment via the Z-tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
19 Here we frame the investment game of Berg et al. (1995) in terms of a labor relationship as in Baker et al. 
(1994), Schmidt & Schnitzer (1995) and Sloof & Sonnemans (2011). 
20 This is called fixed matching (Hales & Williamson, 2010), which allows for building trust, trustworthiness and 
reputation. Reputation considerations may mitigate managers’ moral hazard problem with respect to paying the 
bonus (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Baker et al., 1994; Bol, 2008; Bull, 1987; Fisher et al., 2005; Kreps et al., 1982; 
Lahno, 1995; Moers, 2005). 
21 The number of periods was unknown to the participants. 
22 The multiplication factor of 3 results in a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of 1.5 (investing 1 unit results in 
an average profit of 1.5 units for the manager and the employee). The propensity to cooperate increases in the 
 45 
 
project between herself and the employee. Manager Bonus Allocationit measured for each 
manager each period the ratio between the number of units the manager returned to the 
employee and the tripled number of units invested by the employee. This variable represents 
managers’ cooperative behavior. Higher values for this measure indicate lower levels of 
manager opportunism and vice versa. Employee Effort (Manager Bonus Allocation) averages 
Employee Effortit (Manager Bonus Allocationit) over the 12 periods respectively. 
Furthermore, in the post-experimental questionnaire we asked participants additional 
questions. Using a seven-point Likert scale, we asked the managers to indicate how important 
it is for them to be fair (Manager Fairness) and to indicate whether they rewarded the employee 
because they hoped to earn more money in the long run (Manager Long-term Self-interest). 
Manager Fairness refers to the extent to which a manager cares about a fair bonus allocation 
whereas Manager Long-term Self-interest refers to the extent to which a manager is more self-
interested when allocating the bonus. Lastly, in the additional analyses we research managers’ 
and employees’ trust in each other in greater detail. Using a seven-point Likert scale, 
employees indicated whether they trusted their manager (Employee Trust) and whether they 
thought their manager trusted them (Employee Perceived Trust). Similarly, managers indicated 
whether they trusted their employee (Manager Trust) and whether they thought their employee 
trusted them (Manager Perceived Trust). 
 
Manipulations 
In the 2*2 experiment the variables ‘manager-employee compensation inequality’ and 
‘managerial discretion in determining employee bonus size’ were manipulated. We 
manipulated the variable manager-employee compensation inequality at two levels 
(Compensation Inequality; low vs. high) by providing a different fixed compensation to the 
manager and the employee. Next to the endowment of 100 experimental units that could be 
invested, the employee received each period a fixed compensation of 150 experimental units, 
which could not be invested. The manager received each period a fixed compensation of 300 
(900) experimental units in the low (high) inequality conditions respectively. As such, we only 
considered cases in which the employee earned less than his manager, similar to Dur & Glazer 
(2008) and in line with most real-life employment circumstances.  
The variable ‘managerial discretion in determining employee bonus size’ was manipulated 
at two levels (Managerial Discretion; low vs. high) as in Bailey et al. (2011). In the high 
discretion conditions the allocation of the bonus pool was completely left at managers’ 
discretion i.e. the manager decided freely how much of the bonus pool to keep and how much 
of the bonus pool to give to the employee. In the low discretion conditions the managers could 
only freely allocate part of the bonus pool (the discretionary bonus part), because a part 
consisted of a formula-based allocation based on the objective performance measure, 
‘Employee Effort’ (the non-discretionary bonus part). More specifically, in the low discretion 
conditions 40% of employees’ bonus was non-discretionary and 60% of the bonus was at 
managers’ discretion. The manager with limited discretion decided how much of the bonus 
                                                     
marginal per capita return (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Ledyard, 1995). Berg et al. (1995) use the same 
multiplication factor. 
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pool to keep and how much of the bonus pool to give to her employee, but her employee got 
minimum 40% of the bonus pool.23, 24 
 
Participants 
We recruited 140 undergraduate students from a management accounting course in a large 
university. These students received a course credit and a monetary reward depending on their 
performance in the experiment. The average monetary reward equaled 9.40 euro. The 
experiment lasted between 30 and 60 minutes (depending on the decision speed of the 
participants). Participants were randomly assigned to a separate computer when they arrived. 
They received computerized instructions and worked on a task as discussed in greater detail 
previously. 56% (44%) of the participants was male (female). Participants were 21.5 years old 
on average (minimum 20 years, maximum 29 years) and they had 8.6 months of work 
experience, which was significantly different from 0 (t139 = 8.47; p <0.01). 
 
2.4 Results 
 
Manipulation checks and information sufficiency 
We asked a number of questions before the experiment actually started to make sure 
participants understood the experimental scenario and knew all relevant case information. 
Nobody could continue with the experiment until all questions were answered correctly. We 
asked them, for example, which role they played in the experiment, what their fixed income 
and the fixed income of their counterpart was, whether they could invest any experimental units 
in the experiment, whether their counterpart could invest any experimental units in the 
experiment, how many units maximally could be invested in the experiment each period and 
what the multiplication factor for the investment was. In the low discretion conditions only, we 
further asked what percentage of the bonus pool the manager should minimally provide as a 
reward. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire we asked additional questions to test our 
manipulations. In order to test our manipulation of Managerial Discretion, participants had to 
indicate whether the statement “The manager had to give at least 40% of the return on 
investment of the investment project back to the employee” was true or not. All participants in 
the low discretion conditions answered correctly, while 3 employees in the high discretion 
conditions incorrectly assumed this statement was true.25 Additionally we asked employees to 
                                                     
23 The operationalization of low discretion is similar to the experimental settings of Greiner et al. (2012) and 
Bailey et al. (2011) and the real-life setting of Abernethy et al. (2013). In Greiner et al. (2012) the manager must 
allocate at least 90% of the amount invested. In Bailey et al. (2011) 50% of the bonus pool is non-discretionary. 
In Abernethy et al.’s hospital case study, the managerial discretion refers both to her own bonus as to the bonus 
of her employee, except that her own bonus is restricted to 3.5 times the average bonus of all her employees.  
24 Rational employees in the low discretion conditions would invest each period 100 experimental units, as this 
would increase their number of experimental units at least from 100 experimental units to 100 *3 (multiplication 
factor) * 40% (non-discretionary part of the bonus pool) = 120 experimental units and they might still receive a 
chunk of the 60% discretionary part of the bonus pool. 
25 We conducted our analyses with and without the participants that missed one or more manipulation checks and 
found similar results. In this paper we report the results for the data set including all 140 participants, unless 
specifically mentioned otherwise. 
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indicate their agreement (on a seven-point scale) with the statement “The manager could 
determine the size of my total income to a large extent”. Employees in the high discretion 
conditions agreed significantly more with the statement than employees in the low discretion 
conditions (F1, 68 = 5.380; p = 0.023)
26, which is in line with the manipulation of Managerial 
Discretion, as employees fixed income was the same in all conditions. Additionally, the 
software was programmed such that managers in the low discretion conditions were not able 
to allocate less than 40% as a bonus. 
In order to test our manipulation of Compensation Inequality, we asked managers 
(employees) to indicate whether the statements “I received as a manager (as an employee) a 
higher (lower) fixed income than the employee (manager)” were true or not respectively. All 
employees answered correctly, while 2 managers answered incorrectly. Furthermore, we asked 
managers (employees) to indicate on a seven-point scale their agreement with the statements 
“My fixed income is strongly different from the fixed income of my employee (manager).” 
Managers (employees) in the high inequality conditions agreed significantly more with this 
statement than managers (employees) in the low inequality conditions (F1, 68 = 34.356; p <0.01; 
(F1, 68 = 15.267; p <0.01)), which is in line with our manipulation of Compensation Inequality. 
Furthermore, employees indicated their agreement (on a seven-point scale) with the statement 
“As an employee I had a large influence on the total income of my manager because I decided 
how many units were invested in the investment project.” Employees in the high inequality 
conditions did agree significantly less with this statement than employees in the low inequality 
conditions (F1, 68 = 8.248; p <0.01). Similarly, managers indicated their agreement (on a seven-
point scale) with the statement “The employee had a large influence on my total income 
because he decided how many units were invested in the investment project.” Managers in the 
high inequality conditions did agree marginally significantly less with this statement than 
employees in the low inequality conditions (F1, 68 = 3.356; p = 0.071). The responses to both 
statements are in line with the manipulation of Compensation Inequality. As the fixed 
compensation of managers in the high inequality conditions is much higher than in the low 
inequality conditions, the number of units invested has less influence on the total income of 
managers in the high inequality conditions than on the income of managers in the low 
inequality conditions. Thus, our manipulations of discretion and inequality were successful. 
Additionally, using a seven-point Likert scale, we asked participants to indicate their 
agreement with a couple of statements related to the experimental task. Participants indicated 
they were motivated. The mean response (6.59 on 7) is significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint of 4 (t139 = 47.83; p <0.01). The participants said that the instructions were clear. The 
mean of this measure was 6.18 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 
(t139 = 26.20; p <0.01). Participants indicated that they had enough time to make their decisions 
(mean of 6.89 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t139 = 102.86; p 
<0.01)). Together, these results suggest that participants felt they had sufficient time and were 
capable to perform in the experiment. 
  
                                                     
26 Every p-value mentioned in this paper is a two-sided p-value, unless specifically mentioned otherwise. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of our main dependent variables across each of 
the four experimental conditions. In order to preliminarily test hypothesis 1, we conducted an 
ANOVA analysis with Manager Bonus Allocation as the dependent variable and Managerial 
Discretion and Compensation Inequality as the between subjects independent variables. 
Consistent with hypothesis 1, results (not tabulated) indicate that Manager Bonus Allocation is 
significantly higher when Managerial Discretion is low (mean = 56%) than when Managerial 
Discretion is high (mean = 46%) (F1, 66 = 11.772, p <0.01).
27  
In order to test hypothesis 2, we first conducted a repeated-measures mixed-design ANOVA 
analysis with Employee Effortit as the dependent variable with Period (for the periods 1 to 12) 
as the repeated-measures variable and Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality as 
the between subjects variables. Consistent with hypothesis 2, results (not tabulated) indicate 
that Employee Effort is significantly higher when Managerial Discretion is low (mean = 79.15) 
than when Managerial Discretion is high (mean = 69.52) (F1, 66 = 3.760; p = 0.057).  
In order to test hypothesis 4, we conducted an ANOVA analysis with Manager Fairness as 
the dependent variable and Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality as the 
between subjects variables. Consistent with hypothesis 4, results (not tabulated) indicate a 
significant interaction of Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality (F1, 66 = 5.836, 
p = 0.018). Simple effects analysis further indicates a significant effect of Managerial 
Discretion within high inequality (F1, 66 = 6.447, p = 0.013) i.e. under the condition that 
Compensation Inequality is high, Manager Fairness is significantly higher when Managerial 
Discretion is high (mean = 6.33 on 7) than when Managerial Discretion is low (mean = 5.53 
on 7). This analysis also shows a significant effect of inequality within low discretion (F1, 66 = 
5.587, p = 0.021). To further investigate our expectations, we will conduct a path analysis. 
  
                                                     
27 Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the average proportion of the tripled amount invested that was allocated by 
the manager to the employee over the number of periods in which there was an amount invested. If an employee 
did not invest any experimental units in a particular period, there was no bonus pool and the manager could not 
allocate any experimental units back to the employee in that particular period, which happened for 20 manager-
employee pairs. We exclude those particular periods as in Smith (2011), because the manager had no choice 
regarding the amount she offered as a reward to the employee in that particular period. We conducted a repeated-
measures mixed-design ANOVA analysis with Manager Bonus Allocationit as the dependent variable with Period 
(for the periods 1 to 12) as the repeated-measures variable and Managerial Discretion and Compensation 
Inequality as the between subjects variables as well. Due to the 20 missing manager-employee dyads, we are left 
with 50 dyads. Consistent with hypothesis 1, results (not tabulated) indicate that Manager Bonus Allocation is 
significantly higher when Managerial Discretion is low (mean = 56%) than when Managerial Discretion is high 
(mean = 49%) (F1, 46 = 5.622, p =0.022). Furthermore, the interaction of Managerial Discretion and Compensation 
Inequality is marginally significant (F1, 46 = 3.104, p =0.085). 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
 Managerial Discretiona 
 Low  High 
 Compensation 
Inequalityb 
 Compensation 
Inequalityb 
 Low  High  Low  High 
Dependent Measure (n = 18)  (n = 17)  (n = 17)  (n = 18) 
Employee Effortc 84.07  73.94  70.20  68.88 
 (11.77)  (16.39)  (24.98)  (25.27) 
Manager Fairnessd 6.28  5.53  6.00  6.33 
 (0.75)  (1.12)  (0.79)  (1.03) 
Manager Bonus Allocatione 56.26%  56.17%  45.65%  46.33% 
 (9.64%)  (10.40%)  (11.33%)  (16.96%) 
Employee Trustf 4.94  4.53  4.94  4.17 
 (1.39)  (1.37)  (1.34)  (1.89) 
Employee Perceived Trustg 5.00  5.24  5.00  4.61 
 (1.14)  (0.90)  (1.00)  (1.46) 
Manager Trusth 5.28  5.12  5.06  5.33 
 (1.13)  (0.99)  (1.64)  (1.08) 
Manager Perceived Trusti 5.22  5.18  4.88  5.06 
 (1.35)  (1.13)  (1.80)  (1.51) 
________________ 
a Managerial Discretion refers to whether managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high (i.e. 
the bonus allocation is completely left at managers’ discretion) or low (i.e. the bonus allocation is partly 
discretionary and partly non-discretionary). 
b Compensation Inequality refers to whether manager-employee fixed compensation inequality is high or low. 
c Employee Effort refers to the average number of experimental units of the 100 units endowment the employee 
invested in the investment project over the 12 periods.  
d Manager Fairness refers to the extent to which a manager is concerned about a fair bonus allocation. Using a 
seven-point Likert scale, managers rated how important it is for them to be fair. 
e Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the average proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager 
to the employee over the number of periods in which there was a bonus pool. 
f Employee Trust refers to the extent of trust the employee had in his manager (using a seven-point Likert scale). 
g Employee Perceived Trust refers to the extent of trust the employee estimated his manager had in him (using a 
seven-point Likert scale). 
h Manager Trust refers to the extent of trust the manager had in her employee (using a seven-point Likert scale). 
i Manager Perceived Trust refers to the extent of trust the manager estimated her employee had in her (using a 
seven-point Likert scale). 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis Test 
Our theoretical model is depicted in Figure 2.1. We expect a negative relation between 
Managerial Discretion and Manager Bonus Allocation (H1) and a negative relation between 
Managerial Discretion and Employee Effort (H2). Next, we expect that the interaction between 
Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality will affect Manager Fairness, such that 
when Compensation Inequality is high, managers with low discretion in determining employee 
bonus size are less concerned for fairness than managers with high discretion in determining 
employee bonus size (H4). This means we expect a significantly positive interaction. 
Additionally, we anticipate a positive relation between Employee Effort and Manager Bonus 
Allocation (H3) and a positive relation between Manager Fairness and Manager Bonus 
Allocation (H5). 
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To test our model, we employ a path analysis based on structural equation modelling in SAS 
software. The results (standardized coefficients) of the path analysis are reported in Figure 2.2. 
The model fits the data well, as indicated by various fit measures (χ2 (df = 3, n = 70) = 2.6217 
(p = 0.4537); Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.9877; Adjusted GFI (AGFI) = 0.9137; Bentler 
Comparative Fit Index = 1.0000). Consistent with our expectations, we find support for the 
hypotheses of our theoretical model.  
Additionally, we perform a sensitivity analysis on our causal model by replacing Manager 
Fairness with Manager Long-term Self-interest in our path model.28 Results (not tabulated) for 
the alternative path are in line with the results in Figure 2.2 and therefore support our reasoning 
in the theory section. The sign of the path coefficients related to hypotheses 4 and 5 switched 
from positive to negative, which is logical given we substitute the variable Manager Fairness 
by the variable Manager Long-term Self-interest. 
 
  
                                                     
28 As an alternative test for hypothesis 4, we conducted an ANOVA analysis with Manager Long-term Self-interest 
as the dependent variable and Managerial Discretion and Compensation Inequality as the between subjects 
variables. Consistent with hypothesis 4, results (not tabulated) indicate a significant interaction of Managerial 
Discretion and Compensation Inequality (F1, 66 = 6.561, p =0.013). Simple effects analysis further indicates a 
significant effect of Managerial Discretion within high inequality (F1, 66 = 6.035, p =0.017) (i.e. when 
Compensation Inequality is high Manager Long-term Self-interest is significantly lower when Managerial 
Discretion is high (mean = 4.89 on 7) than when Managerial Discretion is low (mean = 6.18 on 7) (H4)) and a 
significant effect of Compensation Inequality within high discretion (F1, 66 = 4.494, p =0.038). 
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Figure 2.2 Path Analysis Results 
 
 
________________ 
***, ** and * Indicate p-value, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively, two-tailed. 
Standardized path coefficients are presented for paths significant at p < 0.1, two-tailed. 
Fit Indices: χ2 (df = 3, n = 70) = 2.6217 (p = 0.4537); Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.9877; Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 
= 0.9137; Bentler Comparative Fit Index = 1.0000. 
a Managerial Discretion equals 0 in the low managerial discretion conditions, and 1 in the high discretion 
conditions.  
b Compensation Inequality equals 0 in the low compensation inequality conditions, and 1 in the high compensation 
inequality conditions. 
c Employee Effort refers to the average number of experimental units of the 100 units endowment the employee 
invested in the investment project over the 12 periods.  
d Manager Fairness refers to the extent to which a manager is concerned about a fair bonus allocation. Using a 
seven-point Likert scale, managers rated how important it is for them to be fair. 
e Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the average proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager 
to the employee over the number of periods in which there was a bonus pool. If an employee did not invest any 
experimental units in a particular period, there was no bonus pool and the manager could not allocate any 
experimental units to the employee from the bonus pool in that particular period, which happened for 20 manager-
employee pairs. We exclude those particular periods as in Smith (2011), because the manager had no choice 
regarding the amount she offered as a reward to the employee in that particular period. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additional analyses 
Next, we also discuss Manager Bonus Allocationit (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3), Employee 
Effortit (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4), the relationships between Employee Effortit and Manager 
Bonus Allocationit (see Table 2.4) and Employee Trust, Employee Perceived Trust, Manager 
Trust and Manager Perceived Trust in greater detail.  
 
Manager Bonus Allocationit, 
First, we look at Manager Bonus Allocationit in greater detail (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3). 
For each experimental condition, we display the frequency with which managers choose for a 
particular bonus allocation proportion (or a range of proportions). The observed response 
pattern can be explained by anchoring29 on 33.33%, 40%, 50% and 66.67% of the bonus pool.  
                                                     
29 The anchoring heuristic is a commonly used strategy to divide discretionary bonuses (Bailey et al., 2011). When 
decision makers use an anchoring heuristic, they adjust their decision insufficiently for additional, decision 
relevant information, leading to judgments that are biased in the direction of the initial anchor value. 
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A manager in the high discretion conditions is free to allocate as much of the bonus as she 
wants. However employees expect to receive at least their initial amount invested, which is 
33.33% of the bonus pool (as the initial amount invested is tripled in order to obtain the bonus 
pool that can be allocated by the manager). Therefore managers’ bonus decision in the high 
discretion conditions gets anchored towards this 33.33% boundary. Of the bonus allocations in 
the high discretion conditions, 6.43% follows this 33.33% strategy strictly and 14.05% lies in 
the range [33.33%, 40%[. High discretion managers who provide 33.33% or less as a bonus 
allocation (< 33.33% & 33.33% in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3) act opportunistically as they do 
not allocate any of the profit of the investment to their employee. Those offering even less than 
33.33% (< 33.33% in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3) act extremely opportunistically as the employee 
even loses money by investing in the investment project. In the high discretion conditions, the 
manager acts opportunistically in 17.62% of the bonus allocations (< 33.33% & 33.33%) and 
extremely opportunistically in 11.19% of the bonus allocations(< 33.33%). Managers acting 
opportunistically are more likely to face no investment in the next period (No investment).  
A manager in the low discretion conditions is forced to allocate at least the non-discretionary 
part of the bonus to her employee, which is 40% of the bonus pool. Therefore managers’ bonus 
decision in the low discretion conditions gets anchored on the non-discretionary part of the 
bonus (Bailey et al., 2011). Especially, in the low discretion – high inequality condition 
managers anchor on the 40% rule. 40.68% of the bonus allocations in the low discretion - high 
inequality condition are in the range [40%, 50%[, which is in line with the theoretical reasoning 
for hypothesis 4, predicting that managers will use the formal control system as an excuse and 
will act according to the 40% rule. 9.76% of the bonus allocations in the low discretion 
conditions follow the 40% rule strictly. Low discretion managers that allocate only 40% of the 
bonus act as opportunistically as possible and they are more likely to face no investments later 
on. This opportunistic behavior is located slightly more in the low discretion - high inequality 
condition (10.29%) than in the low discretion - low inequality condition (9.26%), which results 
in slightly more cases in which the employee does not invest (No investment) in the low 
discretion-high inequality condition (2.94%) than in the low discretion-low inequality 
condition (1.85%).  
Furthermore, in all conditions managers are anchoring strictly on an equal split of the bonus 
pool (50%) (9.05% in the low discretion conditions and 11.67% in the high discretion 
conditions) or an equal split of the profit taking into account employees’ initial investment 
(66.67%) ((6.19% in the low discretion bonus allocations and 7.62% of the high discretion 
allocations). Equal division is often considered the social reference point (Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2000; Ciriolo, 2007). In the low discretion – low inequality condition, 52.31% of the bonus 
allocations lie in the range [50%, 66.67%], whereas in the low discretion – high inequality 
condition only 37.74% of the bonus allocations lie in this range. As indicated before, this is 
because managers in the low discretion – high inequality condition use the formal control 
system as an excuse and anchor their bonus allocations to a large extent on 40%. More 
surprising, in the high discretion – low inequality condition, half of the bonus allocations lies 
in the range [50%, 66.67%], whereas they could have acted much more opportunistically. 
Additionally, in the high discretion – high inequality condition 37.49% of the bonus allocations 
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lies in this range and 7.87% of the bonus allocations is even higher than 66.67%, which is in 
line with the theoretical reasoning on hypothesis 4.  
Lastly, the results on hypothesis 1 already indicated that managers in the low discretion 
conditions provided a higher proportion of the bonus pool as a reward for their employee than 
managers in the high discretion conditions (56% versus 46% on average). These findings might 
not be that surprising at first sight, as the manager needed to return at least 40% in the low 
discretion conditions, but nonetheless managers in the low discretion conditions allocated on 
average a 56% bonus, more than the rational 40% boundary (t34 = 9.724; p < 0.001), and even 
managers in the high discretion conditions offered on average a 46% bonus, well above the 
40% boundary as well (t34 = 2.483; p = 0.018). The managers in the high discretion conditions 
were, of course, not aware of the 40%-rule in the low discretion conditions and 40% as such 
was no meaningful anchor to them. When managers in the high discretion conditions were able 
to provide a bonus (i.e. when employees invested units), those managers offered in 73% of the 
cases a bonus of 40% or higher and only in 27% of the cases a bonus below 40%.30 So in the 
majority of the cases high discretion managers already voluntarily followed the 40% rule and 
only for 27% of the bonus allocations an implementation of a 40% non-discretionary bonus 
would have made a difference, because it would prevent opportunistic allocation behavior.  
 
  
                                                     
30 Table 2.2 indicates that (1.67% + 18.10% + 11.67% +24.29% +7.62% +4.29%)/(1-7.14%) equals 73% and 
(11.19% + 6.43% + 7.62%)/(1-7.14%) equals 27%.  
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Table 2.2 Frequency Table Manager Bonus Allocation 
 
Low Managerial Discretiona 
Compensation Inequalityb 
Low  High  Total 
Manager 
Bonus 
Allocationc  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
 Manager 
Bonus 
Allocation  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
 Manager 
Bonus 
Allocation  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
No 
investmentd   1.85% 
 No 
investment   2.94% 
 No 
investment   2.38% 
40.00%   9.26%  40.00% 10.29%  40.00%   9.76% 
]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 18.98% 
 ]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 30.39% 
 ]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 24.52% 
50.00% 13.43%  50.00%   4.41%  50.00%   9.05% 
]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 31.94% 
 ]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 27.94% 
 ]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 30.00% 
66.67%   6.94%  66.67%   5.39%  66.67%   6.19% 
> 66.67% 17.59%  > 66.67% 18.63%  > 66.67% 18.10% 
   
High Managerial Discretion 
Compensation Inequality 
Low  High  Total 
Manager 
Bonus 
Allocation  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
 Manager 
Bonus 
Allocation  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
 Manager 
Bonus 
Allocation  
Frequency 
 
_________ 
No 
investment   6.86% 
 No 
investment   7.41% 
 No 
investment   7.14% 
< 33.33%   9.31%  < 33.33% 12.96%  < 33.33% 11.19% 
33.33%   8.33%  33.33%   4.63%  33.33%   6.43% 
]33.33% - 
40.00%[   4.90% 
 ]33.33% - 
40.00%[ 10.19% 
 ]33.33% - 
40.00%[   7.62% 
40.00%   0.98%  40.00%   2.31%  40.00%   1.67% 
]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 19.12% 
 ]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 17.13% 
 ]40.00% - 
50.00%[ 18.10% 
50.00% 13.73%  50.00%   9.72%  50.00% 11.67% 
]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 32.84% 
 ]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 16.20% 
 ]50.00% - 
66.67%[ 24.29% 
66.67%   3.43%  66.67% 11.57%  66.67%   7.62% 
> 66.67%   0.49%  > 66.67%   7.87%  > 66.67%   4.29% 
________________  
a Managerial Discretion refers to whether managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high (i.e. 
the bonus allocation is completely left at managers’ discretion) or low (i.e. the bonus allocation is partly 
discretionary and partly non-discretionary). 
b Compensation Inequality refers to whether manager-employee fixed compensation inequality is high or low. 
c Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager to the 
employee. 
d No investment represents the cases in which the employee did not invest anything and therefore there was no 
bonus pool and the manager was not able to allocate any experimental units back to the employee. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Figure 2.3 Frequency Table – Manager Bonus Allocation 
 
 
________________  
Managerial Discretion refers to whether managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high (i.e. 
the bonus allocation is completely left at managers’ discretion) or low (i.e. the bonus allocation is partly 
discretionary and partly non-discretionary). 
Compensation Inequality refers to whether manager-employee fixed compensation inequality is high or low. 
Manager Bonus Allocation refers to the average proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager 
to the employee over the number of periods in which there was a bonus pool. 
No investment represents the cases in which the employee did not invest anything and therefore there was no 
bonus pool and the manager was not able to allocate any experimental units back to the employee. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Employee Effortit and relationship between Employee Effortit and Manager Bonus Allocationit, 
Next, we look at Employee Effortit in greater detail (see Table 2.3 & 2.4 and Figure 2.4). In 
line with hypothesis 2 (managerial discretion leads to less employee effort), employees in the 
low discretion conditions exert more effort than employees in the high discretion conditions, 
as employees in the low discretion conditions are protected against overly opportunistic 
behavior of their managers. Especially in the low discretion-low inequality condition 
employees invest very large parts of their endowment (59.72% of the investments lie in the 
range [90, 100]). However, in the other 3 experimental conditions employees invest in 41.67% 
to 44.29% of the cases a very large part of their endowment ([90, 100]) as well. Furthermore, 
in the high discretion conditions 28.81% of the investments lie in the range ([0, 50], whereas 
in the low discretion conditions only 15.48% of the investments lie in this range. 
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Table 2.3 Frequency Table Employee Effort 
 
Low Managerial Discretiona 
Compensation Inequalityb 
Low  High  Total 
Employee 
Effortc  
Frequency 
_________ 
 Employee 
Effort  
Frequency 
_________ 
 Employee 
Effort  
Frequency 
_________ 
0   1.85%  0   2.94%  0   2.38% 
]0 - 50[   4.63%  ]0 - 50[ 12.75%  ]0 - 50[   8.57% 
50   5.09%  50   3.92%  50   4.52% 
]50 - 80[ 14.81%  ]50 - 80[ 23.04%  ]50 - 80[ 18.81% 
80   6.94%  80   7.84%  80   7.38% 
]80 - 90[   6.94%  ]80 - 90[   6.86%  ]80 - 90[   6.90% 
90   7.41%  90 10.29%  90   8.81% 
]90 - 100[   3.24%  ]90 - 100[   4.41%  ]90 - 100[   3.81% 
100 49.07%  100 27.94%  100 38.81% 
        
High Managerial Discretion 
Compensation Inequality 
Low  High  Total 
Employee 
Effort  
Frequency 
_________ 
 Employee 
Effort  
Frequency 
_________ 
 Employee 
Effort  
Frequency 
_________ 
0   6.86%  0   7.41%  0   7.14% 
]0 - 50[ 12.75%  ]0 - 50[ 14.81%  ]0 - 50[ 13.81% 
50   6.37%  50   9.26%  50   7.86% 
]50 - 80[ 22.06%  ]50 - 80[ 12.50%  ]50 - 80[ 17.14% 
80   7.35%  80   7.41%  80   7.38% 
]80 - 90[   2.94%  ]80 - 90[   1.85%  ]80 - 90[   2.38% 
90   8.82%  90   8.33%  90   8.57% 
]90 - 100[   2.94%  ]90 - 100[   3.70%  ]90 - 100[   3.33% 
100 29.90%  100 34.72%  100 32.38% 
________________  
a Managerial Discretion refers to whether managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high (i.e. 
the bonus allocation is completely left at managers’ discretion) or low (i.e. the bonus allocation is partly 
discretionary and partly non-discretionary). 
b Compensation Inequality refers to whether manager-employee fixed compensation inequality is high or low. 
c Employee Effort refers to the number of experimental units of the 100 units endowment the employee invested 
in the investment project.  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 2.4 Frequency Table – Employee Effort 
 
 
________________  
Managerial Discretion refers to whether managers’ discretion in determining employee bonus size is high (i.e. 
the bonus allocation is completely left at managers’ discretion) or low (i.e. the bonus allocation is partly 
discretionary and partly non-discretionary). 
Compensation Inequality refers to whether manager-employee fixed compensation inequality is high or low. 
Employee Effort refers to the average number of experimental units of the 100 units endowment the employee 
invested in the investment project over the 12 periods.  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2.4 The effect of managers’ opportunistic behavior on Employee Effort 
 
Panel A: High Discretion Conditions 
 Model 1             Model 2 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 39.58   4.13 <0.001  73.39 13.84 <0.001 
Compensation 
Inequality 
 -1.92  -0.27   0.788   -2.05  -0.29   0.770 
Period   0.37   0.86   0.392    0.37   0.77   0.439 
Manager Bonus 
Allocationt-1 
63.59   3.45   0.001    
Manager 
opportunistict-1 
   -21.23  -3.56 <0.001 
# of observations    384       384   
Overall R2   0.23      0.25   
Prob > chi2 0.0017   <0.001   
 
Panel B: Low Discretion Conditions 
  Model 3   Model 4  
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 42.23   4.60 <0.001  78.67 18.01 <0.001 
Compensation 
Inequality 
 -9.46  -1.82  0.068   -9.39  -1.90   0.057 
Period   1.07   2.80  0.005     1.23   2.98   0.003 
Manager Bonus 
Allocationt-1 
63.38   4.26 <0.001    
Manager 
Opportunistict-1 
   -19.76  -1.98   0.048 
# of observations    384       384   
Overall R2   0.09      0.09   
Prob > chi2 <0.001   <0.001   
________________ 
We used linear random-effects models and we adjusted the standard errors of the estimates for clustering by 
manager-employee dyad. 384 observations = (12 periods -1 initial period in which Manager Bonus Allocationt-1 
was not known yet) * 35 manager-employee dyads – 1 dyad in which the employee did not invest in the first 
period and Manager Bonus Allocationt-1 still was not known in the second period. 
The dependent variable is Employee Effortit, which is number of experimental units the employee invested in 
period t. 
Compensation Inequality equals 0 in the low compensation inequality conditions, and 1 in the high compensation 
inequality conditions. 
Period refers to the period in the investment game. 
Manager Bonus Allocationt-1 refers to the proportion of the bonus pool that was allocated by the manager to the 
employee in the most recent period in which the manager could take a decision. 
Manager Opportunistict-1 is a dummy variable which is 1 if the Manager Bonus Allocation is 33% or less in the 
high discretion conditions or 40% in the low discretion conditions in the most recent period in which the manager 
could take a decision. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Table 2.4, we conducted multiple linear random-effects models with Employee Effortit as 
the dependent variable in order to further investigate the effect of managers’ overly 
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opportunistic behavior on employee effort. In all regressions, we adjusted the standard errors 
of the estimates for clustering by manager-employee dyad. Panel A focuses on the high 
discretion conditions, panel B focuses on the low discretion conditions. Manager Bonus 
Allocationit-1 is the first proxy for managers’ opportunistic behavior. It refers to the proportion 
of the bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee instead of keeping the bonus for 
herself in the most recent period in which the manager could take a decision. Higher values for 
this variable indicate less opportunistic behavior by the manager. The regression results (Table 
2.4, model 1 and 3) clearly indicate that if the manager acts less opportunistically, this leads to 
more employee effort. If a manager allocates 1% extra to her employee, the employee invests 
approximately 0.63 experimental units extra in the next period. Manager Opportunisticit-1 is 
the second proxy for managers’ opportunistic behavior. This is a dummy variable which is 1 if 
the Manager Bonus Allocation is equal to or less than 33% in the high discretion conditions 
(Model 2 of Table 2.4) or equal to 40% in the low discretion conditions (Model 4 of Table 2.4) 
in the most recent period in which the manager could take a decision. The regression results 
(Table 2.4, model 2 and 4) clearly indicate that if the manager acts opportunistically, this leads 
to less employee effort. If a manager allocates 33% or less to her employee in the high 
discretion conditions, the employee invests on average 21.23 experimental units less the next 
period. If a manager allocates 40% to her employee in the low discretion conditions, the 
employee invests on average 19.76 experimental units less the next period. This is surprising, 
as it is rational for employees in the low discretion conditions to exert maximal effort as they 
would receive a reward that was at least worth 1.2 times their effort (3*40%). Interestingly, 
though, if the manager acted opportunistically by allocating only 40% of the bonus pool, 
employees dropped their investments, although this was not the rational thing to do. This is a 
clear example of negative reciprocity, a punishment strategy in which one party (the employee) 
incurs a cost to punish another party (the manager) for failing to reciprocate (McCabe et al., 
2003). Failures to reciprocate are not forgotten or forgiven and will elicit sanctions 
(Williamson, 1993). 
In the low discretion conditions it is rational to exert maximal effort and for employees in 
the high discretion conditions it is rational to exert no effort as they risk to lose everything, but 
it is not per se the optimal strategy. 27 of the 35 employees in the low discretion conditions 
invested 100 units in one or more experimental periods, but only one employee (in the low 
discretion-low inequality condition) exerted maximal effort in each period. By doing so, the 
employee gained only 1960 experimental points. Some of the low discretion employees that 
did not invest 100 experimental units in the first period or employees that did invest 100 
experimental units in the first period, but then occasionally dropped their investments, earned 
more experimental units than the employee that always invested the maximum amount of 100 
experimental units, because their managers provided them with higher bonus allocations in 
order to persuade them to invest more in the future. For example, 11 of the 35 low discretion 
employees that did not invest 100 experimental units in each period outperformed the employee 
that always invested the maximum amount of 100 units. However, low discretion employees 
were aware of the rational strategy. For example, employees in the low discretion conditions 
indicated on a seven-point Likert scale their agreement with the statement “I always invested 
many units because my supervisor had to give back at least 40% of the bonus pool”. The mean 
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of this measure was 5.09 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t34 = 
3.56; p <0.01). However, they further indicated on a seven-point Likert scale their agreement 
with “If the supervisor gave back only 40% of the bonus pool, I invested the next period less”. 
The mean of this measure was 4.77 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint 
of 4 as well (t34 = 2.32; p <0.01). This result is in line with the regression results of Table 2.4 
and can be explained by negative reciprocity. 
Additionally, many employees in the high discretion conditions chose to trust their 
managers as well. 26 of the 35 employees in the low discretion conditions invested 100 units 
in one or more experimental periods, but only one employee (in the high discretion-high 
inequality condition) exerted maximal effort in each period and his manager rewarded this 
extremely trusting behavior. By doing so this employee gained 2700 points, the best 
performance of all employees. Next, six of the 35 high discretion employees were able to 
outperform the low discretion employee that invested 100 experimental units in each period as 
well. 
 
Employee Trust, Employee Perceived Trust, Manager Trust and Manager Perceived Trust 
Traditionally, the amount invested in the investment game is considered to reflect 
employees’ trust in the manager, whereas the proportion of the tripled amount invested returned 
by the manager is considered to reflect managers’ trustworthiness towards her employee (Berg 
et al., 1995).31 Employees in the low discretion conditions of our experiment did not risk to 
lose money by investing in the investment game, whereas employees in the high discretion 
conditions risk to lose money. Therefore, one could argue that employees in the low discretion 
conditions did not (have to) trust their managers, whereas managers in the high discretion 
conditions (had to) trust their managers. Managerial discretion in employee performance 
evaluation falls onto a continuum (Ewing, 2016). By definition, an employee is more 
vulnerable to managers’ decisions (manager opportunism), when managerial discretion 
increases (Fisher et al., 2005). However, the traditional investment game does not allow one to 
rule out altruism or inequity aversion as an alternative motive for sending and returning 
experimental units (Anderson et al., 2006; Cox, 2004). Furthermore, trust is not taking risk per 
se, but it is rather a willingness to take risk or a willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer et al., 
1995). An employee does not need to risk anything in order to be willing to be vulnerable (i.e. 
to trust a manager). Therefore, an employee under low managerial discretion can trust his 
manager as much or even more than an employee under high managerial discretion. However, 
an employee can only show his trusting intentions to others by actually taking risk (instead of 
being willing to take risk). Therefore, only a high discretion employee displays trusting 
behavior by investing in the investment game, but this does not mean that low discretion 
employees did not trust their manager (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust is often confused with 
cooperation, because trust often leads to cooperation. However, trust is not needed in order to 
cooperate. People can cooperate with somebody they do not trust (Coletti et al., 2005; Mayer 
et al., 1995). E.g. strong control mechanisms lead a party to cooperate even in the absence of 
                                                     
31 Trust is then defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995).  
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trust, because they enable the parties to reduce risk and opportunistic behavior (Coletti et al., 
2005; Fisher et al., 2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2012; Lenton & Mosley, 2011). Others can then 
attribute the cooperation either to the cooperators’ innate trustworthiness (dispositional 
characteristic) or to the strong control system (situational characteristic). However, due to the 
fundamental attribution error, others at least partially attribute the control-induced cooperation 
to the strong control system (low managerial discretion) instead of to the cooperators’ inherent 
trustworthiness (Coletti et al., 2005). However, strong control systems can enhance the level 
of trust among collaborators as well (Coletti et al., 2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2012; Lenton & 
Mosley, 2011). Therefore, it is hard to predict in which experimental condition manager-
employee dyads trusted each other more. We here investigate employees’ and managers’ trust 
in each other in an exploratory way.  
In the post-experimental questionnaire we asked employees (using a seven-point Likert 
scale) whether they trusted their manager (Employee Trust) and whether they thought their 
manager trusted them (Employee Perceived Trust). Similarly, we asked managers whether they 
trusted their employee (Manager Trust) and whether they thought their employee trusted them 
(Manager Perceived Trust). T-tests (not tabulated) indicate that each of the four 
aforementioned variables has a mean that is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of four 
(at significance level 0.001). This indicates that on average employees and managers in all 
experimental conditions tended to trust each other. Finally, we conducted four ANOVA 
analyses with each of these four variables as the dependent variable and Managerial Discretion 
and Compensation Inequality as the between subjects variables. We did not observe any 
differences in trusting beliefs between the different experimental conditions. Managers’ and 
employees’ trusting beliefs did not depend on the extent of managerial discretion or 
compensation inequality. 
 
2.5 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we develop and find support for a causal model that explains how managers 
subjectively allocate a bonus within manager-employee dyads. Specifically, our model 
explains how managerial discretion in determining employee bonus size and manager-
employee compensation inequality influence the proportion of the bonus pool that a manager 
allocates to her employee (knowing that she can keep the rest for herself). Managers’ bonus 
allocation decision is jointly driven by the management control system (managers’ discretion 
in determining employee bonus size), by other-regarding preferences that are conditional on 
employees’ behavior (reciprocity) and by other-regarding preferences that are not conditional 
on employees’ behavior (fairness). Formal control systems (such as limited managerial 
discretion) prevent overly opportunistic behavior of managers and therefore lead directly to 
higher bonus allocations to the employee compared to less formal control systems (that do not 
limit managerial discretion). Furthermore, formal control systems improve cooperation and 
employee effort, and in the end managers reciprocate to this extra employee effort by allocating 
a higher bonus to the employee. However, in case of manager-employee compensation 
inequality the presence of a formal control system provides a manager with a legitimate excuse 
to act within the boundaries of the control system. As a result, focusing on long-term self-
interest becomes justifiable, in contrast to paying more attention to fairness. This increased 
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focus on long-term self-interest instead of fairness will ultimately lead to lower bonus 
allocations to the employee.  
These are useful findings for academia and practice, as they provide interesting insights in 
managers’ use of discretion, a common practice in organizations (Bailey et al., 2011; Maas et 
al., 2012; WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting, 2012). We do not know much about how 
managers use their discretion to influence employee incentives (Ahn et al., 2010; Bol, 2008). 
We provide interesting findings, documenting benefits and drawbacks of control systems with 
explicit incentives to mitigate employer opportunism (Fisher et al., 2005). Especially, they 
explain why high managerial discretion over employee bonus size can be beneficial to 
employees in situations with high compensation inequality. Earlier research demonstrated the 
negative effects of managerial discretion over the size of employees’ bonus on employee effort 
and employee bonuses (Fisher et al., 2005). Here we indicate that in the presence of high 
compensation inequality managers with high managerial discretion do not act as 
opportunistically as earlier thought. In fact, installing a control system that limits managerial 
discretion in order to reduce managers’ opportunistic bonus allocations might backfire in the 
presence of compensation inequality, as it alters managers’ fairness perceptions and causes 
managers to focus on rationality instead of ethics. In the presence of compensation inequality, 
managers with high discretion take fairness to a larger extent into account in their bonus 
decision than managers with low managerial discretion. This insight is novel, since previous 
academic research suggests that a reduction in managerial discretion in employee bonus size is 
beneficial, as it causes a manager to act less opportunistically, leading to higher employee effort 
and advantageous employee bonuses (Fisher et al., 2005). However, this literature does not 
consider manager-employee compensation inequality, a factor that receives substantial 
attention in the debate on performance rewards today (Anderson et al., 2006; Bloomberg, 2014; 
Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Greiner et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2017; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Reuters, 2013, 2014; Smith, 2011; The Economist, 2009). Our 
findings further confirm Fisher et al.’s (2005) results, a reduction in managerial discretion leads 
to higher employee effort and employee bonuses, but we further add additional insights to the 
research of Fisher et al. (2005). We contribute to the literature on subjective performance 
evaluation by indicating how social preferences influence managers’ use of discretion in bonus 
allocations (Abernethy et al., 2013; Maas et al., 2012). Our findings indicate for instance that 
managers’ bonus allocations are both influenced by reciprocity and fairness concerns. 
Additionally, we demonstrate that managers’ mindset towards fairness changes, depending on 
the extent of managerial discretion in combination with compensation inequality managers 
balance concerns for long-term self-interest versus fairness in a different way. Next, we 
contribute to the academic literature on the effect of compensation inequality on fairness, trust 
or employee effort as well. Some papers on compensation inequality found a negative effect of 
compensation inequality on trust or employee effort (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), others found 
no effect (Anderson et al., 2006; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Greiner et al., 2012) and still others 
found a positive effect (Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Smith, 2011). In our research we find no 
effect of compensation inequality on employee effort and trust. However, we answer the call 
of Anderson et al. (2006) for experimental research that disentangles the effect of fairness, 
reciprocity and trust in implicit contracts, the call of Ciriolo (2007) and Greiner et al. (2012) 
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for research on multi-period versions of the investment game and dynamic aspects of trusting 
relations and the call of Coletti et al. (2005) for research on weaker control systems that provide 
feedback on collaborating parties actions, without providing strong enough incentives for 
cooperation (i.e. our high discretion conditions).  
As all academic research, this study is subject to a number of limitations, most of them 
related to the specific formal management control system in place. In the experiment, the 
number of units invested by the employee was tripled, which led to the bonus pool. In the low 
discretion conditions 40% of employees’ bonus was non-discretionary. In this context it seems 
rational for employees in the low discretion conditions to exert maximal effort as they would 
receive a reward that was at least worth 1.2 times their effort (3*40%). Therefore, the findings 
of H2 (managerial discretion leads to less employee effort) may not be that surprising. More 
surprisingly though, is that not all employees in the low discretion conditions did exert maximal 
effort and as such it seems that some ignored certain benefits because of fairness concerns. 
However, by investing less, these employees were able to convince their managers to provide 
a larger proportion of the bonus pool to them and by doing so, they outperformed employees 
that always exerted maximal effort. Employees’ reduction in investment was a form of negative 
reciprocity. The employee incurred a cost in order to punish his manager for overly 
opportunistic behavior (McCabe et al., 2003). In the low discretion conditions, employees that 
invested all bonus points would earn 1.2 points per point invested for sure. In reality, bonus 
pools allocations may not be that benevolent towards their employees, but most incentive 
systems are designed in such a way that they elicit extra effort and that extra effort is rewarded. 
The manager needed to return at least 40% in the low discretion conditions, but nonetheless 
managers in the low discretion conditions allocated on average a 56% bonus, more than the 
rational 40% boundary, and managers in the high discretion conditions offered on average a 
46% bonus. The fact that employee effort acted as a mediator on the relation between 
managerial discretion and employee bonuses is interesting, as it indicates that managers’ bonus 
allocation was led by conditional other-regarding preferences (reciprocity (H3)), next to the 
requirements of the management control system (H1). Due to the fact that employees in the 
low discretion conditions were certain to gain from exerting effort, the underlying motivation 
for exerting effort of employees in the low discretion conditions was less clear to the managers. 
Managers in the low discretion conditions could attribute employees’ effort to the certain 
benefits for the employee, to the fact that the employee trusted the manager or to both, while 
managers in the high discretion conditions could only attribute employees’ effort to the fact 
that the employee trusted the manager. Therefore, managers in the low discretion conditions 
could have acted in a rational way (allocating only 40% of the bonus pool to the employee) 
instead of being driven by reciprocity, nonetheless they chose to reciprocate as well. Managers 
in all experimental conditions indicated that they thought their employees trusted them. 
Additionally, companies often allow for managers’ justification of bonus allocations which 
can reduce conflicts, misinterpretations and faulty attributions (Hermans et al., 2017). In 
addition, feedback can motivate employees as well. These are interesting topics for future 
research. Similarly, manager and employee had to interact for 12 periods in the experiment. 
Employees were not allowed to resign if managers acted opportunistically and managers were 
not allowed to fire lazy employees. Employees’ potential threat to leave the company in case 
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of insufficient bonus allocations and the managers’ potential threat of dismissal in case of 
insufficient employee effort, put a cap on employees’ and managers’ opportunistic behavior in 
practice and provide an interesting area for future research. In our paper, 40% of the employee 
bonus was non-discretionary and this percentage was exogenously decided upon. In practice 
managers might set this percentage themselves or the percentage might be a result of 
negotiation between manager and employee. Managers choosing to apply a formal control 
system (low discretion) or a less formal control system (high discretion) might send a message 
to their employees, which might lead to different effects than managers that cannot choose the 
extent of managerial discretion involved. We leave this for future research.  
Next, in practice, manager and employee can choose to join companies that fit their 
preferred work situation regarding manager-employee compensation inequality and managerial 
discretion and therefore jealousy, envy, inequity-aversion and social preferences may play a 
lesser role. However, we need future research to confirm these presumptions. Additionally, 
employee performance and all payoffs in the experiment were very clear to the manager and 
the employee, while in reality employee performance, compensation inequality, relative 
payouts of profits and the construction of the bonus system might be more ambiguous and 
secret. Previous research indicates this affects managers’ performance evaluations (Bol et al., 
2016) and their use of discretion (Maas et al., 2012). Finally, there was a clear link between 
bonus amounts received by managers and employees, in that managers and employees had 
adverse interests in the bonus allocation because the manager was residual claimant, which is 
not always the case. The manager being the residual claimant in the bonus pool or not, might 
affect results. We leave this issue for future research as well. 
 
  
 65 
 
Chapter 3 
The role of information accuracy and accountability 
in bonus allocations 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Managers often subjectively allocate bonuses amongst their employees in order to stimulate 
employee performance. Previous literature shows that managers tend to compress their bonus 
allocations in order to avoid confrontation with their employees, which usually results in 
disadvantageous organizational outcomes (Bol, 2011, Bol et al., 2016; Moers, 2005). This 
paper examines the potential role of two control system design elements to decrease managers’ 
compression in bonus allocations: the accuracy of the performance information on which 
managers base their evaluations and process accountability (meaning that managers get the 
opportunity to write a justification on how they allocated employee bonuses). A path analysis 
shows how the two control system elements jointly affect managers’ compression in bonus 
allocations. More accurate performance information leads to more differentiation in bonus 
allocations, which is in line with the informativeness principle (Holmström, 1979). 
Furthermore, highly accurate information in the presence of process accountability increases 
managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of 
differentiation in bonus allocations. In this context, managers tend to differentiate more when 
evaluating employees and allocate bonuses correspondingly. 
 
Keywords: subjective performance evaluation, bonus allocation, information accuracy, 
process accountability, centrality bias 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study investigates how control system design affects the extent to which managers 
differentiate in bonus allocations when subjectively assessing the performance of their 
employees. Subjective performance assessments and attached rewards are highly common in 
today’s work environment in order to create incentives for employees (Rajan & Reichelstein, 
2006). A manager can often base her evaluation on a performance overview containing 
multiple performance measures, such as a balanced scorecard. She then has to subjectively 
decide upon the weights she attaches to the different performance measures (Cardinaels & van 
Veen-Dirks, 2010; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003). 32  However, managers’ 
                                                     
32 Therefore subjective performance evaluation differs from formula-based bonus allocations, which are based on 
weights that are fixed ex-ante. The correctness of a subjective evaluation cannot be verified by a third party, 
because it entails subjective judgment (Bol, 2008; Bol & Smith, 2011). With subjective evaluations the manager 
can redirect employees to the performance measures that need more attention in the future due to changing 
circumstances. Additionally, the manager can avoid that employees manipulate measures or focus too much on 
particular performance measures (“gaming of the performance evaluation system”) (Bol, 2008). 
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preferences and judgment biases may impair the performance evaluation process (Bol et al., 
2016; Moers, 2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1993; Prendergast, 1999), especially when the 
evaluation decision has direct financial consequences for the employees (Prendergast & Topel, 
1993). Managers try to avoid confrontation with dissatisfied employees and they may thereby 
inadequately differentiate in performance ratings between employees (i.e. centrality bias) 
(Bailey et al., 2011; Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Moers, 2005). Centrality bias is related to 
lower employee performance (Golman & Bhatia, 2012) and lower employee performance 
improvement (Ahn et al., 2010; Bol, 2011). A fair performance evaluation is desirable for 
organizations in order to align employee incentives with firm objectives (Baker et al., 1988; 
Gibbs et al., 2004).33  
Bol et al. (2016) already demonstrated how the interplay of two elements of the management 
control system, performance information accuracy and outcome transparency, influences 
managers’ personal costs and benefits related to the performance evaluation and thereby affects 
managers’ compression of employee performance evaluations. More specifically, they show 
that increasing information accuracy increases the extent to which managers differentiate in 
the bonus allocation, but only when there is transparency about evaluation outcomes (Bol et 
al., 2016).34 In this study, we focus on a complementary element of the management control 
system, process accountability (meaning that managers get the opportunity to write a 
justification on how they allocated bonuses to their employees), which is different from 
outcome transparency (Castilla, 2015).35 Performance evaluation systems vary across firms, 
and some firms incorporate the possibility to justify performance assessments, while others do 
not (Brutus, 2010; Castilla, 2015). While data quality can be different, perceptions of data 
quality (information accuracy) may vary across its users as well (Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & 
Strong, 1996). Prior literature already indicates how performance information accuracy and/or 
process accountability reduce the common measures bias in managers’ performance evaluation 
                                                     
33  Fair performance evaluations are evaluations in which the rewards are allocated amongst the employees 
proportionally to the employees’ input or work contributions. The employees should not perceive any difference 
between their rewards-to-input ratio and the rewards-to-input ratio of any colleague (Adams, 1963, 1965; Golman 
& Bhatia, 2012; Walster et al., 1973). Fair performance evaluations therefore differ from equal performance 
evaluations, in which the allocated rewards to each employee are the same or similar, irrespective of employees’ 
input or work contributions (Reis & Gruzen, 1976). Equal performance evaluations are the result of centrality 
bias. 
34 The logic behind the result of Bol et al. (2016) is that if outcome transparency is absent, managers will increase 
the bonus of weaker employees, in line with employees’ overly optimistic self-perceptions, in order to avoid costly 
confrontations with weaker employees. The increased weaker employees’ bonuses lead to more compression in 
the bonus allocation. Being unaware of the bonuses received by their weaker colleagues, the stronger employees 
will not complain. However, in case of outcome transparency, social comparison between employees is possible 
and stronger employees will complain about the inflation of weaker employees’ bonuses. Managers with relatively 
accurate performance information will not increase weaker employees’ bonuses anymore (which leads to more 
differentiation in bonuses), as confrontation with weaker employees is less costly in case of accurate performance 
information, while it allows to satisfy the stronger employees. With less accurate information, managers will still 
increase weaker employees’ bonuses, as this leads to the least confrontation costs. 
35 Supervisors may be accountable for their performance evaluations to their superiors, their subordinates or both 
(Ferris et al., 2008). However, the justification of performance evaluations to subordinates is the norm (Libby et 
al., 2004). 
 67 
 
(Libby et al., 2004).36 We investigate the effect of two control system elements, information 
accuracy and process accountability, because, according to our theory, they jointly affect 
managers’ estimates of employees’ perceived procedural fairness of the bonus allocation 
process and we reason that it is in managers’ interest to differentiate more in bonus allocations 
when they estimate that their employees will perceive the decision-making procedures leading 
to a differentiation in bonus allocations as more fair.  
We first hypothesize that information accuracy is positively related to managers’ 
differentiation in bonus allocation because a manager should put more weight on a measure 
that is more informative or accurate about employee effort (Holmström, 1979). Additionally, 
managers take into account that employees evaluate the fairness of the allocation procedures, 
which then affects employees’ perceived fairness of the final bonus allocation (Leventhal, 
1980). Employees are more likely to support a detrimental decision when they perceive the 
decision-making procedures as fair (Bies & Shapiro, 1988). Employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions of the bonus allocation process will increase if managers base their decision on 
more accurate information (Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980), if the opinions of employees 
affected by the decision have been taken into account (Colquitt et al., 2001) and if managers 
justify their decisions (Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Leventhal, 1980). Similarly, also informational 
fairness perceptions are related to information accuracy and the possibility for justification 
(Colquitt, 2001). 37  More specifically, accountability leads managers to engage in extra 
information processing in search for reasons to justify their decisions. Consequently they make 
better and more fair decisions, taking into account the perceptions of the employees affected 
by the decisions (Ashton, 1990; Brutus, 2010; Gibbins & Newton, 1994; Kennedy, 1993; 
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Libby et al. 2004; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2003). 
Providing a justification allows managers to signal they act fairly and it may further increase 
employees’ perceived procedural fairness of the bonus allocation process (Bies & Shapiro, 
1988). However, the effect of accountability on employees’ perceived procedural fairness is 
likely to depend on performance information accuracy. If the data quality of the performance 
measures is (perceived as) sufficiently high to make a decent decision and to write out a 
justification, employees receiving a justification of the bonus allocation process will have 
higher procedural and informational fairness perceptions (Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 
1980; Libby et al., 2004; Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 1996; Yim, 2001). In contrast, 
when the accuracy of the performance measures is (perceived as) low, it is less possible to 
make a decent decision and come up with a clear justification. In this case, employees 
procedural and informational fairness perceptions will be lower. Our second hypothesis 
therefore states that when managers have the opportunity to write out a justification, they have 
higher estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and employee acceptance of 
differentiation in bonus allocations when information accuracy is high than when information 
accuracy is low. Additionally, when employees have higher perceived procedural fairness, they 
                                                     
36 The common measures bias refers to managers’ tendency to focus on performance measures common to 
different business units and to ignore performance measures unique to a particular business unit while evaluating 
performance (Libby et al., 2004; Lipe & Salterio, 2000). 
37 Informational fairness perceptions refer the extent to which employees perceive that they receive timely, 
accurate, and reasonable explanations about decision-making processes or outcomes (Colquitt, 2001). 
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will more easily accept the final bonus allocations (Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Leventhal, 1980). 
This opens the path to the manager to differentiate more in her bonus allocations, as managers 
try to rate employees’ performance in line with their inputs and work contributions (Adams, 
1963, 1965; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Maas et al., 2012; Walster et al., 
1973). Thus, our third hypothesis predicts that managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations are positively related 
to the managers’ differentiation in bonus allocation.  
We use a 2*2 between-subjects experiment manipulating the accuracy of the performance 
measures (high vs. low) and the possibility managers get to provide a written justification for 
their bonus allocation (absent vs. present). In our experiment, students participate as evaluators 
in a hypothetical case setting. They assume the role of a regional manager allocating a fixed 
bonus pool amongst five store managers based on a performance overview containing three 
performance measures. Our findings, based on a path analysis, indicate that increasing 
performance information accuracy increases the managers’ differentiation in bonus allocations 
in a direct way (hypothesis 1). Next, the path analysis shows that information accuracy interacts 
with accountability such that accountability increases managers’ estimates of employees’ 
procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations, but only 
when information accuracy is relatively high (hypothesis 2). Finally, managers’ estimates of 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations are positively related to the managers’ differentiation in bonus allocations 
(hypothesis 3). 
This study contributes to the accounting and management literature on compressed rating 
behavior in bonus pools (Ahn et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2011; Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; 
Golman & Bhatia, 2011; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003; Moers, 2005; Prendergast & Topel, 
1993) in several ways. First, we contribute to the literature indicating that choices related to 
the design of the management control system should not be made in isolation, as they jointly 
influence evaluation bias (Bol et al., 2016; Libby et al., 2004). We research a similar setting as 
in Bol et al. (2016) and our results are strongly in line with theirs. However, we research a 
different kind of transparency (Castilla, 2008, 2015). Bol et al. (2016) focus on outcome 
transparency, a forced disclosure of the outcomes of the bonus allocation to all employees, 
which likely affects employees’ perceived distributive fairness and potential for social 
comparison. This paper researches process accountability, a voluntary disclosure of the bonus 
allocation process to each individual employee separately, but not the disclosure of outcomes 
of the bonus allocation. Additionally, we provide more details about the underlying process 
leading to compressed rating behavior, by examining how the two control system elements, 
information accuracy and process accountability, jointly affect managers’ estimates of 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and consequently managers’ performance 
evaluation.  
Second, we contribute to this literature by investigating the allocation of a fixed bonus pool. 
Prior literature focuses on the allocation of independent bonuses and shows that managers tend 
to rate asymmetrically: they often inflate bonuses of weaker employees in order to avoid 
confrontation with them, which results in compression in the bonus allocation (Bol, 2011; Bol 
et al., 2016; Moers, 2005). However, given the zero-sum nature of fixed bonus pools, any bonus 
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decision to certain employees involves some kind of balancing decision towards the other 
employees (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Bol et al., 2016; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). We show 
that managers’ decision to compress bonus allocations with a fixed bonus pool is symmetric in 
the sense that managers tend to inflate the bonuses of weaker employees as well as to decrease 
the bonuses of stronger employees. Lastly, we add to the literature on accountability in 
performance evaluations (Kennedy, 1993; Mero et al., 2003; Mero et al., 2007; Shore & 
Tashchian, 2002). In this paper we show that the effect of accountability differs depending on 
the level of accuracy of the performance measurement system. We hereby provide further 
insights into the use and effect of written comments in subjective performance assessments 
(Brutus, 2010). 
The next section presents the relevant literature and the development of the hypotheses. 
Section III discusses the research method and section IV focuses on the results. In section V 
we provide the discussion and conclusion. 
 
3.2 Literature & Hypotheses 
 
Subjective performance evaluations and differentiation in bonus allocations 
Subjective performance evaluations of employees by their manager are omnipresent (Gibbs 
et al., 2004; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). For the evaluation, a 
manager typically uses a performance overview containing multiple performance measures, 
often presented as a balanced scorecard. The operationalization of the performance scorecards 
varies considerably across firms (Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010; Lohman et al., 2004), 
as the performance measures in the scorecard are dedicated to key aspects of the business, 
reflecting the company’s’ strategy (Banker et al., 2004; Ittner et al., 2003, Libby et al., 2004). 
The manager then subjectively weighs performance on the different performance measures 
(Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003), but there is no best way to determine these weights 
(Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010; Libby et al., 2004). Managers might ignore certain 
performance measures, change the weightings of performance measures from period to period 
or include factors that were not even performance measures (Ittner et al., 2003; Lipe & Salterio, 
2000, 2002). Furthermore, evaluators might overly weigh performance on particular categories 
of measures at the expense of other categories, e.g. performance measures common to different 
business units versus measures unique to a particular business unit (Banker et al., 2004; Libby 
et al., 2004; Lipe & Salterio, 2000), financial measures versus non-financial measures 
(Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010; Ittner et al., 2003) or strategically linked performance 
measures versus non-linked measures (Banker et al., 2004; Humphreys & Trotman, 2011). 
Additionally, managers often do not adequately weigh differences in performance measures, 
resulting in insufficient differentiation in employees’ performance ratings i.e. centrality bias 
(Bailey et al., 2011; Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Levin, 2003; 
MacLeod, 2003; Moers, 2005). Managers try to avoid disputes and conflicts with their 
employees and they make a tradeoff between providing incentives to the employee ex ante 
(MacLeod, 2003) and reducing the cost of conflict with the employee ex post (Bol, 2011; Bol 
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et al., 2016; MacLeod, 2003).38 Fair, unbiased performance evaluations are needed in order to 
align employee incentives with firm objectives (Gibbs et al., 2004). Biased performance 
evaluations such as centrality bias reduce employees’ incentives (Ahn et al., 2010; Baker et al., 
1988; Bol, 2011; Golman & Bhatia, 2012), which leads to lower employee productivity (Baker 
et al., 1988), lower employee performance (Golman & Bhatia, 2012) and lower employee 
performance improvement (Ahn et al., 2010; Bol, 2011). Biased performance evaluations make 
it more difficult to distinguish good performers from average or bad performers as well, and 
therefore they may cause promotion of the wrong employees or misidentification of 
employees’ training needs (Bol, 2008).  
The performance evaluation’s success depends crucially on the confidence of the employees 
in the evaluator (Gibbs et al., 2004) and their attitudes related to the fairness and acceptability 
of the performance evaluation system (Dickinson, 1993, p. 142; Landy et al., 1978; Lawler, 
1967). Earlier research already examined the effect of contextual factors and components of 
the performance evaluation system on employees’ reactions related to fairness or justice of the 
systems (Dickinson, 1993; Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999; Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2012; Landy et 
al., 1978), such as the amount of the employees’ voice in the performance evaluation process 
(Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2012). 
In this study, we examine how variations in the perceptions of the accuracy of the 
performance information on which the manager bases her evaluation and process 
accountability affect the manager’s estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions of 
differentiation in bonus allocations and how these estimated fairness perceptions consequently 
affect compression in bonus allocations.  
 
Information Accuracy and Process Accountability: Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
The theoretical model of our study is presented in Figure 3.1. This model predicts that the 
interaction of performance information accuracy and process accountability determines 
managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions (hypothesis 2). Managers’ 
differentiation in the bonus allocation is then determined jointly by performance information 
accuracy (hypothesis 1) and their estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and 
acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations (hypothesis 3).  
  
                                                     
38 Traditionally, managers inflate performance ratings of weak employees in an attempt to avoid confrontation 
with unsatisfied, poor performers, while maintaining good relationships with stronger performers (Bol, 2011; Bol 
et al., 2016; Colella et al., 2007; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Mero et al., 2007; Shore & Tashchian, 2002). This 
asymmetric inflation of the ratings results in less variance in the remaining performance ratings i.e. performance 
evaluation compression (Bol et al., 2016). However, in the context of a fixed bonus pool, as in our study, these 
arguments do not hold, as other employees are affected by the bonuses given to colleagues. Increasing the bonus 
of one employee leads automatically in a decrease in the bonuses allocated to one or more other employees. With 
a fixed bonus pool, allocating bonuses fairly, in line with individuals’ performance or work contributions (Adams, 
1963; 1965), is the best strategy for a manager in order to avoid confrontation with employees (Walster et al., 
1973). 
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical Model 
 
________________ 
a Accuracy refers to whether the accuracy of the performance information is high or low. Accuracy is coded as 1 
for the High Accuracy conditions and 0 for the Low Accuracy conditions. 
b Accountability refers to whether the manager had an opportunity to provide a written justification for the bonus 
allocation or not. Accountability is coded as 1 for the Accountability conditions and as 0 for the No Accountability 
conditions. 
c Perceived Fairness of Differentiation reflects the managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations. Using a seven-point Likert scale, managers 
rated their agreement with the following statement: “If I would offer a well-performing store manager a much 
higher bonus than a badly-performing store manager, then my store managers would think that I am fair”. 
d Differentiation refers to the extent of differentiation in the bonus allocation. It is measured by two alternative 
variables (i.e. Differentiation, the standard deviation of the bonuses given to each of the 5 store managers or Bonus 
Range, the maximum bonus allocated to a store manager minus the minimum bonus allocated to a store manager).  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
More specifically, we argue that managers receiving more accurate performance 
information will differentiate more in their bonus allocations, in line with Holmström’s (1979) 
informativeness principle (hypothesis 1). Furthermore, if the performance measures are 
sufficiently accurate to make a motivated decision and write out a decent justification, 
managers estimate that employees receiving a justification of the bonus allocation process will 
have higher procedural and informational fairness perceptions (Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 
1980; Libby et al., 2004; Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 1996; Yim, 2001). In contrast, 
when the accuracy of the performance measures is (perceived as) low, it is less possible to 
make a decent decision and write out a corresponding justification. Consequently, managers’ 
estimates of employees procedural and informational fairness perceptions will be lower 
(hypothesis 2). Additionally, higher perceived procedural fairness results in a more easy 
acceptance of final bonus allocations (Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Leventhal, 1980). This allows the 
manager to differentiate more in bonus allocations, in line with her fairness preferences 
(Adams, 1963, 1965; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Maas et al., 2012; 
Walster et al., 1973) (hypothesis 3). We discuss each of the three hypotheses in greater detail 
below. 
 
Information accuracy and Differentiation in bonus allocations 
An increase in the perceived quality of the performance information (information accuracy) 
might be a useful means to reduce centrality bias. When evaluating employees, a manager 
subjectively weighs performance on the different performance measures (Höppe & Moers, 
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2011; Ittner et al., 2003). The determination of exact weights is often impossible (Libby et al., 
2004). However, the informativeness principle proclaims that any measure that is informative 
of employee effort should be incorporated in the performance evaluation and a manager should 
put more weight on a measure when that measure is more informative or accurate (Holmström, 
1979).39 Zero weights are unsuitable (Ittner et al., 2003; Libby et al., 2004) unless the data 
quality is sufficiently poor (Libby et al., 2004; Yim, 2001). Centrality bias is (amongst others) 
caused by the uncertainty about employees performance (Golman & Bhatia, 2012). Managers 
try to rate employees’ performance fairly, in line with employees’ inputs and work 
contributions (Adams, 1963, 1965; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Maas et al., 2012; Walster et al., 
1973). However, when the accuracy of the performance measures is (perceived as) low, it is 
difficult to judge how well an employee performed and to determine a fair rating. Managers 
want to decrease the probability that the subjective performance evaluation is very different 
from the true employee performance level. Taking into account that the probability for 
extremely good or bad employee performance is low, managers try to avoid these extremes, 
which then means that they do differentiate to a lesser extent in the performance evaluation 
(Bol, 2011; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003). In contrast, when the 
accuracy of the performance measures is (perceived as) high, it is easier to judge how well an 
employee performed and to come to a fair, differentiated rating. We therefore formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Information accuracy is positively related to managers’ differentiation in bonus 
allocation. 
 
Accountability, Information accuracy and Managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions  
Next, we research the possibility that managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions are jointly influenced by data quality (information accuracy) and process 
accountability. In order to make adequate performance assessments, managers need to invest 
time and effort in gathering and processing employee performance information. Since 
managers’ time is scarce and costly (Bol, 2008, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Kramer & Maas, 2014; 
Maas et al., 2012), they might not dedicate enough time to the information processing 
(Bernardin & Villanova, 1986; Bol, 2011). Prior literature indicates that the requirement to 
justify one’s decision to others (accountability) leads to better decision making and lower 
information processing biases such as overconfidence or insensitivity to new information 
(Ashton, 1990; Kennedy, 1993; Libby et al. 2004). Accountable managers are more attentive, 
engaged and motivated in the evaluation process. They care about how others see them (Mero 
et al., 2006) and they want to avoid appearing incompetent in front of the persons to whom 
they are accountable. Therefore they engage in extra effort and self-critique in search for 
reasons to justify their decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock et al. 1989). Accountable 
managers will look for cues about preferences of the persons to whom they are accountable 
                                                     
39 Information accuracy refers to the extent to which information is informative about employees' effort. It refers 
to the variability around a point estimate of an employee’s effort level (Bol et al., 2016). Information accuracy is 
similar to information precision (Banker & Datar, 1989). 
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and, when possible, provide ratings that are consistent with the perceived views (Mero et al., 
2007) in order to maximize the defensibility of their decision (Frink & Ferris, 1998; Klimoski 
& Inks, 1990; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2007; Tetlock et al., 1989). Consequently 
they make better and more fair decisions, taking into account the opinions of the employees 
affected by the decisions (Ashton, 1990; Brutus, 2010; Gibbins & Newton, 1994; Kennedy, 
1993; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Libby et al. 2004; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2003).  
Employees’ procedural fairness perceptions of the bonus allocation process are positively 
affected when the opinions of various employees affected by the evaluation have been taken 
into account (Colquitt et al., 2001) and when managers justify their decisions (Bies & Shapiro, 
1988; Leventhal, 1980). Providing a justification allows managers to signal they act fairly and 
it may further increase employees’ perceived procedural fairness of the bonus allocation 
process because it eliminates a worst-case reading of the managers’ motives and intentions 
(Bies & Shapiro, 1988). Furthermore, informational fairness perceptions are positively 
influenced by the possibility for justification as well. However, we expect that this is only the 
case if the performance measures are perceived as sufficiently accurate to make a proper 
decision (Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Libby et al., 2004; Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 
1996; Yim, 2001). It means that the positive effect of accountability on employees’ perceived 
procedural fairness is likely to depend on the accuracy of the information about employees’ 
performance used in the decision-making (Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980). Managers 
try to rate employees’ performance according to their fairness preferences (Adams, 1963, 1965; 
Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Maas et al., 2012; Walster et al., 1973). However, in case of inaccurate 
performance information, it is difficult to judge how well an employee performed and to 
determine a fair rating. In this situation it is hard for a manager to provide a reasonable 
justification of the performance evaluation and to credibly signal fair rating behavior to an 
employee. In this case, employees’ procedural and informational fairness perceptions will be 
lower. For managers with accurate performance information, on the other hand, it is easier to 
reasonably explain the performance evaluations and to credibly signal fair rating behavior to 
the employees. As a consequence, employees receiving a justification for the bonus allocation 
process will have higher procedural and informational fairness perceptions (Colquitt et al., 
2001; Leventhal, 1980; Libby et al., 2004; Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 1996; Yim, 
2001). This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Accountability will increase managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations, but only when 
information accuracy is relatively high. 
 
Managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and Differentiation 
in bonus allocations 
The performance evaluation’s success depends crucially on employees’ attitudes related to 
the fairness and acceptability of the performance evaluation system (Dickinson, 1993, p. 142; 
Landy et al., 1978; Lawler, 1967). Employees are more likely to support a detrimental decision 
when they perceive the decision-making procedures as fair (Bies & Shapiro, 1988). Managers 
take into account that employees evaluate the fairness of the allocation procedures and that 
these evaluations affect the perceived fairness of the final bonus allocation (Leventhal, 1980). 
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We therefore reason that it is in managers’ interest to differentiate more in bonus allocations 
when they estimate that their employees will perceive the decision-making procedures leading 
to a differentiation in bonus allocations as more fair. This results in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and 
acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations are positively related to the managers’ 
differentiation in bonus allocations. 
 
3.3 Method 
 
Experimental task and design  
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2*2 between subjects experiment. 
Participants conducted a performance evaluation task in a hypothetical case setting. They 
assumed the role of a regional manager of a retail chain. This regional manager had to divide 
a fixed bonus pool of 50.000 euros entirely amongst five store managers based on three 
performance measures. We manipulated two variables between subjects: the accuracy of the 
performance measures (High Accuracy or Low Accuracy) and whether the participants had the 
opportunity to justify or clarify their performance evaluations towards each of the five store 
managers (Accountability or No Accountability).  
 
Experimental procedures 
Upon arrival at the computer room each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
four experimental conditions. Participants received computerized instructions on the 
experimental task.40 They assumed the role of a regional manager of a local retail chain that 
was responsible for the five stores in her region. The instructions specified that these five stores 
had a similar size, sold the same assortment and faced similar market circumstances. 
Furthermore, these stores did not compete directly with each other. Participants were informed 
that the retail chain recently installed a bonus system whereby store managers of well 
performing stores could earn an extra financial reward. The instructions noted that the aim of 
the bonus system was to encourage store managers to perform as well as possible. The regional 
manager got the duty to allocate the bonus of 50.000 euros amongst the five store managers. 
The performance evaluation had to be based upon each store’s scores on three performance 
measures: employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and mystery shopping. Each 
component was scored on a 0-100 scale. The instructions specified that a survey amongst 
employees (customers) measured employee (customer) satisfaction. Additionally, it was stated 
that head office sent a mystery shopper to each store. The mystery shopper valued store 
performance in a subjective score. The case stipulated that the performance on the three criteria 
(employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and mystery shopping) would provide an 
indication of overall performance for each store manager in the previous year and that 
participants had to base their bonus decision on each of the three performance criteria. 
Participants in all four conditions received the same performance overview for the five store 
                                                     
40 We conduct the experiment in the Ztree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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managers containing the same performance information on the three performance measures.41 
Table 3.1 displays the performance overview. 
 
Table 3.1 Performance overview for 5 store managers and 3 performance measures 
 
 Employee satisfaction 
(score from 0 to 100) 
Customer satisfaction 
(score from 0 to 100) 
Mystery shopping 
(score from 0 to 100) 
Store manager A 68 72 79 
Store manager B 73 71 71 
Store manager C 95 85 92 
Store manager D 78 69 64 
Store manager E 51 48 49 
Average score 73 69 71 
________________ 
The table displays the performance overview that all participants received during the experiment. Participants 
were responsible for 5 store managers (Store manager A to E). They had to allocate a bonus amongst their store 
managers based on the performance on the 3 performance measures that were equally important and that were 
scored on a scale from 0 to 100 (employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and mystery shopping). Store 
manager C performed the best on all three performance measures, store manager E performed the worst on all 
three performance measures and the store managers A, B and D performed somewhat in-between. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participants were informed that the rewards allocated to each store manager would be 
personal and confidential. After reading all case information, participants were asked to divide 
the bonus of 50.000 euros amongst the five store managers. They then received a number of 
post-experimental and demographic questions. 
 
Dependent variables 
In this research we focus on the manager’s tendency to insufficiently differentiate bonus 
allocations (centrality bias). We use two measures to capture the extent to which the regional 
manager differentiates in the bonus allocation to the store managers: Differentiation and Bonus 
Range. We measured the bonus amounts (of the 50.000 euros fixed bonus pool) participants 
allocated to each of the five store managers. Differentiation is defined as the standard deviation 
of the bonuses given to each of the five store managers.42 Bonus Range is defined as the 
maximum bonus allocated to a store manager minus the minimum bonus allocated to a store 
                                                     
41 Firms often use scorecards that only contain performance measures that are common to all business units 
(Cardinaels & van Veen-Dirks, 2010). 
42 This measure is similar to the measure for centrality bias in Bol (2011). In her paper the ratio between the 
standard deviation of the objective performance measures and the standard deviation of the subjective 
performance ratings of all employees in a reference group provided by a manager is used as a measure for 
centrality bias. As the objective performance measures are the same in all treatments of our paper, we only focus 
on the standard deviation of the subjective performance ratings of all employees in the reference group. 
 76 
 
manager.43 This second variable will be used in supplemental analyses. Higher values for both 
dependent variables indicate a higher degree of differentiation in the bonus allocation, which 
means less centrality bias. Furthermore, in the post-experimental questionnaire, managers rated 
their agreement with the following statement (using a seven-point Likert scale): “If I would 
offer a well-performing store manager a much higher bonus than a badly-performing store 
manager, then my store managers would think that I am fair”. This variable, Perceived 
Fairness of Differentiation, refers to managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations.  
 
Manipulations 
In the 2*2 experiment the variables ‘information accuracy’ and ‘accountability’ were 
manipulated. We manipulated the variable information accuracy at two levels (high vs. low), 
as in Bol et al. (2016). Participants in the Low Accuracy conditions received the following 
message in the case description: “The performance criteria will give only a moderate picture 
of the performance of each individual store manager”. Participants in the High Accuracy 
conditions were instructed as follows: “The performance criteria will give a fairly accurate 
picture of the performance of each individual store manager”.  
The variable accountability was manipulated at two levels (present vs. absent), in line with 
Brutus (2010) and Libby et al. (2004). Participants in the Accountability conditions were given 
the opportunity to provide written comments to justify or clarify their bonus decision to each 
individual employee separately, whereas the participants in the No Accountability conditions 
did not get this opportunity. More specifically, participants in the Accountability conditions 
received additional messages mentioning “Additionally, you can justify your bonus decision in 
writing to each individual store manager” and “Written justification to the store manager: 
below you are allowed to indicate to each store manager why you allocate this amount of 
money to that store manager”. 44  Five text fields for the justification for each individual 
employee were then provided, next to the five input fields for the bonus amounts. 
 
Participants 
We recruited 292 undergraduate students from a business program in a large university. The 
students received a course credit as an incentive to participate in the experiment. The 
experiment lasted 30 to 60 minutes (depending on the decision speed of the participants). 129 
students were female and 163 were male. They were 20 years old on average (minimum 18 
years, maximum 29 years) and they had 8.3 months of work experience, which is significantly 
different from 0 (t291 = 11.511; p <0.001). 
  
                                                     
43 This measure is similar to the measure for centrality bias in Bol et al. (2016). In this paper centrality bias is 
captured by calculating the difference in bonus allocated to the strongest performer and the weakest performer. 
44 The justification of performance scores to a virtual person instead of an actual, living person is common in this 
literature (Bol et al., 2016; Libby et al., 2004; Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2003). 
 77 
 
3.4 Results 
 
Manipulation checks and Descriptive statistics 
In the No Accountability conditions the experimental computer program did not allow for a 
justification or clarification of the bonus allocation. As such, in these experimental treatments 
accountability was denied. In the Accountability conditions the experimental computer 
program provided the possibility for a written justification. All participants in the 
Accountability conditions chose to make use of this possibility and justified their bonus 
allocation to each store manager. The manipulation of accountability therefore worked. 
Furthermore, accountability did indeed lead to increased information processing: participants 
in the Accountability conditions did take significantly more time to make and justify their 
bonus decisions (mean = 787 seconds) than the time taken by participants in the No 
Accountability conditions to make their bonus decision (mean = 247 seconds)(F1, 290 = 359.131; 
p <0.001).45 Additionally, various items of the post-experimental questionnaire indicate the 
effects of accountability on participants’ rating behavior.46 Participants in the Accountability 
conditions had the perception that “they took the potential reaction of the store managers to 
their bonus decision” significantly more into account than the managers in the No 
Accountability conditions (F1, 290 = 5.228; p = 0.023). Furthermore, participants in the 
Accountability conditions admitted significantly more that “providing each store manager 
with a similar bonus would lead store managers to think that they insufficiently thought about 
the bonus decision” (F1, 290 = 3.339; p = 0.069). Participants in the Accountability conditions 
stated significantly more than participants in the No Accountability conditions that “a fair 
bonus division is important” (F1,290 = 8.391; p = 0.004) and that “they divided the bonus fairly” 
(F1, 290 = 6.830; p = 0.009). Participants in all conditions thought “one can avoid a potential 
reaction by the store managers providing a written justification” (mean of 5.79 on 7), which 
is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t291 = 26.429; p <0.001).
47 Participants in 
the Accountability conditions indicated that “they thoroughly explained the procedures used 
during the bonus allocation” (mean of 4.87 on 7), which is significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint of 4 (t146 = 7.408; p <0.001).  
In order to test our manipulation of performance information accuracy, we included a 
manipulation check question in the post-experimental questionnaire. Using a seven-point 
Likert scale, participants rated their agreement with the statement that “the three performance 
                                                     
45 Every p-value mentioned in this paper is a two-sided p-value. 
46 Using a seven-point Likert scale, we collected this data at the end of the experiment in order to avoid that 
participants’ attention was attracted to the presence or absence of the possibility for justification depending on the 
condition they were in and in order to avoid leading participants to certain response patterns. 
47 Participants in the No Accountability conditions agreed that “a written justification of the bonus allocation to 
the store managers would have been useful” (mean of 6.06 on 7), which is significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint of 4 (t144 = 23.965; p <0.001) and they agreed that “they would have liked to provide a written 
justification to the store managers” (mean of 5.74 on 7), which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 
4 (t144 = 15.061; p <0.001). Participants in the Accountability conditions agreed that “the written justification of 
the bonus allocation to the store managers was useful” (mean of 6.00 on 7), which is significantly higher than the 
scale midpoint of 4 (t146 = 18.913; p <0.001) and that “they would dislike allocating the bonus without a 
justification of the bonus allocation” (mean of 5.46 on 7), which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 
4 (t146 = 11.202; p <0.001). 
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measures provided a highly accurate image of the performance of each individual store 
manager”. Participants judged the accuracy of the performance measures to be significantly 
higher in the High Accuracy than in the Low Accuracy conditions (F1, 290 = 27.042; p <0.001). 
Thus, our manipulations of accountability and performance information accuracy were 
successful. 
Additionally we asked participants to indicate (on a seven-point scale) their agreement with 
a couple of statements related to the experimental task. Participants indicated they were 
motivated (mean of 6.37 on 7), which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t291 
= 58.825; p <0.001). The participants said that the instructions were clear (mean of 6.37 on 7), 
which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t291 = 48.322; p <0.001). Participants 
indicated that they had enough time to make their decisions (mean of 6.8 on 7), which is 
significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t291 = 99.241; p <0.001). Furthermore, 
participants did not think the task was difficult. The mean response (3.70 on 7) is significantly 
lower than the scale midpoint of 4 (t291 = 3.192; p = 0.002). All participants allocated the 
highest bonus to manager C and the lowest bonus to manager E, which is consistent with the 
performance information overview in Table 3.1. Together, these results suggest that 
participants felt they had sufficient time and were capable to make a reasonable performance 
evaluation. 
Table 3.2 shows the definitions and descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) by 
experimental condition for the main variables. This table shows the correlation matrix for the 
main variables as well.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A - Mean (Standard Deviation) 
  Accuracya 
  High  Low 
  Accountabilityb  Accountabilityb 
  Absent  Present  Absent  Present 
Dependent Measure  (n = 72)  (n = 74)  (n = 73)  (n = 73) 
Differentiationc  5,178.17  5,785.73  4,985.38  4,989.18 
  (2,085.94)  (1,976.46)  (1,885.73)  (1,687.75) 
Bonus Ranged  15,368.06  17,361.41  14,863.01  14,910.96 
  (5,967.04)  (5,633.34)  (5,517.18)  (4,960.50) 
Perceived Fairness   5.86  6.31  5.96  5.92 
of Differentiatione  (1.42)  (0.83)  (0.93)  (1.19) 
Maximum Bonusf  18,236.11  19,442.49  18,041.10  18,000.00 
  (4,263.32)  (4,048.20)  (3,619.73)  (3,106.89) 
Minimum Bonusg  2,868.06  2,081.08  3,178.08  3,089.04 
  (2,264.22)  (2,131.03)  (2,285.78)  (2,323.41) 
 
 
Panel B - Pearson Correlation Matrix (n = 292) 
 Differentiation Bonus Range Perceived Fairness of 
Differentiation 
Differentiation 1.000   
Bonus Range 0.990*** 1.000  
Perceived Fairness of 
Differentiation 
0.171*** 0.176*** 1.000 
 
***, ** and * Indicate p-value, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively, two-tailed. 
 
a Accuracy refers to whether the accuracy of the performance information is high or low. Accuracy is 
coded as 1 for the High Accuracy conditions and 0 for the Low Accuracy conditions. 
b Accountability refers to whether the manager had an opportunity to provide a written justification for 
the bonus allocation or not. Accountability is coded as 1 for the Accountability conditions and as 0 for 
the No Accountability conditions. 
c Differentiation refers to the extent of differentiation in the bonus allocation (i.e. the standard deviation 
of the bonuses given to each of the 5 store managers).  
d Bonus Range refers to the extent of differentiation in the bonus allocation (i.e. the maximum bonus 
allocated to a store manager minus the minimum bonus allocated to a store manager.).  
e Perceived Fairness of Differentiation reflects the managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations. Using a seven-point Likert 
scale, managers rated their agreement with the following statement “If I would offer a well-performing 
store manager a much higher bonus than a badly-performing store manager, then my store managers 
would think that I am fair.”. 
f Maximum Bonus refers to the maximum bonus allocated to a store manager. 
g Minimum Bonus refers to the minimum bonus allocated to a store manager. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Hypothesis tests 
Our first hypothesis predicts a positive effect of information accuracy on differentiation in 
bonus allocation. In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted an ANOVA analysis with 
Differentiation as the dependent variable and Accuracy and Accountability as the independent 
variables (not tabulated). The ANOVA analysis indicates a significant main effect for Accuracy 
(F1, 288 = 4.875; p = 0.028), in line with the informativeness principle (Holmström, 1979) and 
hypothesis 1. The ANOVA does not show a significant main effect for Accountability (F1, 288 
= 1.861; p = 0.174), nor a significant interaction of Accuracy and Accountability (F1, 288 = 1.816; 
p = 0.179). We additionally conducted a simple effects analysis. This analysis (not tabulated) 
indicates that Accountability leads to more differentiation in bonus allocations when Accuracy 
is high (F1, 288 = 3.676, p = 0. 056), but not when Accuracy is low (F1, 288 = 0.000, p = 0.990). 
Additionally, the simple effects analysis indicates that Accuracy leads to more differentiation 
in bonus allocations when managers are Accountable (F1, 288 = 6.364, p = 0.012), but not when 
managers are not Accountable (F1, 288 = 0.368, p = 0.545).
48  
In order to test hypothesis 2 (Accountability will increase managers’ estimates of 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations, but only when information accuracy is relatively high), we conducted an ANOVA 
analysis with Perceived Fairness of Differentiation as the dependent variable and Accuracy 
and Accountability as the independent variables. Consistent with the reasoning above, ANOVA 
results (not tabulated) indicate a significant interaction of Accuracy and Accountability on 
Perceived Fairness of Differentiation (F1, 288 = 3.548, p = 0.061). Simple effects analysis (not 
tabulated) indicates a significant effect of Accountability when Accuracy is high (F1, 288 = 5.956, 
p = 0.015) (i.e. when performance information accuracy is high, accountable managers estimate 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations higher (mean = 6.31 on 7) than non-accountable managers (mean = 5.86 on 7)) and 
no effect of Accountability when Accuracy is low (F1, 288 = 0.050, p = 0.824) (i.e. when 
performance information accuracy is low, accountable managers do not estimate employees’ 
procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations higher 
(mean = 5.92 on 7) than non-accountable managers (mean = 5.96 on 7)). This result supports 
hypothesis 2. Simple effects analysis further indicates a significant effect of Accuracy when 
Accountability is present (F1, 288 = 4.581, p = 0.033) (i.e. when managers are accountable, they 
estimate employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations higher when information accuracy is high (mean = 6.31 on 7) than when 
information accuracy is low (mean = 5.92 on 7)). Furthermore, there is no significant effect of 
Accuracy when Accountability is absent (F1, 288 = 0.280, p = 0.597) (i.e. when managers are not 
accountable, they do not estimate employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance 
                                                     
48 We also conducted an ANOVA analysis with our alternative dependent variable for centrality bias, Bonus 
Range. The results are similar to the results for Differentiation. ANOVA analysis on Bonus Range (not tabulated) 
shows a significant main effect for Accuracy (F1, 288 = 5.212; p = 0.023), no significant main effect for 
Accountability (F1, 288 = 2.486; p = 0.116), nor a significant interaction effect of Accuracy and Accountability on 
Bonus Range (F1, 288 = 2.258; p = 0.134). Simple effects analysis indicates that Accountability leads to 
differentiation in bonus allocations when Accuracy is high (F1, 288 = 4.741, p = 0.030), but not when Accuracy is 
low (F1, 288 = 0.003, p = 0.958). Accuracy leads to more differentiation in bonus allocations when managers are 
Accountable (F1, 288 = 7.215, p = 0.008), but not when managers are not Accountable (F1, 288 = 0.302, p = 0.583). 
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of differentiation in bonus allocations higher when information accuracy is high (mean = 5.86 
on 7) than when information accuracy is low (mean = 5.96 on 7)). 
To further investigate our expectations, we conducted a path analysis to test the overall 
process and the specific paths by which Accuracy and Accountability affect Perceived Fairness 
of Differentiation and eventually Differentiation in the bonus allocations (see also Barton & 
Mercer, 2005; Christ et al., 2012; Masschelein et al., 2012). Figure 3.2 displays the path model 
with standardized path coefficients significant at the 10% level or less (two-tailed). The model 
is suitable for the data, as indicated by several tests of goodness of fit. The Bentler Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI) (0.9560) indicates that our model is significantly better than the null model, 
since its value is above the recommended minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2001). The Goodness 
of Fit Index (GFI) (0.9798) indicates a good fit, since its value is above the generally accepted 
minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2001). However, χ2 (df = 2, n = 292) = 16.7425 (p = 0.0002) 
indicates that the model might be less suitable for the data, though this test is very sensitive to 
large sample sizes. The results of the path model indicate that Accuracy leads directly to more 
differentiation in bonus allocations (0.101; p < 0.1), confirming hypothesis 1. Furthermore, a 
significant interaction between Accuracy and Accountability indicates that managers estimate 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations higher when they are accountable and have accurate information at their disposal 
(0.191; p < 0.1), confirming hypothesis 2. Finally, managers’ estimates of employees’ 
procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations are 
positively related to the extent to which managers differentiate in their bonus allocations 
(0.139; p < 0.05), confirming hypothesis 3. Overall, our findings confirm the theoretical 
reasoning above.  
We conducted a similar path analysis to test the overall process for the alternative dependent 
variable Bonus Range as well.49 Results (not tabulated) are consistent. Accuracy leads directly 
to more differentiation in bonus allocations (0.100; p < 0.1), confirming hypothesis 1. A 
significant interaction between Accuracy and Accountability indicates that managers estimate 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus 
allocations higher when they are accountable and have accurate information at their disposal 
(0.191; p < 0.1), confirming hypothesis 2. Managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural 
fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations are positively related 
to the extent to which managers differentiate in their bonus allocations (0.137; p < 0.05), 
confirming hypothesis 3.  
 
  
                                                     
49 The Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) (0.9699) indicates a good fit, since its value is above the generally accepted 
minimum value of 0.95 (Byrne 2001). However, χ2 (df = 2, n = 292) = 26.0549 (p < 0.0001) indicates that the 
model might be less suitable for the data, though this test is very sensitive to large sample sizes. 
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Figure 3.2 Path Analysis Results 
 
________________ 
***, ** and * Indicate p-value, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively, two-tailed. 
a Accuracy refers to whether the accuracy of the performance information is high or low. Accuracy is coded as 1 
for the High Accuracy conditions and 0 for the Low Accuracy conditions. 
b Accountability refers to whether the manager had an opportunity to provide a written justification for the bonus 
allocation or not. Accountability is coded as 1 for the Accountability conditions and as 0 for the No Accountability 
conditions. 
c Perceived Fairness of Differentiation reflects the managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations. Using a seven-point Likert scale, managers 
rated their agreement with the following statement “If I would offer a well-performing store manager a much 
higher bonus than a badly-performing store manager, then my store managers would think that I am fair”. 
d Differentiation refers to the extent of differentiation in the bonus allocation (i.e. the standard deviation of the 
bonuses given to each of the 5 store managers).  
 
Fit Indices: χ2 (df = 2, n = 292) = 16.7425 (p = 0.0002); Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.9798; Adjusted GFI 
(AGFI) = 0.8487; Bentler Comparative Fit Index = 0.9560; standardized RMR = 0.1001 
Standardized path coefficients are presented. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Additional analyses 
Prior literature on compression in evaluations indicates that the compression in evaluations 
is caused by an asymmetric effect i.e. managers increase the bonus of weaker performers in 
order to minimize personal costs such as confrontation costs, while maintaining the same levels 
of bonuses for stronger performers (Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016). These studies examine the 
context of independent bonuses, in which they find that bonuses allocated to weaker performers 
do not affect bonuses allocated to stronger performers. Since in our setting, however, the bonus 
pool is fixed, the dynamics of managers’ compressed rating decisions might be different (Bol 
et al., 2016). A fixed bonus pool implies an inherent interdependence between the bonuses 
allocated to all employees. In other words, it is impossible to favor a weaker performer without 
affecting one or more other employees. We expect managers to allocate bonuses 
symmetrically, in the sense that they might offer weaker performers higher bonuses than they 
deserve and stronger performers lower bonuses than they deserve. In the following paragraph, 
we investigate this expectation empirically. 
If we examine the variables Maximum Bonus, the highest bonus allocated by the manager, 
and Minimum Bonus, the lowest bonus allocated by the manager, in closer detail, we see that 
they almost mirror each other. ANOVA analysis with Maximum Bonus as the dependent 
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variable and Accuracy and Accountability as the independent variables (not tabulated) indicates 
a significant main effect for Accuracy (F1, 288 = 3.416; p = 0.066): more accurate information 
leads to a higher Maximum Bonus in line with the informativeness principle (Holmström, 1979) 
and hypothesis 1. The ANOVA does not show a significant main effect for Accountability (F1, 
288 = 1.730; p = 0.189), nor a significant interaction of Accuracy and Accountability (F1, 288 = 
1.983; p = 0.160). We additionally conducted a simple effects analysis. This analysis (not 
tabulated) indicates that Accountability leads to a higher Maximum Bonus when Accuracy is 
high (F1, 288 = 3.708, p = 0. 055), but not when Accuracy is low (F1, 288 = 0.004, p = 0.948). 
Additionally, the simple effects analysis indicates that Accuracy leads to a higher Maximum 
Bonus when managers are Accountable (F1, 288 = 5.338, p = 0.022), but not when managers are 
not Accountable (F1, 288 = 0.096, p = 0.757). ANOVA analysis with Minimum Bonus as the 
dependent variable and Accuracy and Accountability as the independent variables (not 
tabulated) indicates a significant main effect for Accuracy (F1, 288 = 6.251; p = 0.013). In other 
words, more accurate information leads to a lower Minimum Bonus in line with the 
informativeness principle (Holmström, 1979) and hypothesis 1. The ANOVA does not show a 
significant main effect for Accountability (F1, 288 = 2.762; p = 0.098), nor a significant 
interaction of Accuracy and Accountability (F1, 288 = 1.753; p = 0.187). We additionally 
conducted a simple effects analysis. This analysis (not tabulated) indicates that Accountability 
leads to a lower Minimum Bonus when Accuracy is high (F1, 288 = 4.457, p = 0. 036), but not 
when Accuracy is low (F1, 288 = 0.057, p = 0.811). Additionally, the simple effects analysis 
indicates that Accuracy leads to a lower Minimum Bonus when managers are Accountable (F1, 
288 = 7.363, p = 0.007), but not when managers are not Accountable (F1, 288 = 0.687, p = 0.408). 
It means that the observed pattern of managers’ differentiation in the bonus allocation is 
symmetrically caused both by a higher bonus allocated to the strongest store manager and by a 
lower bonus allocated to the weakest store manager. 
We further look at the bonuses allocated to the three mediocre store managers. ANOVA 
analysis with the average bonus allocated to the three mediocre store managers as the 
dependent variable and Accuracy and Accountability as the independent variables (not 
tabulated) indicates an insignificant main effect for Accuracy (F1, 288 = 0.702; p = 0.403), an 
insignificant main effect for Accountability (F1, 288 = 0.607; p = 0.437) and an insignificant 
interaction of Accuracy and Accountability (F1, 288 = 0.345; p = 0.557). ANOVA analysis with 
the standard deviation of the bonuses allocated to the three mediocre store managers as the 
dependent variable and Accuracy and Accountability as the independent variables (not 
tabulated) indicates an insignificant main effect for Accuracy (F1, 288 = 0.047; p = 0.828), an 
insignificant main effect for Accountability (F1, 288 = 0.455; p = 0.500) and an insignificant 
interaction of Accuracy and Accountability (F1, 288 = 0.027; p = 0.870). As such, the average 
level of the bonus allocated to mediocre store managers and the compression in the bonuses of 
mediocre store managers is not affected by information accuracy nor process accountability. It 
means that the observed pattern of managers’ differentiation in the bonus allocation is caused 
both by a higher bonus allocated to the strongest store manager and by a lower bonus allocated 
to the weakest store manager, but not by adjustments to the bonuses of mediocre store 
managers. 
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3.5 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we investigate the common practice that allows managers subjectively 
evaluate and reward employees based on a number of key performance measures (Gibbs et al., 
2004; Golman & Bhatia, 2012; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). One of the main problems with 
subjective performance evaluation is that managers usually do not differentiate adequately 
between employees (Bol, 2008; Moers, 2005). This is not desirable for organizations, as more 
differentiation leads to favorable organizational outcomes such as higher employee incentives, 
productivity, performance and performance improvement and better recognition of which 
employees might be eligible for promotion or additional training (Ahn et al., 2010; Baker et 
al., 1988; Bol, 2011; Golman & Bhatia, 2012). 
We develop and find support for a causal model that explains how managers subjectively 
allocate a fixed bonus pool to a number of employees. Specifically, our model shows how (the 
perceived) accuracy of the performance information and a manager’s opportunity to write out 
a justification for the bonus allocation to her employees (process accountability) influence how 
much a manager differentiates her bonus allocations amongst employees. Higher (perceived) 
information accuracy directly leads to more differentiation in bonus allocations compared to 
lower (perceived) information accuracy, supporting the informativeness principle (Holmström, 
1979). Furthermore, (perceived) information accuracy and the possibility to write out a 
justification for the bonus allocation jointly influence the manager’s estimates of employees’ 
procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of differentiation in bonus allocations. More 
specifically, managers estimate employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and acceptance of 
differentiation in bonus allocations as higher when the performance information accuracy is 
high and when they are allowed to justify the bonus allocation to the employees. Managers will 
consequently differentiate more in their bonus allocations to employees, in line with their 
estimates of employees’ perceived procedural fairness.  
Allowing managers to write out a justification for their bonus allocation provokes 
accountability urges that lead them to process the information better and to take better decisions 
(Ashton, 1990; Gibbins & Newton, 1994; Kennedy, 1993; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Mero & 
Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2003), but the manager will only use data that is perceived fit 
for use, of sufficiently high quality (Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 1996). Organizations 
should therefore invest in either higher data quality, or either perceptions of higher data quality. 
Since perceptions of data quality (information accuracy) vary across different users of the 
performance information (Pipino et al., 2002; Wang & Strong, 1996), organizations could 
consider dedicating time and resources to specific communication aimed to alter or improve 
managers’ perceptions about the data quality of the performance measures (Libby et al., 2004). 
Such perceptions will eventually drive the use of the performance measures in performance 
evaluation. More accurate information often comes at a cost and firms need to make a trade-
off between higher data quality and costs for investments in data-gathering and higher data 
quality (Bol, 2011). Based on our observations, we conclude that extra investments in higher 
(perceptions of) data quality (and the often extensive related costs) are worthwhile, especially 
when organizations provide managers the possibility to justify their bonus allocations: it will 
encourage managers to spend time and effort on information processing and will strengthen 
the pay-for-performance relationship. Our results are in line with the call for dedicating enough 
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time, effort and/or resources to the performance information gathering process by Bol (2011), 
because we observe that extra time and effort spent on information processing during the 
performance evaluation (induced by accountability) cannot make up for a lack of sufficiently 
accurate performance information. Allowing a manager to justify her performance evaluation 
decision when she perceives the performance information as inaccurate is not worthwhile, as 
it is a waste of the manager’s valuable productive time without altering her estimates of 
employees’ procedural fairness perceptions, or, at the bottom line, the degree to which she 
differentiates in the bonus allocation. In our experiment, for instance, accountable managers 
with inaccurate performance information spent on average 828 seconds on the performance 
evaluation and justification, which is significantly higher than the 748 seconds spent by the 
accountable managers with accurate performance information. 
This study contributes to the accounting and management literature on subjective 
performance evaluation based on scorecards (Banker et al., 2004; Cardinaels & van Veen-
Dirks, 2010; Humphreys & Trotman, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003; Lipe & Salterio, 2000; Libby et 
al., 2004). Our findings are useful, as they provide interesting insights on managers’ rating 
behavior, and more specifically centrality bias in performance evaluations (Ahn et al., 2010; 
Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Golman & Bhatia, 2011; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003; Moers, 
2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). First, we contribute to the literature indicating that choices 
related to the design of the management control system should not be made in isolation, as they 
influence evaluation bias (Bol et al., 2016; Libby et al., 2004). We research a similar setting as 
in Bol et al. (2016) and our results are strongly in line with theirs. However, while both papers 
are related to information asymmetry from the perspective of the employees, process 
accountability and outcome transparency are different concepts (Castilla, 2008, 2015). 50 
Outcome transparency (the focus of Bol et al., 2016) relates to a forced disclosure of the 
outcomes of the bonus allocation to all employees, whereas process accountability (the focus 
of this paper) relates to a voluntary disclosure of the bonus allocation process to each individual 
employee separately, but not to the disclosure of outcomes of the bonus allocation. Pay secrecy 
is an established organizational practice that firms often do not want to alter, because it reduces 
or avoids conflicts in the workplace (Colella et al., 2007). In this context, process accountability 
might be a valid alternative to outcome transparency that is more easy to install and leads to 
similar results for managers’ performance evaluation. 
Second, we provide more details about the underlying process leading to compressed rating 
behavior, by examining how the two control system design elements, information accuracy and 
process accountability, jointly affect managers’ estimates of employees’ procedural fairness 
perceptions and consequently managers’ performance evaluation (Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; 
Moers, 2005). Third, we contribute to this literature by investigating the allocation of a fixed 
bonus pool. Prior literature focuses on the allocation of independent bonuses, showing that 
managers tend to rate asymmetrically. Compression in bonus allocations is an indirect effect 
of managers’ decision to inflate weaker employees’ bonuses (Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; 
Moers, 2005). However, with a fixed bonus pool managers can no longer inflate weaker 
                                                     
50 See Castilla (2008, 2015) for a discussion of the differences and similarities between transparency and process 
acountability. 
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employees’ bonuses without affecting other employees’ bonuses and risking confrontation with 
these employees. Therefore the allocation of a fixed bonus pool involves a deliberate decision 
of a manager to differentiate in bonus allocation, taking into account the fairness for all 
employees (Walster et al., 1973). Balancing between employees in the bonus allocation is 
inherent given the zero-sum nature of fixed bonus pools (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Rajan & 
Reichelstein, 2006) and this inherent interdependence might change the dynamics of managers 
(Bol et al., 2016). We demonstrate indeed that the dynamics of managers’ rating decisions 
change when using a fixed bonus pool instead of independent bonuses. Firstly, our research 
shows that manager’s decision to compress bonus allocations with a fixed bonus pool is 
symmetric i.e. managers tend to inflate bonuses of weaker employees as well as to decrease 
bonuses of stronger employees. Secondly, our research indicates that the manager’s decision 
to compress bonus allocations with a fixed bonus pool is directly dependent on performance 
information accuracy. Third, we add to the literature on accountability and its debiasing 
potential in performance evaluations as well (Brutus, 2010; Hoffman & Patton, 1997; Kennedy, 
1993; Libby et al., 2004; Mero et al., 2003; Mero et al., 2007; Roch, 2005; Shore & Tashchian, 
2002). Some judgment biases are more effort-related than others and hence some judgment 
biases are more susceptible to accountability’s debiasing potential (Kennedy, 1993). We 
demonstrate that accountability’s debiasing potential for the centrality bias depends on the 
accuracy of the performance information.  
We recognize that this study is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, participants in the 
computer-based experimental task evaluated a hypothetical case and did not actively interact 
with the people they had to evaluate. This setting did not allow for potential conflict with one 
of the subordinates and limited the fear for negative reactions by one of the subordinates. The 
absence of physical interaction is highly common in the literature (Bol et al., 2016; Klimoski 
& Inks, 1990; Mero et al., 2007; Shapiro, 1975). As our results are already strong in a situation 
without a potential conflict, we are convinced that actual, face-to-face interaction would make 
the results even more significant. We assume that in a situation with actual face-to-face 
interaction and more being at stake, managers in the Low Accuracy - Accountability condition 
might have attempted to avoid confrontation with their subordinates and therefore might have 
allocated less differentiated bonuses than participants in the Low Accuracy – No 
Accountability condition. The differentiation is expected to be even lower when accountable 
managers would find out, through their extra information-processing, that the performance 
information is so inaccurate that a differentiated bonus allocation is impossible to justify to the 
employees, whereas managers that are not accountable would not come to this conclusion. 
However, we consider it unlikely that organizations would use performance information in the 
performance evaluation that is so inaccurate that accountable managers consider it worthless 
to use. Additionally, we consider it unlikely that managers that are not accountable would not 
be able to detect the inferiority of the ‘worthless’ performance information. We leave this for 
future research. Furthermore, we operationalized accountability as a ‘possibility’ to write out 
a justification to the subordinate, while it could be a requirement (Libby et al., 2004; Mero & 
Motowidlo, 1995; Mero et al., 2007). We believe that our results would have been even more 
outspoken if we would have used a requirement instead of a possibility. Realistic alternatives 
are to introduce a justification towards a superior, or towards both a superior and the 
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subordinates (Ferris et al., 2008; Libby et al., 2004; Mero et al., 2007). The justification of 
performance evaluations to subordinates is the norm (Libby et al., 2004), but we leave it for 
future research to investigate whether the justification towards a superior or towards both a 
superior and the subordinates affects our results. Lastly, the performance measures on which 
the participants had to base their performance evaluations in our experiment were all expressed 
in terms of a numerical, quantitative rating scale. This may have affected participants’ 
perceptions of the information accuracy. More specifically, participants may perceive 
numerical performance measures as more accurate and objective than measures rated on a 
verbal scale or more subjective performance measures such as perceptions of the supervisor 
regarding the behavior of her subordinates.51 Quantitative performance measures are often 
called objective. However, the measures can often be manipulated by the employee or the 
manager and they may often not measure exactly what they are thought to measure, so this 
terminology is misleading (Gibbs et al., 2004). If participants in the Low Accuracy conditions 
thought the performance measures were rather accurate and objective, this may have reduced 
the strength of the manipulation of Information Accuracy. Nonetheless, we obtained significant 
results, but we recommend future research to include more subjective, non-numerical 
performance measures. 
  
                                                     
51 Even in the Low Accuracy conditions participants thought the performance measures were quite accurate. Their 
average response to the statement “the three performance measures provided a highly accurate image of the 
performance of each individual store manager” was 4.13 on 7, which is not significantly different from the scale 
midpoint of 4 (t145 = 1.089; p = 0.278), but still rather high.  
 88 
 
Chapter 4 
Performance evaluation in a multitasking 
environment: the effect of task complexity,  
distorted time allocation and  
detailed relative performance information 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Employees often work on multiple tasks, involving the need to schedule these tasks 
appropriately (Gonzalez & Mark, 2004). Previous research indicates that employees often 
distort their effort allocation across tasks away from the firm-preferred effort allocation as a 
reaction to relative performance information (RPI) (Hannan et al., 2013). This distortion 
reduces employee performance (Hannan et al., 2013) and ultimately firm performance (Farkas, 
2013). In this paper we describe the results of two experiments in which two employees work 
on two tasks for a manager. In both experiments, we manipulated task complexity (a context 
with two complex tasks versus a context with two less complex tasks). The paper examines the 
joint role of task complexity and distortion in effort allocation across tasks on employee 
performance. Additionally, we investigate how a management control system providing 
detailed RPI and a discretionary bonus affects employees’ effort allocation across tasks. Our 
findings indicate that a distorted allocation of effort across tasks indeed leads to lower 
employee overall performance on both tasks, consistent with Hannan et al. (2013). However, 
the effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall employee performance on 
both tasks is less negative in a work environment consisting of complex tasks than in a work 
environment with simple tasks. Furthermore, we find that, in the first period, employees will 
focus on the task for which they have the highest skills or find easiest in order to perform at 
least well on that task. However, managers’ bonus allocation is in line with the RPI they receive 
about the employees. Consistent with social comparison theory and expectancy theory 
(Festinger, 1954; Vroom, 1964), we find that after the provision of RPI and the performance 
evaluation, employees reallocate their time across tasks such that they focus more (less) on 
tasks for which they under(out)performed relative to their colleague. 
 
Keywords: task complexity, detailed relative performance information, multitasking, social 
comparison, performance evaluation 
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4.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates how employees’ effort allocation across tasks and task complexity52 
jointly affect employees’ overall performance in a multitasking environment. Additionally, we 
research how employees’ effort allocations across tasks are influenced by managers’ 
performance evaluations based on detailed relative performance information (RPI). 53 
Nowadays, time management has become an important aspect of employees’ job. Employees 
typically engage in multiple tasks, involving the need to schedule these tasks appropriately 
(Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012; Farkas, 2013; Gonzalez & Mark, 2004; Kushleyeva et al., 
2005; Payne et al., 2007). A trade-off in attention allocation exists as effort expended on one 
task cannot be expended on another task (Eichhorn, 2016; Farkas, 2013). Employees often 
overly focus on some tasks, neglecting the other ones, leading to overachievement on some 
tasks and underachievement on others (Baker et al., 1994; Hannan et al., 2013; Ittner et al., 
2003). Such dysfunctional employee behavior is unwanted, as employees that distort their 
effort allocations across tasks away from the firm-preferred allocations reduce employee 
overall performance, firm productivity and profits (Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). 
Organizations can therefore assist their employees by designing management control 
systems that motivate the appropriate level and allocation of effort across tasks according to 
firm preferences (Chenhall, 2003; Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). One possibility is to 
work with financial incentives based on detailed relative performance information to redirect 
employees’ effort allocations across tasks (Brüggen, 2011; Brüggen & Moers, 2007; Eichhorn, 
2016; Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Prior research demonstrated the positive effect of 
RPI on employee performance in a single-task setting (Kramer et al., 2016; Murthy & Schafer, 
2011; Tafkov, 2013) and concluded that this positive effect is larger under a performance-based 
contract than under a flat-wage contract (Tafkov, 2013). However, when RPI is provided in a 
multi-tasking setting without financial incentives, it reduces performance and does not lead to 
firm-preferred effort allocations (Hannan et al., 2013). We are therefore interested in 
investigating whether tying financial incentives to RPI would be useful to reach firm-preferred 
effort allocations and better performance in a multi-task setting. An earlier study on financial 
incentives in a multi-tasking setting (Farkas, 2013) demonstrates that financial incentives are 
not effective at directing employee effort or improving performance. She also demonstrates 
that RPI has a negative effect on employees’ effort allocation and performance in the presence 
of financial incentives. However, this result may be due to the fact that employees did not 
believe they were able to obtain the compensation (Farkas, 2013). In contrast, we examine how 
employees would act when they are evaluated under a discretionary bonus pool that brings the 
bonus into reach. In a multitasking environment, a discretionary system in which the manager 
has the final say in the evaluation seems particularly useful, since it is impossible to design and 
install a complete contract specifying all possible outcomes and related employee rewards in 
this context (Gibbs et al., 2004; MacLeod and Parent, 1999; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). 
                                                     
52 “Broadly defined, task complexity refers to the amount of attention or processing a task requires as well as the 
amount of structure and clarity the task provides” (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). 
53 Relative performance information is information regarding some aspect of peer performance (Farkas, 2013). 
Detailed relative performance information is information about the specific performance levels of peers (Kramer 
et al., 2016). 
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Additionally, discretionary bonus pools mitigate the occurrence of distorted performance, 
which is often associated with formula-based performance evaluations (Ittner et al., 2003).  
In this paper, we first investigate how employees’ distortion in effort allocation across tasks 
away from the firm-preferred equal effort allocation and task complexity jointly affect 
employees’ overall performance (hypothesis 1 and 2). We research employees’ effort 
allocation and its effect on their overall performance across settings with different levels of 
task complexity (a setting with complex tasks versus a setting with less complex tasks), because 
accounting task settings can vary strongly in complexity and complexity is one of the most 
important determinants of performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Our first hypothesis 
predicts that employees’ overall performance is lower when effort allocations are distorted 
(Hannan et al., 2013). Furthermore, the extant literature also highlights the role of task 
complexity reducing employee performance because employees’ abilities increasingly cannot 
meet task complexity (Bonner et al., 2000; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bonner, 2008, p. 161). 
However, since complex tasks require both additional skills and additional effort from 
employees (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002), we predict in hypothesis 2 that in a setting with complex 
tasks a distorted effort allocation that overly focuses on a single task and therefore allocates 
additional effort to that task may be beneficial for solving that single task and that thus the 
negative effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on employee overall performance 
is less negative in a context of high task complexity than in a context of low task complexity. 
Second, we research how providing detailed RPI affects employees’ distortion of effort 
allocation across tasks away from the firm-preferred allocations (Hypothesis 3a, 3b and 5) and 
managers’ allocation of the discretionary bonus (hypothesis 4a and 4b). Employees typically 
spend more time on tasks for which they have higher skills (hypothesis 3a) or on easier, more 
productive tasks (hypothesis 3b) in order to maximize their return to effort (Duggan et al., 
2013; Farkas, 2013; Janssen et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2007). By doing so, employees may 
distort their effort allocations across tasks away from firm-preferred effort allocations. 
However, a management control system providing detailed RPI and installing a performance 
evaluation and reward system containing bonuses, can steer employees towards firms 
objectives and preferences (Chenhall, 2003). Based on equity theory, we predict that managers 
will allocate their bonus in line with the RPI (hypothesis 4a) (Adams, 1963, 1965; Walster et 
al., 1973) and that managers will punish deviations from firm-preferred effort allocations, in 
line with the objectives of the firm (hypothesis 4b) (Chenhall, 2003). Next, the provision of 
detailed relative performance information in the performance evaluation process allows 
employees to compare themselves with their colleagues and this social comparison will affect 
employees’ effort allocation across tasks (Festinger, 1954; Hannan et al., 2013). However, 
social comparison theory and self-affirmation theory provide contradicting predictions related 
to social comparison (Eichhorn, 2016; Festinger, 1954; Steele, 1988). According to social 
comparison theory, social comparison leads to competition and a drive to outperform 
colleagues on all tasks (Eichhorn, 2016; Festinger, 1954, P. 124 & 126; Tafkov, 2013). 
Therefore, in line with social comparison theory, we predict that employees working for 
multiple time periods, will in the next period focus more on the tasks they neglected before, 
and less on the task they overly focused on earlier (hypothesis 5). In contrast, self-affirmation 
theory predicts that social comparison causes employees to overly focus on some tasks at the 
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expense of other tasks, because they want to counter a threat to their self-image in one area by 
affirming their competence in another area (Steele, 1988) and/or satisfy an innate desire for 
social distinction (Frey, 2007) by outperforming their peers in at least one area (Farkas, 2013; 
Hannan et al., 2013). Therefore, self-affirmation theory predicts that employees will focus 
more on the tasks they overly focused on earlier, and focus less on the task they neglected 
before (Hannan et al., 2013). However, managers can use the management control system to 
induce an appropriate allocation of effort across tasks according to firm preferences (hypothesis 
4a, 4b & 5) (Chenhall, 2003; Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Employees will assess the 
likelihood that increased effort will yield higher performance and thus higher rewards and will 
allocate their effort accordingly (Farkas, 2013; Vroom, 1964). The discretionary bonus 
attached to performance on both tasks limits the opportunity for self-affirmation in a single 
area of performance and reduces the occurrence of disruptive employee behavior. Installing a 
performance evaluation system based on detailed RPI allows managers to thoroughly analyze 
employees’ performance, to detect and punish employees’ distorted performance, and to 
mitigate dysfunctional behavior in the future (Baker et al., 1994; Ittner et al., 2003). Therefore 
the performance evaluation system can incentivize employees to allocate their effort across 
tasks in line with firm preferences. The detailed RPI indicates precisely how employees should 
shift their time allocation in order to perform the tasks better than their colleague. Hypothesis 
5 predicts that employees will shift their time allocation from the task on which they 
outperformed their colleague - because they overly focused on that task or because they had 
higher abilities for that task - to the task for which they underperformed their colleague - 
because they neglected that task or had lower abilities for that task (Festinger, 1954; Vroom, 
1964). We expect that by doing so employees allocate their effort more in line with firm 
preferences.  
We address our research questions by means of two experiments in which two employees 
work for a manager in a multitasking (dual-task) environment for two periods. The employees 
can freely decide when to switch between tasks and how much time to allocate to each of two 
independent tasks. In both experiments, we manipulate the complexity of the tasks that the 
employees performed (task complexity; low vs. high) such that employees work on two simple 
tasks or two complex tasks. Afterwards, the managers receive a set of performance measures 
per employee on each task, they reward the employees with a bonus and they can motivate 
their evaluation towards the employees. The two experiments differ in terms of the 
management control system. In the first experiment the managers are required to allocate one 
bonus pool for overall performance on the two tasks. In the second experiment managers can 
allocate a separate bonus pool for performance on each task separately.  
Consistent with our predictions we find that a distorted allocation of effort across tasks leads 
to lower employee overall performance on both tasks (hypothesis 1) and that the negative effect 
of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall employee performance on both tasks is 
less negative for complex tasks than for simple tasks (hypothesis 2). Further, our findings 
indicate that, in the first period, employees will focus on the task for which they have the 
highest skills (hypothesis 3a), employees will focus on the easiest task in order to perform at 
least well on that task (hypothesis 3b) and after the provision of RPI and the performance 
evaluation, employees reallocate their time across task such that they focus more (less) on tasks 
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for which they under(out)performed relative to their colleague (hypothesis 5). Finally, we 
confirm hypothesis 4a that managers’ bonus allocation is in line with the RPI, but we do not 
find evidence for hypothesis 4b that, ceteris paribus, managers’ bonus allocation will be lower 
when employees’ performance deviates from the firm-preferred effort allocation. 
With this research we contribute to the growing stream of accounting research investigating 
effort allocation concerns in multi-task environments (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Brüggen & 
Moers, 2007; Hannan et al., 2013, 2017; Hecht et al., 2012). Especially, research on 
performance evaluations in a multitasking setting is lacking (Bailey & Konstan, 2006; Buser 
& Peter, 2012; Dux et al., 2009; Monsell, 2003; Ren et al., 2009; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Stoet 
et al., 2013). First, we provide additional insights on how performance-contingent monetary 
incentives and detailed RPI can affect employees’ allocations and levels of effort among an 
employee’s various responsibilities in small groups (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Hannan et al., 
2013, 2017). Most existing RPI studies provided employees with information about their 
relative rank instead of detailed RPI information.54 However, only detailed information can 
indicate employees exactly how their performance on the different tasks compares to the 
performance of their peers and how they could change their effort level and allocation (Kramer 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, many studies do not provide any performance-dependent pay 55, but 
performance-based incentives are omnipresent and affect employee performance (Bonner & 
Sprinkle, 2002; Eichhorn, 2016). Lastly, the majority of studies focuses on groups of 5 peers 
(Hannan et al., 2013; Kramer et al., 2016), yet, social comparison concerns and competitive 
behavior amongst peers as well as employee motivation and effort decrease if the number of 
peers increases (Garcia & Tor, 2009; Eichhorn, 2016). 
Second, we show the extent to which this effort allocation across tasks affects individual 
effort and task performance depending on task complexity (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Hannan 
et al., 2013). Our study thereby aims to respond to the call for more research on how the 
negative effects of task complexity on performance can be attenuated (Bonner, 2008, p. 167; 
Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Ren et al., 2009; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Segal, 2004). A potential 
important implication for practice is that, in a working environment with low task complexity, 
providing detailed RPI and basing bonus allocations to this information are efficient means to 
increase employee performance. In contrast, in a working environment with high task 
complexity, detailed RPI and bonus allocations attached to detailed RPI improve employee 
performance to a smaller extent. Lastly, RPI and bonus allocations attached to detailed RPI are 
able to steer employees effort allocations across tasks towards firm preferences. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the relevant 
literature and the development of the hypotheses. Section III discusses the experimental design 
and section IV focuses on the results. In section V we provide the discussion and conclusion. 
  
                                                     
54 Some studies on RPI in multitasking environments only provide information about the relative rank (Farkas, 
2013; Hannan et al., 2013) others provide detailed RPI (Hannan et al., 2017) and other studies on RPI in single-
task environments provide both relative ranks and detailed RPI (Kramer et al., 2016). 
55 Some studies introduce financial incentives (Brüggen, 2011; Christ et al., 2016; Eichhorn, 2016; Farkas, 2013; 
Guymon, 2008) others do not (Hannan et al., 2013; Kramer et al., 2016). 
 93 
 
4.2 Literature & Hypotheses 
 
In a first step, we research how the impact of employees’ effort (re)allocations across tasks 
on overall employee performance depends on the complexity of the tasks at hand. In a second 
step, we research how the provision of detailed RPI and bonus allocations based on RPI affect 
employees’ effort allocations across tasks. 
 
Distorted effort allocation across tasks, task complexity and employee overall 
performance 
The effort allocation decision across tasks is an important decision when working in a multi-
tasking context. 56, 57 Employees have to decide how much time to allocate to each task and 
time allocated to one task cannot be allocated to another task (Eichhorn, 2016; Farkas, 2013; 
Hannan et al., 2013). The effort allocation can have important consequences for employee 
performance and firm performance when the returns for the various tasks differ (Farkas, 2013; 
Hannan et al., 2013), but often the completion of less rewarding tasks is important or required 
as well (Farkas, 2013). Firms often want their employees to focus on several tasks at the same 
time; e.g. information workers perform administrative deskwork, respond to e-mails and phone 
calls or participate in scheduled and unscheduled meetings (Gonzalez & Mark, 2004) or 
employees in a customer service department focus on cross selling or up selling while 
providing excellent service to customers (Jasmand et al., 2012) or professors supervise 
students, perform departmental duties and participate in different research projects (Gonzalez 
& Mark, 2004). Firms often desire a certain allocation of effort across tasks (Farkas, 2013). 
The distortion of effort across tasks away from the firm-preferred allocation 58  decreases 
employees’ overall performance when different tasks have (similar) diminishing marginal 
returns to effort, a feature inherent to many tasks (Hannan et al., 2013). Additionally, this 
distortion leads to a decrease in the firm’s overall productivity and profit (Farkas, 2013).  
                                                     
56 Multitasking is the result of both interruptions caused by an external party as well as internal choices to switch 
tasks (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012). Externally caused interruptions and their effects on task performance for 
tasks of different complexity have been extensively researched (Bailey & Konstan, 2006; Borst et al., 2010; Dux 
et al., 2009; Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Ren et al., 2009; Rubinstein et al., 2001; Segal, 2004; Speier et al., 1999; 
Speier et al., 2003; Zijlstra et al., 1999), but empirical literature on self-imposed interruptions is sparse (Adler & 
Benbunan-Fich, 2012). However, internal interruptions occur as often as external interruptions (Gonzalez & Mark, 
2004), so further research on the effects of internal interruptions on performance is warranted (Adler & Benbunan-
Fich, 2012). Therefore, we unravel employees’ multitasking behavior under discretionary multitasking i.e. self-
imposed, internal choices to switch tasks.  
57 Note that our definition of multitasking differs from the research of Adler & Benbunan-Fich (2012), Buser & 
Peter (2012) and Madjar & Shalley (2008). They do not allow for the reallocation of time between tasks; they 
keep the total time that can be allocated to each separate task constant. They thereby ignore a possible advantage 
of working on multiple tasks concurrently, the possibility of time re-allocation and better time-management 
(König, et al., 2005). This is in contrast to everyday life in which people typically have to deal with different, 
independent tasks and need to schedule these tasks appropriately in order to obtain their goals within the limited 
time available (time management) (Payne et al., 2007). Many real-world complex tasks involve multitasking in 
which performers themselves decide when to switch between tasks and how much time to devote to each task 
(Kushleyeva et al., 2005). 
58 Firm-preferred effort allocations are employee effort allocations in line with the organization’s desires (Farkas, 
2013). In our experiments, the firm prefers an equal allocation of effort across tasks, in line with Hannan et al. 
(2013). 
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However, the relationship between distorted allocation of effort across tasks and overall 
employee performance depends on task complexity as well. Complexity refers to the amount 
of attention or processing a task requires as well as the amount of structure and clarity the task 
provides (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). Complex tasks require 
additional skills, additional effort (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002) and a better task strategy (Farkas, 
2013). When performing complex tasks, employees in general lose intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation59, because they do not feel competent for the job (i.e. they lack ability for the job) 
and therefore believe the effort will not yield a reward (Bonner et al., 2000; Bonner & Sprinkle, 
2002; Bonner, 2008, p. 161; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Furthermore, employees have a tendency to 
believe they perform worse than average on difficult tasks, which reduces motivation to exert 
effort, while they tend to believe they perform better than average on easy tasks, which 
increases their motivation to exert effort (Moore, 2007). Overall, task complexity reduces 
employee performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). However, complex tasks require additional 
effort and may benefit from undue focus on a single task (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). There are 
multiple ways to solve a complex task and it is unclear which strategy is the best way (Farkas, 
2013, p. 25). Extra time dedicated to a single task allows employees to test different strategies 
in order to find a better strategy. The quality of the strategy used compared to the effort exerted 
is more important for the successful handling of complex tasks than the handling of simple 
tasks (Locke & Latham, 1990). If employees’ effort allocation is distorted and they overly 
focus on a single task, this extra effort allocation can be beneficial for solving a complex task 
as it allows employees to search for a better strategy to deal with the task. As such, the negative 
effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on employee overall performance is less 
negative for complex tasks than for simple tasks. The reasoning above leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A distorted allocation of effort across tasks leads to lower employee overall 
performance on both tasks. 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall 
employee performance on both tasks is less negative in a context of high task complexity than 
in a context of low task complexity. 
 
Relative performance information, managers’ bonus allocation and employees’ effort 
allocation across tasks 
Effort-averse employees will allocate effort to the task for which they have higher skills 
(Farkas, 2013). Employees typically spend more time on easier, more productive tasks in order 
to maximize the return to effort (Duggan et al., 2013; Janssen et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2007). 
The reasoning above leads to the following hypotheses: 
                                                     
59 According to self-determination theory, extrinsically motivated employees perform a task because of some 
external reward. Intrinsically motivated employees perform a task because it provides them with inherent 
satisfaction, fun or challenge instead of some external reward (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
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Hypothesis 3a: In the first period, employees will focus on the task for which they have the 
highest skills. 
Hypothesis 3b: Employees will focus on the easiest task in order to perform at least well on 
that task. 
 
However, organizations have a certain preferred effort allocation in mind. Employees’ 
tendency to focus on easier, more productive tasks or tasks for which they have higher skills 
causes a distortion in effort allocations across tasks away from firm-preferred effort allocations. 
Organizations then use management control systems (MCS) in order to align employees’ goals 
with organizational goals and strategies (Chenhall, 2003; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; 
Salterio, 2015). MCS measure, analyze and report information that is meant to be useful to 
managers and employees in order to perform their job well (Otley. 1999; Sprinkle, 2003; 
Sprinkle & Williamson, 2006). The MCS consists of tools such as performance overviews 
containing detailed RPI and managers’ performance evaluation and bonus allocation that can 
steer employees towards firms objectives and preferences (Chenhall, 2003). Firms often allow 
managers to evaluate employees’ performance by means of  a performance overview 
containing multiple performance measures, such as a balanced scorecard. The manager then 
decides upon the weights she attaches to the different performance measures (Cardinaels & van 
Veen-Dirks, 2010; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner et al., 2003). Therefore subjective 
performance evaluation differs from formula-based bonus allocations, which are based on 
weights that are fixed ex-ante. Firms often install a discretionary performance evaluation 
system in order to enhance organizational performance (Baiman & Rajan, 1995; Franco-Santos 
et al., 2012; Gibbs et al., 2004). In a multitasking environment, a discretionary system in which 
the manager has the final say in the evaluation seems particularly useful, since a complete 
contract specifying all possible outcomes and related employee rewards would be impossible 
(Gibbs et al., 2004; MacLeod and Parent, 1999; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). With subjective 
evaluations the manager can redirect employees to the performance measures that need more 
attention in the future due to changing circumstances. Additionally, the manager can avoid that 
employees manipulate measures or focus too much on particular performance measures (Bol, 
2008). Discretionary bonus pools mitigate the occurrence of distorted performance, which is 
often associated with formula-based performance evaluations (Ittner et al., 2003). Equity 
theory predicts that managers will take into account employees relative performance when 
allocating the bonus and as such their evaluation will be in line with the RPI (Adams, 1963, 
1965; Walster et al., 1973). Managers will consider firms’ objectives and preferences in their 
bonus allocation as well (Chenhall, 2003). The RPI allows managers to thoroughly analyze 
employees’ performance, to detect and to punish employees’ distorted performance and to 
mitigate dysfunctional behavior in the future (Baker et al., 1994; Ittner et al., 2003). As such, 
we predict that managers’ bonus allocation will consider distorted effort allocations away from 
firm preferences as well. The reasoning above leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Managers’ bonus allocation is in line with the RPI they receive about the 
employees. 
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Hypothesis 4b: Ceteris paribus, managers’ bonus allocation will be lower when employees’ 
performance deviates from the firm-preferred effort allocation. 
 
The provision of RPI by the MCS allows employees to compare their performance with 
their peers.60 Humans have an innate desire to compare themselves with others (Festinger, 
1954). Social comparison leads to competitiveness, which will eventually affect employee 
performance and employee effort allocation across tasks (Eichhorn, 2016; Festinger, 1954; 
Steele, 1988). There are two types of competitiveness arising from RPI: 1) goal, personal 
development or task-orientated competiveness (the focus of social comparison theory) and 2) 
hyper-, interpersonal or other-referenced competitiveness (the focus of self-affirmation 
theory). How competitiveness affects employee performance and employee effort allocation 
across tasks depends on the specific type of competitiveness that is provoked (task-oriented or 
other-referenced competitiveness) and their related rivalry theories (social comparison theory 
or self-affirmation theory) (Eichhorn, 2016; Festinger, 1954; Steele, 1988). 
Social comparison theory states that people are willing to outperform others (Festinger, 
1954). Employees tend to behave competitively, in the sense that they strive for better overall 
performance than that of their colleague in order to generate positive feelings and a positive 
self-image (Festinger, 1954; Hannan et al., 2013). Task-oriented competiveness thereby 
focuses on self-improvement. This type of competitiveness leads to an increase in task-related 
effort and effort aimed at learning in order to improve performance (Eichhorn, 2016). 
According to social comparison theory, social comparison leads to competition and an 
unidirectional drive upward as employees want to outperform their colleagues by performing 
the tasks better (Festinger, 1954, P. 124; Tafkov, 2013). Social comparison theory further 
predicts a trend towards uniformity, a tendency to change one’s own position so as to move 
closer to others in the group when a discrepancy in abilities exists (Eichhorn, 2016; Festinger, 
1954, p.126). The provision of detailed RPI indicates employees on which task(s) they 
outperformed their colleague or whether they overly focused on one task at the expense of the 
other task (distorted performance). This information allows employees to discover how they 
should shift their time allocation across tasks in order to allocate their effort in line with firm 
preferences in order to compete with their colleague for the financial reward and outperform 
their colleague. Social comparison thereby predicts that employees will shift their time 
allocation from the task on which they outperformed their colleague (the task on which they 
overly focused) to the task for which they underperformed their colleague (the task they 
neglected), in line with firm-preferences in order to outperform their colleagues on all tasks. 
By doing so employees allocate their effort more balanced across tasks. 
However, self-affirmation theory would make very different predictions. Self-affirmation 
theory focuses on other-referenced competiveness that is concerned with maintaining a positive 
                                                     
60 This social comparison can lead to assimilation (the belief that one can achieve the same performance as the comparison 
target) or contrast (the belief that you and the target are very different). Assimilation increases motivation when comparing 
oneself with a better-performing person, but can cause demotivation when comparing oneself with a worse-performing person. 
A contrast leads to the opposite effect. It leads to demotivation when comparing oneself with a better-performing person 
because it leads to negative feelings of inferiority and lack of ability, but it creates positive feelings when comparing oneself 
with a worse-performing person. Overall, assimilation should dominate as people cease social comparison when they are very 
different from each other (Eichhorn, 2016). 
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self-image, outperforming competitors and obtaining a higher rank instead of performing a task 
as good as possible (Eichhorn, 2016; Steele, 1988). This theory predicts that social comparison 
causes employees to overly focus on some tasks at the expense of other tasks, because they 
want to address a threat to their self-image in one area by showing their competence in another 
area (Steele, 1988) and/or satisfy an innate desire for social distinction (Frey, 2007) by 
outperforming their peers in at least one area (Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Employees 
that perform better than others experience positive feelings such as pride, whereas employees 
that perform worse than others experience negative feelings such as shame (Hannan et al., 
2013; Lazarus, 1991; Smith, 2000). Therefore, self-affirmation theory predicts that employees 
will focus on the tasks for which they have the highest skills in order to secure at least good 
performance on those tasks and to distinguish themselves from their peers at least at one 
performance dimension instead of focusing on overall employee performance (Hannan et al., 
2013).  
Empirical research on the effect of the provision of RPI by the MCS on employee 
performance is inconclusive. Consistent with social-comparison theory, in a single-task setting 
RPI leads to better employee performance (Kramer et al., 2016; Murthy & Schafer, 2011; 
Tafkov, 2013) and this positive effect is larger under an individual performance-based 
compensation contract than under a flat-wage contract (Tafkov, 2013). Consistent with self-
affirmation theory, in a multi-tasking setting, RPI reduces employee performance and it leads 
to distorted effort allocations (Hannan et al., 2013). However, Hannan et al. (2013) does not 
consider financial incentives tied to employee performance, but only financial incentives to 
allocate effort according to firm preferences. Expectancy theory would predict that employees’ 
behavior changes when financial incentives are at stake. With financial incentives linked to 
their performance, employees will be motivated to exert extra effort and to allocate their effort 
according to firm preferences in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining a bonus (Vroom, 
1964). However, Farkas (2013) demonstrates that financial incentives are not effective at 
directing effort or in improving performance and RPI has a negative effect on employees’ effort 
allocation and performance as well. This result may be due to the fact that employees did not 
believe they were able to attain the pre-specified performance goal on the firm-preferred 
complex task in order to qualify for the goal-based compensation, whereas employees under a 
discretionary bonus pool do not have to attain a certain performance level before they might 
qualify for a bonus (Farkas, 2013). Therefore, we still believe that the management control 
system will motivate the appropriate allocation of effort across tasks according to firm 
preferences (Chenhall, 2003; Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Employees will assess the 
likelihood that increased effort will yield higher rewards and will allocate their effort 
accordingly (Farkas, 2013; Vroom, 1964). This effort directing role of incentives provides a 
powerful control tool, in that it allows the manager to direct employee effort toward the tasks 
most crucial for firm success (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Brüggen & Moers, 2007; Hecht et al., 
2012; Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). Employees that distort their effort towards a single task, 
will receive a smaller bonus (see hypothesis 4b). The discretionary bonus thereby limits the 
opportunity for self-affirmation in a single area of performance and reduces the occurrence of 
disruptive employee behavior. Therefore we predict that a manager’s performance evaluation 
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will lead employees to allocate their effort across tasks in line with firm preferences and social 
comparison theory. The reasoning above leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: After the provision of RPI and the performance evaluation, employees reallocate 
their time across tasks such that they focus more (less) on tasks for which they 
under(out)performed relative to their colleague. 
 
4.3 Method 
 
We used two computer-based experiments in order to test our hypotheses. Participants were 
grouped in anonymous groups of three persons in which two employees work for a manager 
for two periods. Each period the employees have to work individually on two independent but 
equally important tasks. The tasks consist of solving two numerical puzzles (a binary puzzle 
and a Japanese puzzle), and the employees’ job is to provide as many correct answers as 
possible to both puzzles. The employees could freely switch between both tasks and they could 
freely decide how much time to allocate to each task separately. It was specified that both tasks 
were equally important for the manager, indicating that the firm-preferred allocation of effort 
is an equal allocation across the two tasks. The total time available in a period to perform both 
tasks is constrained at ten minutes. Participants were familiarized with the puzzles by means 
of practice puzzles before the actual experiment took place. Figure 4.1 displays the practice 
puzzles, with the related rules and solutions for the binary puzzle and Japanese puzzle 
respectively. 
After each period the manager and the employees receive detailed RPI on both tasks for 
both employees. The manager can then base her performance evaluation on the performance 
measures productivity (i.e. the number of answers that each employee provided for each task) 
and accuracy (i.e. the percentage of correct answers that each employee provided for a sample 
of 5 randomly selected answers for each task). Therefore, the managers’ imperfect measure of 
employees’ performance on each task is the product of the variables productivity and accuracy 
(“ImperfectPerformanceit”). The manager is required to evaluate and reward employee 
performance on both tasks by means of a bonus pool, and she has the possibility to justify her 
decision to each employee. The manager does not need to allocate the entire bonus pool.  
In the first experiment, managers receive after each period performance information for both 
employees on both tasks jointly and they evaluate, reward and (possibly) explain their decision 
for the performance on both tasks jointly (allocating one bonus pool). In the second experiment, 
managers allocate two separate bonus pools. They first receive after each period performance 
information for both employees on task 1 and they evaluate, reward and (possibly) explain their 
evaluation decision for the first task. After their bonus allocation for task 1, they receive 
performance information for both employees on task 2 and they allocate a second bonus then.  
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Figure 4.1 Practice puzzles: rules, example and solution 
 
Binary puzzle 
 
Rules: 
(1) Each cell contains a “0” or a “1”. 
(2) No more than two the same numbers may be placed next to each other or beneath each other.  
(3) Each row and each column contains as much “0” values as “1” values.  
(4) Each row and each column is unique, but any row may be filled similarly as any column. 
(5) Each binary puzzle has a unique solution. This solution can always be found without guessing. 
 
Example 
 
Solution  
 
 
 
Japanese puzzle 
 
Rules: 
(1) Each cell contains a “0” or a “1”. 
(2) The numbers left to the rows indicate how many adjacent cells contain a “1” in that row, after which 
at least one cell must contain a “0” e.g. When “1 2” is displayed to the left of a row, then (possibly after 
one or multiple cells with a “0”) one cell should contain a “1”. Next, at least one cell must contain a “0” 
and afterwards two adjacent cells should contain a “1”.  
(3) The numbers above each column indicate how many adjacent cells contain a “1” in that column, 
after which at least one cell must contain a “0” e.g. When “3 2 1” is displayed above a column, then 
(possibly after one or multiple cells with a “0”) first three adjacent cells should contain a “1”, next, at 
least one cell must contain a “0” and afterwards two adjacent cells should contain a “1”. Next, again at 
least one cell must contain a “0”, after which one cell must contain a “1”.  
(4) Each Japanese puzzle has a unique solution. This solution can always be found without guessing.  
 
Example 
 
 
Solution 
(black cells = “1”, white cells = “0”) 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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In all experimental conditions the total bonus that could be allocated by a manager is the 
same, 20.000 points. In the first experiment (‘one bonus pool’ experiment) the bonus that could 
be allocated consists of 20.000 points, while in the second experiment (‘two bonus pools’ 
experiment) each bonus that could be allocated consists of 10.000 points.61 The manager’s goal 
is to let her two employees provide as many correct answers as possible to the puzzles and both 
tasks are equally important. The employees’ goal is to receive as many bonus points as possible 
through the manager’s performance evaluations. We conducted the experiment via the Ztree 
experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). In both experiments, we manipulate ‘task 
complexity’ as explained in the experimental design section. 
 
Experimental design 
We conducted two computer-based experiments in which we randomly assigned student 
participants to a group of three persons in one of the four experimental conditions. The 
experiments were anonymous, so participants did not know their group members. In both 
experiments, we manipulated the complexity of the two tasks (the binary and Japanese puzzle) 
performed by the employees between groups (Task Complexity; low vs. high). Both employees 
that work for the same manager receive the same level of task complexity (either low 
complexity or high complexity). In the low (high) complexity conditions participants solve a 
medium-difficult (difficult) binary puzzle and a medium-difficult (difficult) Japanese puzzle62. 
The type of tasks performed in the high and low complexity conditions is the same (task 1 (2) 
consists of solving a binary (Japanese) puzzles), but we change the complexity of the tasks.  
 
Experimental procedures 
Upon arrival at the computer room each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
two experimental conditions of the two experiments. Participants were grouped by 3 and 
received computerized instructions on the experimental task. Two persons assumed the role of 
employee in a department and one person assumed the role of department manager. The 
instructions specified that the two employees worked individually on the same two tasks (a 
binary puzzle and a Japanese puzzle) for the manager during two periods of ten minutes. After 
the first period, employees received new puzzles to solve. Employees were able to choose how 
much time they would dedicate to each task and when and how often they would switch 
between tasks. It was specified that both tasks were equally important to the manager (firm-
preferred effort allocation) and that the employees had to provide as many correct answers as 
                                                     
61 We conducted these two experiments to see whether our results hold in different MCS environments. The bonus 
system in the first experiment rewards overall performance on both tasks and strong performance on one task can 
compensate for weak performance on another task. It allows employees to outrank their colleague at least at one 
task without necessarily performing well on both tasks and should therefore stimulate other-referenced 
competitiveness (the focus of self-affirmation theory). The bonus system in the second experiment rewards 
performance on each individual task and weak performance on one task will not (or to a smaller extent) be 
compensated by strong performance on another task. It should therefore stimulate task-oriented competitiveness 
(the focus of social comparison theory). This is similar to the different effect of unidimensional and 
multidimensional RPI on employee performance in Eichhorn (2016). 
62 Based on the indicated difficulty levels on the websites, we selected medium-difficult and difficult binary 
puzzles (http://www.binairepuzzel.net) and Japanese puzzles (http://pic-a-pix.nl). Additionally, we pilot tested the 
difficulty levels of the puzzles involving colleagues at the university. 
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possible. Participants were informed that the more correct answers the employees would 
provide, the better the department would perform and the higher the chances were for the 
manager to win a 15 euros reward. Furthermore, it was specified that after each period, the 
manager would evaluate the performance of each employee and that she was able to allocate 
one bonus pool of 20.000 points (experiment 1) or two bonus pools of 10.000 points each 
(experiment 2) amongst the employees. The manager had the discretion to decide whether and 
how many bonus points a particular employee would receive. The more bonus points an 
employee received, the higher the chances were for that employee to win a 15 euros reward, a 
lottery as in Masschelein et al. (2012). It was specified that the manager did not have to divide 
all bonus points, but non-allocated bonus points would not benefit the manager, nor the 
employees. This is in line with for example Bol et al. (2016), where managers did not have to 
allocate the entire bonus either. This set-up helps avoiding agency costs related to predefined 
bonus pools, such as collusion and employee opportunism (Fisher et al., 2005). An employee 
did only know how many bonus points he received and the total amount of bonus points that 
could be divided. He would not know how many bonus points his colleague received. This is 
in line with pay secrecy practices in many firms in the US and abroad (Bamberger & 
Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Colella et al., 2007; Day, 2007; 
Thompson & Pronsky, 1975). Additionally, the manager could provide a written justification 
of her bonus allocation to each employee separately. Each employee could only see the written 
justification addressed to him, not the written justification addressed to his colleague. 
The instructions further indicated that all participants received a performance overview 
indicating how many answers an employee provided; this was per period for each employee 
and for both tasks. Furthermore, a random sample of five answers per task from each employee 
was used to calculate the percentage of correctly answered numbers for that sample. The 
manager received this performance overview to use for her bonus allocation. In the first 
experiment (‘one bonus pool’) the manager could allocate and justify a 20.000 points bonus 
amongst the two employees based on the performance information for the binary puzzle and 
the Japanese puzzle. In the second experiment (‘two bonus pools’) the manager could first 
allocate and justify a 10.000 points bonus amongst the two employees based on the 
performance information for the binary puzzle. Next, she could allocate and justify a 10.000 
points bonus amongst the two employees based on the performance information for the 
Japanese puzzle.  
After reading all case information, all participants were given two practice puzzles and the 
rules to solve those puzzles (see Figure 4.1) in order to familiarize with the required 
experimental task. Participants received a paper printed version of the rules as well. Only after 
all three participants in a group had completed the practice puzzles, the first period of the actual 
experiment started. Participants needed on average 235 (302) seconds to familiarize with the 
rules and the practice puzzles of the binary (Japanese) puzzle. Next, the experiment started. 
After 10 minutes the manager allocated the bonus and possibly justified her bonus allocation 
decision, after which the second period started. In the end, participants received a number of 
post-experimental and demographic questions. 
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Variables 
Employee performance, employee effort allocation and managers’ bonus allocation 
The manager’s goal is to have her two employees provide as many correct answers as 
possible to the binary and Japanese puzzle, both tasks being equally important. The variable 
EmployeePerformanceit captures employees’ overall performance. It measures the actual 
number of correct answers both employees provided each period for task 1 (the binary puzzle) 
and task 2 (the Japanese puzzle) together. However, the actual employee performance is 
unknown to the manager and the employees as the performance overview is based on a sample 
which only imperfectly captures employees’ performance. The performance overview contains 
the performance measures productivity (i.e. the number of answers that each employee 
provided for each task) and accuracy (i.e. the percentage of correct answers that each employee 
provided for a sample of 5 randomly selected answers for each task). Therefore, the managers’ 
imperfect measure of employees’ performance on each task is the product of the variables 
productivity and accuracy (“ImperfectPerformanceit”).  
We further define the variables RelativePerfTask1it and RelativePerfTask2it. They indicate 
how an employee performed relative to his colleague on task 1 or task 2. Positive values signal 
an employee outperformed his colleague on task 1 or task 2. RelativePerfTask1it is calculated 
as (ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 for an employee minus ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 
for his colleague) divided by the sum of ImperfectPerformanceit on both tasks for both 
employees. RelativePerfTask2it is calculated as (ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2 for an 
employee minus ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2 for his colleague) divided by the sum of 
ImperfectPerformanceit on both tasks for both employees. 
Each period employees were free to allocate 10 minutes (600 seconds) across the two 
puzzles. TimeSpentTask1it equals the number of seconds an employee spent on task 1. The 
number of seconds an employee spent on task 2 is then 600 minus TimeSpentTask1it. This 
measure captures employees’ allocation of effort across tasks. Δ TimeSpentTask1i is the change 
in the number of seconds an employee spent on task 1 from the first period to the second period. 
Positive values signal an increase in the time spent on task 1. 
After each period the manager was then able to allocate a bonus of 20.000 experimental 
units (experiment 1) or two bonuses of each 10.000 experimental units (experiment 2) amongst 
the two employees. Bonusit measures the number of experimental units each employee received 
each period.  
 
Task complexity and distorted effort allocation 
Complexity is a dummy variable related to the manipulation of task complexity in the two 
experiments. A value of zero for this measure indicates that the participants solved medium-
difficult puzzles. A value of one on this measure indicates that the participants solved difficult 
puzzles.  
Furthermore, the experimental description indicated that both tasks (binary or Japanese 
puzzle) were equally important to the manager. We define three variables that measure the 
extent to which employees’ effort allocations across tasks differ from the firm-preferred equal 
allocation of effort across tasks: EffortDistortionit, PerformanceDistortionit and 
DistortionImperfectPerformanceit. First, EffortDistortionit is measured as the absolute value of 
 103 
 
the difference between the time spent on a single task and the average time available to spend 
on each task. Second, PerformanceDistortionit is an alternative variable that measures how 
much employees’ performance across tasks deviates from firm preferences for an equal 
performance across tasks. For each task (the binary and Japanese puzzle respectively) we 
divide the number of answers an employee provided by the maximum number of answers that 
could be provided for that task. This leads for each task to a percentage which indicates the 
extent of completion of that task. PerformanceDistortionit is then the absolute value of the 
difference between the percentages for both tasks. Third, DistortionImperfectPerformanceit is 
the absolute value of the difference between ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 and 
ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2. It measures the degree of performance distortion from an 
equal allocation of performance across both tasks, as perceived by the manager based on the 
RPI. Finally, Complexity * EffortDistortionit, and Complexity * PerformanceDistortionit are the 
interactions between Complexity and EffortDistortionit (PerformanceDistortionit) respectively 
and ImperfectPerformance * DistortionImperfectPerformanceit is the interaction of the 
variables ImperfectPerformanceit and DistortionImperfectPerformanceit. 
 
Control variables 
PracticeTask1i refers to how much time (in seconds) it took the employee to solve the 
practice puzzle for task 1 (the binary puzzle). PracticeTask2i refers to how much time (in 
seconds) it took the employee to solve the practice puzzle for task 2 (the Japanese puzzle). 
Furthermore, we asked employees in the post-experimental questionnaire (using a seven-point 
Likert scale) to indicate the extent to which employees perceived task 1 (the binary puzzle) 
difficult (DifficultyTask1i) and the extent to which they perceived task 2 (the Japanese puzzle) 
difficult (DifficultyTask2i). A high value for PracticeTask1i, PracticeTask2i, DifficultyTask1i 
or DifficultyTask2i indicates less ability for that particular task. 
 
Participants 
We recruited 348 undergraduate students from a business program in a large university. The 
students received a course credit as an incentive to participate in the experiments. Furthermore, 
20 managers and 40 employees received a 15 euros reward based on a lottery with increasing 
chances to win depending on their performance during the experiments. The experiments lasted 
50 to 90 minutes (depending on the decision speed of the participants). 166 students were 
female and 182 were male. They were 22 years old on average (minimum 19 years, maximum 
30 years) and they had 10.1 months of work experience, which was significantly different from 
0 (p <0.01). 
 
4.4 Results 
 
Manipulation checks 
In order to check the manipulation of Task Complexity, we asked participants whether they 
experienced the puzzles that the employees had to solve as relatively easy or relatively difficult. 
94% of the participants in the low complexity conditions indicated that the puzzles were 
relatively easy, whereas 99% of the participants in the high complexity conditions indicated 
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that the puzzles were relatively difficult. Additionally, we asked participants to indicate (on a 
seven-point scale) their agreement with the statements that task 1 (the binary puzzle) was 
difficult and that task 2 (the Japanese puzzle) was difficult, respectively. Participants in the 
high complexity conditions agreed significantly more with the statements than participants in 
the low complexity conditions (F1, 346 = 153.04; p <0.01 and F1, 346 = 36.42; p <0.01 
respectively).63 Lastly, we asked participants who took the role of an employee to indicate (on 
a seven-point scale) whether solving the puzzles was a difficult task to execute (on a seven-
point scale). Employees judged the task difficulty to be significantly higher in the high 
complexity conditions than in the low complexity conditions (F1, 230 = 93.003; p <0.01). We 
therefore conclude that the manipulation of Task Complexity was successful. 
Additionally we asked participants to indicate (on a seven-point scale) their agreement with 
a couple of statements related to the experimental task. Participants indicated they were 
motivated. The mean of this measure is 6.17 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint of 4 (t347 = 39.46; p <0.01). The participants said that the instructions were clear. The 
mean of this measure was 5.70 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 
(t347 = 25.95; p <0.01). Participants indicated that they had enough time to make their decisions 
(mean of 4.85 on 7, which is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t347 = 9.80; p 
<0.01)). Together, these results suggest that participants felt they had sufficient time and were 
capable of making a reasonable performance evaluation. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the definitions and descriptive statistics mean (standard deviation) of our 
main dependent variables used to test our hypotheses by task complexity for the two 
experiments. The table clearly indicates that the manipulation of task complexity worked as 
the number of correct answers provided by the employees is much lower in the high complexity 
conditions than in the low complexity conditions. Further, we can see that on average 
employees preferred to work on task 1 (the binary puzzle) over task 2 (the Japanese puzzle). 
Each period, employees could freely decide how to allocate their time (600 seconds per period) 
across the two tasks. In all experimental conditions employees spent on average more seconds 
on task 1 than on task 2. Next, we can see that managers did not allocate the entire bonus. 
Managers in all experimental conditions could divide a bonus of 20.000 experimental points 
across the two employees, which means an average of 10.000 points per employee. However, 
the average allocated bonus ranges between 7,572.54 and 8,640.05. Finally, we can see that, 
on average, employees spent less time on task 1 in the second period than in the first period. 
  
                                                     
63 Every p-value mentioned in this paper is a two-sided p-value. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
  Task Complexitya  Task Complexitya 
  Low  High  Low  High 
Dependent Measure  (n = 58)b  (n = 56)  (n = 60)  (n = 58) 
EmployeePerformancec  119.45  81.14  128.78  81.03 
  (36.25)  (28.23)  (34.67)  (27.34) 
TimeSpentTask1d  358.18  315.89  365.58  327.25 
  (111.91)  (146.79)  (93.13)  (132.77) 
Bonuse  8,640.05  7,572.54  8,276.13  7,857.70 
  (3,439.12)  (3,886.69)  (3,750.96)  (3,343.27) 
Δ TimeSpentTask1f  -69.44  -103.18  -35.80  -90.85 
  (138.73)  (151.56)  (100.84)  (123.42) 
________________ 
a Task Complexity refers to whether the complexity of the puzzles is high or low. Task Complexity is coded as 1 
for the High Complexity conditions and 0 for the Low Complexity conditions. 
b N refers to the number of employees in each condition. 
c EmployeePerformance is the average number of correct answers an employee provided to both puzzles over the 
two periods. 
dTimeSpentTask1 equals the average number of seconds an employee spent on task 1 over the two periods. 
TimeSpentTask2 is then 600 seconds minus TimeSpentTask1. 
e Bonus is the average number of experimental units an employee received as a bonus from his manager over the 
two periods. 
f Δ TimeSpentTask1 is the change in the average number of seconds an employee spent on task 1 from the first 
period to the second period. Positive values signal an increase in the time spent on task 1. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hypothesis tests 
Hypothesis 1 states that a distorted allocation of effort across tasks leads to lower employee 
overall performance on both tasks and hypothesis 2 predicts that the negative effect of a 
distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall employee performance on both tasks is less 
negative for complex tasks than for simple tasks. In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
conducted random-effects regressions for both experiments with EmployeePerformanceit as the 
dependent variable and Complexity, EffortDistortionit and their interaction as the independent 
variables (see Panel A of Table 4.2). We further controlled for the period and employees’ 
abilities for each task (PracticeTask1 and PracticeTask2) and we clustered the standard errors 
by the manager. Hypothesis 1 indicates we expect a negative effect of EffortDistortion on 
EmployeePerformance and hypothesis 2 indicates we expect a positive effect of the interaction 
of Complexity and EffortDistortion on EmployeePerformance. Additionally we expect a 
negative effect of PracticeTask1 and PracticeTask2 on EmployeePerformance, as a lack of 
skills should reduce performance. 
As reported in Panel A of Table 4.2, the results for both experiments provide clear support 
for H1, as EffortDistortion is negatively related to EmployeePerformance (Experiment 1: t = -
10.37; p<0.001; Experiment 2: t = -11.63; p<0.001). The results further provide support for 
H2, as the interaction between Complexity and EffortDistortion is positively related to  
EmployeePerformance (Experiment 1: t = 3.90; p<0.001; Experiment 2: t = 4.62; p<0.001). 
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Additionally, we find a negative effect of  PracticeTask1 (Experiment 1: t = -2.53; p=0.011; 
Experiment 2: t = -3.58; p<0.001) and PracticeTask2 (Experiment 1: t = -5.10; p<0.001; 
Experiment 2: t = -3.40; p=0.001) on EmployeePerformance indicating that employees that 
have less ability performed worse. Finally, we find a positive effect of Period on 
EmployeePerformance (Experiment 1: t = 5.15; p<0.001; Experiment 2: t = 5.60; p=0.001), 
indicating learning effects, strategy development and improved performance that was amongst 
others predicted by social comparison theory (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Festinger, 1954; 
Locke & Latham, 1991). In Panel B of Table 4.2 we further did a robustness check for 
hypotheses 1 and 2 by conducting random-effects regressions for both experiments with 
EmployeePerformanceit as the dependent variable and Complexity, PerformanceDistortionit 
and their interaction as the independent variables (see Panel B of Table 4.2). Our results remain 
similar. 
Hypothesis 3a predicted that, in the first period, employees will focus on the task for which 
they have the highest skills. Hypothesis 3b further predicted that Employees will focus on the 
easiest task in order to perform at least well on that task. 
In order to test hypothesis 3a, we conducted OLS-regressions for both experiments with 
TimeSpentTask1i observed in the first period as the dependent variable and employees’ abilities 
for each task (PracticeTask1 and PracticeTask2) as the independent variables (see Panel A of 
Table 4.3). The employees’ abilities for each task jointly affect the time spent on the first task 
in the first period (Experiment 1: F2, 111 = 5.27; p = 0.007; Experiment 2: F2, 115 = 9.84; p <0.001) 
and this result is mainly driven by employees’ ability for task 2 (PracticeTask2). The less 
ability employees have for task 2 the Japanese puzzle (i.e. the more time the employees needed 
to solve the practice puzzle for task 2 (the Japanese puzzle)), the more time they spend on the 
other task (the binary puzzle) in the first period (Experiment 1: t = 2.53; p=0.013; Experiment 
2: t = 4.18; p<0.001). Employees ability for task 1 (the binary puzzle) (PracticeTask1) does 
not affect their focus on the binary puzzle in the first period (Experiment 1: t = 1.09; p=0.278; 
Experiment 2: t = -0.28; p=0.780). These results provide support for hypothesis 3a.  
As a robustness test for hypothesis 3a we further conducted OLS-regressions for both 
experiments with TimeSpentTask1i observed in the first period as the dependent variable and 
employees’ perceptions of the difficulty of each task (DifficultyTask1 and DifficultyTask2) as 
the independent variables (see Panel B of Table 4.3). The employees’ perceptions of task 
difficulty jointly affect the time spent on the first task in the first period (Experiment 1: F2, 111 
= 7.35; p = 0.001; Experiment 2: F2, 115 = 7.32; p = 0.001). The more difficult employees 
perceived task 1, the less time they spent on task 1 in the first period (Experiment 1: t = -2.57; 
p=0.011; Experiment 2: t = -2.15; p=0.034) and the more difficult employees perceived task 2, 
the more time they spent on task 1 in the first period (Experiment 1: t = 3.37; p=0.001; 
Experiment 2: t = 3.53; p=0.001), which supports hypothesis 3a as well. 
In order to test hypothesis 3b, we asked employees in the post-experimental questionnaire 
(using a seven point Likert scale), to indicate whether they focused on the easiest task in order 
to perform at least well on that task (see Panel C of Table 4.3). In line with hypothesis 3b, 
participants agreed with this statement. The mean response (4.56 (4.53) on 7 for experiment 1 
( experiment 2)) is significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 4 (t113 = 2.94; p <0.01; (t117 
= 2.83; p <0.01)). We therefore provide support for H3b. 
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Hypothesis 4a and 4b claimed that when managers allocate their bonus, they take into 
account the RPI and the firm-preferred equal allocation of effort. Hypothesis 4a predicts that 
the bonus allocated to the employee is positively related to employees’ relative performance 
and hypothesis 4b predicts that the bonus allocated to the employee is negatively related to the 
extent to which employee performance deviates from the firm-preferred effort allocation. 
When evaluating performance, the true employee performance on both tasks is unknown to the 
manager. The manager can only consult the performance measures productivity (i.e. the 
number of answers that each employee provided for each task) and accuracy (i.e. the percentage 
of correct answers that each employee provided for a sample of 5 randomly selected answers 
for each task). Therefore, the managers’ imperfect measure of employees’ performance on each 
task is the product of the variables productivity and accuracy (“ImperfectPerformanceit”). In 
order to test hypotheses 4a, we conducted random-effects regressions for both experiments 
with Bonusit as the dependent variable and RelativePerfTask1it and RelativePerfTask2it as the 
independent variables (see Panel A of Table 4.4). We further controlled for the period.  
As reported in Panel A of Table 4.4, the results for both experiments provide clear support 
for H4a, as both RelativePerfTask1 (Experiment 1: t = 2.97; p = 0.003; Experiment 2: t = 4.18; 
p<0.001) and RelativePerfTask2 (Experiment 1: t = 6.10; p<0.001; Experiment 2: t = 7.14; 
p<0.001) are positively related to Bonus. Managers consider employees relative performance 
on both tasks when allocating their bonus. 
In order to further test hypotheses 4a and in order to test 4b, we conducted random-effects 
regressions for both experiments with Bonusit as the dependent variable and 
ImperfectPerformanceit, DistortionImperfectPerformanceit and their interaction as the 
independent variables (see Panel B of Table 4.4). In line with hypothesis 4a, we find that the 
bonus the managers allocate is positively related to employees performance 
(ImperfectPerformance) (Experiment 1: t = 7.00; p<0.001; Experiment 2: t = 8.45; p<0.001). 
However, in contrast to our hypothesis 4b, managers do not consider firm preferences for an 
equal allocation of effort/performance. DistortionImperfectPerformance (Experiment 1: t = 
1.10; p = 0.271; Experiment 2: t = -0.23; p = 0.818) and the interaction between 
ImperfectPerformance and DistortionImperfectPerformance (Experiment 1: t = 1.54; p = 
0.124; Experiment 2: t = -0.09; p = 0.928) do not significantly affect managers’ bonus. As such, 
we do find support for hypothesis 4a, but we do not find support for hypothesis 4b. 
Lastly, hypothesis 5 predicted that employees would reallocate their time across tasks such 
that they focus more (less) on tasks for which they under(out)performed relative to their 
colleague. This reallocation will eventually result in a less distorted allocation of effort across 
tasks and accordingly this leads to better employee overall performance (see H1 and Table 4.2). 
In order to test hypothesis 5 we conducted an OLS-regression with Δ TimeSpentTask1 as the 
dependent variable and RelativePerfTask1 and RelativePerfTask2 in the first period as the 
independent variables (see Table 4.5). We expect a negative coefficient for RelativePerfTask1 
and a positive coefficient for RelativePerfTask2. In line with hypothesis 5, we find that the 
difference in time spent on task 1 is positively related to employees relative performance on 
task 2 (RelativePerfTask2) (Experiment 1: t = 2.30; p = 0.025; Experiment 2: t = 3.47; p = 
0.001) and that the difference in time spent on task 1 is negatively related to employees relative 
performance on task 1 (RelativePerfTask1) for experiment 1 (t = -3.57; p = 0.001), but 
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surprisingly not for experiment 2 (t = 0.64; p = 0.526). We therefore find (partial) support for 
hypothesis 5 in experiment 1 (experiment 2). 
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Table 4.2 Random-effects regression results: H1 & H2 
 
Panel A: H1 & 2: Effect of Effort Distortion and Complexity on Employee Performance 
 Experiment 1:  
Employee Performancea             
Experiment 2:  
Employee Performancea 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 145.37  23.01 <0.001 146.80  24.30 <0.001 
Periodb   13.18    5.15 <0.001   14.09    5.60 <0.001 
Complexityc  -49.30   -8.03 <0.001  -55.16  -13.40 <0.001 
EffortDistortiond    -0.20 -10.37 <0.001    -0.24  -11.63 <0.001 
Complexity * 
EffortDistortione 
    0.10    3.90 <0.001      0.13    4.62 <0.001 
PracticeTask1f    -0.02   -2.53   0.011    -0.04   -3.58 <0.001 
PracticeTask2g    -0.06   -5.10 <0.001    -0.03   -3.40   0.001 
# of observations      228        236   
Overall R2   0.597     0.678   
Prob>chi2   0.000     0.000   
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: H1 & H2: Effect of Performance Distortion and Complexity on Employee 
Performance 
 Experiment 1:  
Employee Performancea             
Experiment 2:  
Employee Performancea 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 144.41  20.83 <0.001 147.27  21.98 <0.001 
Periodb   13.45    5.24 <0.001   12.43    5.06 <0.001 
Complexityc  -53.60   -7.85 <0.001  -65.40  -13.46 <0.001 
PerformanceDistortionh  -63.70 -8.94 <0.001  -74.55  -11.02 <0.001 
Complexity * 
PerformanceDistortioni 
  45.28    4.51 <0.001    77.65    7.98 <0.001 
PracticeTask1f    -0.02   -3.08   0.002    -0.04   -2.49   0.013 
PracticeTask2g    -0.05   -4.89 <0.001    -0.04   -3.52 <0.001 
# of observations      228        236   
Overall R2   0.606     0.657   
Prob>chi2   0.000     0.000   
________________ 
We used linear random-effects models and we adjusted the standard errors of the estimates for clustering by group 
of two employees and their manager.  
a The dependent variable is Employee Performanceit, which is the number of correct answers an employee 
provided to both puzzles in period t. 
b Period refers to the period in the experiment (1 or 2). 
c Complexity refers to whether the complexity of the tasks the employees performed was high or low. 
d EffortDistortionit equals the absolute value of the difference between the time spent on a single task and the 
average time available to spend on each task). It measures the degree of effort distortion from an equal allocation 
of effort across both tasks. 
e Complexity * EffortDistortionit refers to the interaction of the variables Complexity and EffortDistortionit. 
f PracticeTask1i equals the number of seconds it took the employee to solve the practice puzzle for task 1. High 
values for this variable, indicate less skill for the task. 
g PracticeTask2i equals the number of seconds it took the employee to solve the practice puzzle for task 2. High 
values for this variable, indicate less skill for the task. 
h PerformanceDistortionit equals the absolute value of the difference in the percentage of completion of task 1 and 
task 2. It measures the degree of performance distortion from an equal allocation of performance across both tasks. 
i Complexity * PerformanceDistortionit refers to the interaction of the variables Complexity and 
PerformanceDistortionit. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 4.3 OLS regression and t-test results: H3a & H3b 
 
Panel A: H3a: Effect of Task Ability on Time Spent on Task 1 in the first period 
 Experiment 1:  
TimeSpentTask1a             
Experiment 2:  
TimeSpentTask1a 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 300.76  10.90 <0.001 305.72  14.03 <0.001 
PracticeTask1b      0.07     1.09   0.278    -0.02   -0.28   0.780 
PracticeTask2c      0.19     2.53   0.013      0.28   4.18 <0.001 
# of observations      114        118   
Adjusted R2   0.070     0.131   
F   5.27     9.84   
Prob>F   0.007   <0.001   
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: H3a: Effect of Task Difficulty on Time Spent on Task 1 in the first period 
 Experiment 1:  
TimeSpentTask1a             
Experiment 2:  
TimeSpentTask1a 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 338.66    8.58 <0.001 325.70    9.38 <0.001 
DifficultyTask1d  -18.16   -2.57   0.011  -13.04   -2.15 0.034 
DifficultyTask2e    23.34   3.37   0.001    22.20     3.53   0.001 
# of observations      114        118   
Adjusted R2   0.101     0.098   
F     7.35       7.32   
Prob>F   0.001     0.001   
________________ 
We used OLS regressions.  
a TimeSpentTask1 equals the number of seconds employees spent on task 1 in the first period. TimeSpentTask2 is 
then 600 seconds minus TimeSpentTask1. 
b PracticeTask1 equals the number of seconds it took the employee to solve the practice puzzle for task 1. High 
values for this variable, indicate less skill for the task. 
c PracticeTask2 equals the number of seconds it took the employee to solve the practice puzzle for task 2. High 
values for this variable, indicate less skill for the task. 
d DifficultyTask1 refers to the extent to which employees perceived task 1 (the binary puzzle) difficult (using a 
seven-point Likert scale). 
e DifficultyTask2 refers to the extent to which employees perceived task 2 (the Japanese puzzle) difficult (using a 
seven-point Likert scale). 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C: H3b: t-test whether employees focused on the easiest task in order to perform 
at least well on that task. 
 Mean Std. Dev. t-statistic Df p-value 
Experiment 1 4.56 2.04 2.94 113 0.004 
Experiment 2 4.53 2.02 2.83 117 0.006 
________________ 
We used a one-sample t-tests; H0: mean = 4; Ha mean ≠ 4. Employees answered the question (using a seven 
point Likert scale) whether they focused on the easiest task in order to  perform at least well on that task. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4.4 Random-effects regression results: H4a & H4b 
 
Panel A: H4a: The effect of RPI on Managers’ Bonus Allocation 
 Experiment 1: Bonusa  Experiment 2:Bonusa  
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 7,610.13 14.56 <0.001 7,876.52 20.68 <0.001 
Periodb   337.02   1.24 0.216 129.30 0.75 0.455 
RelativePerfTask1c 4,754.07 2.97 0.003 6,597.37 4.18 <0.001 
RelativePerfTask2d 7,121.23 6.10 <0.001 5,935.10 7.14 <0.001 
# of observations 228   236   
Overall R2 0.22   0.29   
Prob>chi2   0.000     0.000   
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: H4b: Effect of Performance Distortion on Managers’ Bonus Allocation 
 Experiment 1: Bonusa  Experiment 2:Bonusa  
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept 8,990.01 17.13 <0.001 8,985.99 23.72 <0.001 
Periodb -598.69 -2.03   0.042 -610.80 -2.97 0.003 
ImperfectPerformancee 1,831.35 7.00 <0.001 1,686.64   8.45 <0.001 
DistortionImperfectPerformancef    267.00 1.10   0.271    -34.29 -0.23   0.818 
ImperfectPerformance * 
DistortionImperfectPerformanceg 
   467.19 1.54   0.124    -19.68 -0.09   0.928 
# of observations 228   236   
Overall R2 0.21   0.25   
Prob>chi2   0.000     0.000   
________________ 
We used linear random-effects models and we adjusted the standard errors of the estimates for clustering by group 
of two employees and their manager.  
a The dependent variable is Bonusit, which is the number of experimental units an employee received as a bonus 
from his manager in period t. 
b Period refers to the period in the experiment (1 or 2). 
c RelativePerfTask1it refers to how an employee performed relative to his colleague on task 1. It is calculated as 
(ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 for an employee minus ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 for his colleague) 
divided by the sum of ImperfectPerformanceit on both tasks for both employees. Positive values signal an 
employee outperformed his colleague on task 1. 
d RelativePerfTask2it refers to how an employee performed relative to his colleague on task 2. It is calculated as 
(ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2 for an employee minus ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2 for his colleague) 
divided by the sum of ImperfectPerformanceit on both tasks for both employees. Positive values signal an 
employee outperformed his colleague on task 2. 
e ImperfectPerformanceit is the standardized ImperfectPerformanceit on both tasks for an employee. 
f DistortionImperfectPerformanceit is the standardized absolute value of the difference between 
ImperfectPerformanceit on task 1 and ImperfectPerformanceit on task 2. It measures the degree of performance 
distortion from an equal allocation of performance across both tasks, as perceived by the manager based on the 
RPI. 
g ImperfectPerformance * DistortionImperfectPerformanceit refers to the interaction of the variables 
ImperfectPerformanceit and DistortionImperfectPerformanceit. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4.5 OLS regression results: H5 
 
H5: The effect of RPI on Change in Time Spent on Task 1 
 
 Experiment 1:  
Δ TimeSpentTask1a  
Experiment 2: 
Δ TimeSpentTask1a 
       
Independent Variable Estimate t-statistic p-value Estimate t-statistic p-value 
Intercept   -86.01 -6.12 <0.001 -62.85 -5.49 <0.001 
RelativePerfTask1b -247.36 -3.57 0.001   52.94 0.64   0.526 
RelativePerfTask2c  103.49  2.30 0.025 135.79 3.47   0.001 
# of observations 114   118   
R2       0.15        0.08   
F     11.62        6.71   
Prob>F <0.001   0.002   
________________ 
We used OLS regressions and we adjusted the standard errors of the estimates for clustering by group of two 
employees and their manager.  
a The dependent variable is Δ TimeSpentTask1, which is the difference in how much time (in seconds) employees 
spent on task 1 from the first period to the second period. Positive values signal an increase in the time spent on 
task 1. 
b RelativePerfTask1 refers to how an employee performed relative to his colleague on task 1 in the first period. It 
is calculated as (ImperfectPerformance on task 1 for an employee in the first period minus ImperfectPerformance 
on task 1 for his colleague in the first period) divided by the sum of ImperfectPerformance on both tasks for both 
employees in the first period. Positive values signal an employee outperformed his colleague on task 1 in the first 
period. 
c RelativePerfTask2 refers to how an employee performed relative to his colleague on task 2 in the first period. It 
is calculated as (ImperfectPerformance on task 2 for an employee in the first period minus ImperfectPerformance 
on task 2 for his colleague in the first period) divided by the sum of ImperfectPerformance on both tasks for both 
employees in the first period. Positive values signal an employee outperformed his colleague on task 2 in the first 
period. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
This paper examines the joint impact of employees’ effort allocation across tasks and task 
complexity on employees’ overall performance in a multitasking environment. Additionally, 
we research how managers’ allocation of a discretionary bonus based on detailed relative 
performance information (RPI) influences employees’ effort allocations across tasks. 
Employees are often required to take on multiple tasks and responsibilities, while their time 
is limited. If employees allocate time to a certain task, this time cannot be used for another task 
(Eichhorn, 2016; Farkas, 2013). Therefore, time management is an important part of 
employees’ job (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012; Farkas, 2013; Gonzalez & Mark, 2004; 
Kushleyeva et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2007). The way employees allocate their time across their 
various tasks and responsibilities affects their performance. If employees overly focus on a 
single task this impacts their overall performance negatively (Hannan et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, if employees’ effort allocation across tasks deviates from what the firm values 
based on its strategy, objectives or just the direct revenues related to each task, this may impact 
firm’s performance negatively as well (Farkas, 2013). Organizations can therefore assist their 
employees by designing management control systems that motivate the appropriate level of 
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effort and allocation of effort across tasks according to firm preferences (Chenhall, 2003; 
Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Firms often disperse relative performance information 
(RPI) amongst their employees to motivate employees. This RPI elicits social comparison and 
competitiveness, which should affect employee performance positively (Festinger, 1954). In a 
single-task context, prior research demonstrated the positive effect of RPI on employee 
performance (Kramer et al., 2016; Murthy & Schafer, 2011; Tafkov, 2013). However, in a 
multi-task context, the provision of RPI causes employees to distort their effort allocation 
across tasks away from firm preferences in an attempt to socially distinct themselves from their 
peers (Frey, 2007) by outperforming their peers in at least one area (Farkas, 2013; Hannan et 
al., 2013). This behavior is in line with self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988).  
In this study we focus on a management control system consisting of a discretionary bonus 
pool that accompanies the provision of detailed RPI in order to redirect employees’ effort 
towards firm-preferred effort allocations across tasks. Consistent with expectancy theory and 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; Vroom, 1964), we predict that the detailed RPI and 
the allocation of the discretionary bonus guide employees towards an allocation of effort across 
tasks in line with firm preferences. 
We investigate our research questions by means of two experiments in which two employees 
work for a manager in a multitasking (dual-task) environment for two periods. In both 
experiments, we manipulate task complexity at two levels (a setting with two demanding tasks 
versus a setting with two less demanding tasks), because accounting task settings can vary 
strongly in complexity and complexity is one of the most important determinants of 
performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). After each period, the managers receive per employee 
a set of performance measures on each task and they reward the employees with a bonus. The 
two experiments differ in their management control environment. In the first experiment the 
managers are required to allocate one bonus pool for overall performance on the two tasks. In 
the second experiment managers can allocate a separate bonus pool for performance on each 
task separately.  
Our findings indicate that if employees’ allocation of effort across tasks deviates from the 
firm-preferred equal allocation of effort, this leads to lower employee overall performance on 
both tasks (H1). This is consistent with the findings of Hannan et al. (2013). We further 
demonstrate that the negative effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall 
employee performance on both tasks is less negative for complex tasks than for simple tasks 
(H2). This is the case because the extra time dedicated to a single task caused by the distorted 
allocation of effort allows employees to develop and test different strategies in order to solve 
the task. Finding and applying a better strategy is especially worthwhile for handling complex 
tasks (Locke & Latham, 1990). Our results further indicate that in the first period, employees 
will focus on the task for which they have the highest skills (H3a) and employees will focus on 
the easiest task in order to perform at least well on that task (H3b), consistent with self-
affirmation theory (Steele, 1988). This behavior leads to a distorted allocation of effort across 
tasks. We further demonstrate that managers’ bonus allocation is in line with the RPI they 
receive about the employees (H4a), but we do not find evidence of managers’ that take into 
account employees deviations from the firm-preferred effort allocation across tasks in their 
bonus allocation (H4b). Nonetheless we find that the management control system consisting of 
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a discretionary bonus pool that accompanies the provision of detailed RPI is able to redirect 
employees’ effort towards firm-preferred effort allocations across tasks. Consistent with social 
comparison theory and expectancy theory (Festinger, 1954; Vroom, 1964), we find that after 
the provision of RPI and the performance evaluation, employees reallocate their time across 
tasks such that they focus more (less) on tasks for which they under(out)performed relative to 
their colleague (H5). 
We thereby hope to contribute to academic research related to the effect of RPI and 
distortions in effort allocations across tasks on employee performance in a multi-tasking 
context (Brüggen, 2011; Brüggen & Moers, 2007; Eichhorn, 2016; Farkas, 2013; Hannan et 
al., 2013). More specifically we demonstrate how discretionary bonus pools accompanying 
detailed RPI may affect employees’ effort allocations across tasks (H5) and ultimately 
employee performance (H1 & 2). Our findings seem particularly useful for practice as well. 
Firms commonly provide RPI to their employees, but earlier research suggests that the 
provision of this RPI leads to distortions in effort allocation and lower employee performance 
(Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013). Our results indicate that RPI can lead to less distortion in 
effort allocation and higher employee performance. This is presumably caused by the fact that 
in our experiments RPI is accompanied with a discretionary bonus pool that allows the manager 
to direct employees’ focus towards organizational preferences and objectives. However, further 
research is needed, as our experiments only focus on settings in which a discretionary bonus 
pool is present. It seems interesting to investigate the difference in employee performance and 
employee distortion depending on whether the firm only provides RPI or whether the firm 
accompanies RPI with a discretionary bonus pool. Farkas (2013), for instance, investigated the 
joint effect of financial incentives and RPI. Her results indicate that financial incentives are not 
effective at directing employee effort across tasks or in improving performance. Farkas (2013) 
further demonstrates that RPI has a negative effect on employees’ effort allocation and 
performance in the presence of financial incentives. However, this result may be affected by 
the fact that employees did not believe they were eligible for compensation (Farkas, 2013). A 
discretionary bonus pool that does not contain hard-to-reach performance targets may be a 
better tool in promoting organizational desirable performance. Especially in a multitasking 
environment, a discretionary system seems particularly useful, since a complete contract 
specifying all possible outcomes and related employee rewards would be impossible (Gibbs et 
al., 2004; MacLeod and Parent, 1999; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2006). 
Another area for future research lies in investigating the effect of the number of employees 
included in the RPI performance overviews. Most papers focus on a setting with 5 employees, 
whereas our paper focuses on a setting with 2 employees (Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013; 
Kramer et al., 2013). Social comparison concerns, competitive behavior amongst peers, 
employee motivation and employee effort decrease if the number of peers increases (Eichhorn, 
2016; Garcia & Tor, 2009). There can only be one person that outperforms all the others and 
that flourishes by the RPI. All the others fall behind and can only distinguish themselves by 
focusing on one of the tasks of the multi-task setting. It seems probable that whether the 
predictions by self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) (‘employees will distort their effort 
allocation to a single task in order to affirm their competence at least in one area’) or social 
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) (‘employee will try to outperform their employees on all 
 115 
 
areas’) hold depends on the number of people featuring in the RPI performance overview. If 
the RPI only consists of two persons, the bottom performer can only substantially distinguish 
himself by improving his performance on both tasks. Focusing on one task will not increase 
his status, as he still remains the bottom performer. However, in a setting with 5 peers the top 
performer may be out of reach, but an average or bottom performer can still gain social status 
by outperforming his fellow average or bottom peers by focusing on a single task.  
Another area for future research lies in the investigation of detailed RPI in a multitasking 
context. Most studies on RPI focus on rank orderings (Kramer et al., 2016 being an exception 
in a single-task setting). However, with rank orderings employees are unable to identify how 
close their performance is to the performance of others. Especially when employees can see 
that peer performance is close to one’s own performance, social comparison leads to 
assimilation (the belief that one can achieve the same performance as the comparison target) 
(Eichhorn, 2016; Smith, 2000), which should lead to fierce competition and a willingness to 
perform well on all tasks (Festinger, 1954).  
Lastly, the allocation of the discretionary bonus in our experiment was not publicly available 
to the employees. An employee did only know how many bonus points he received and the 
total amount of bonus points that could be divided. He would not know how many bonus points 
his colleague received. This is in line with pay secrecy practices in many firms in the US and 
abroad (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Colella et al., 
2007; Day, 2007; Thompson & Pronsky, 1975). However, previous literature indicates how the 
transparency of the bonus allocation affects how managers allocate a bonus (Bol et al., 2016). 
It seems likely that a public, transparent bonus attached to overall employee performance and 
compliance to firm-preferred effort allocations across tasks may serve as a tool for social 
distinction amongst employees. It then encourages employees to focus on overall performance 
on all tasks, which makes a strategy to focus on a single task obsolete, as this behavior will not 
(to a smaller extent) be rewarded by the manager. A similar effect was obtained in Eichhorn 
(2016) who demonstrates that unidimensional RPI indicating overall employee performance 
positively affects employee performance, whereas multidimensional RPI indicating employee 
performance on each separate task does not affect employee performance. 
Our study is subject to some limitations as well, mainly related to the design of the second 
experiment. In our second experiment managers did not receive a performance overview 
containing employee performance on both tasks. They first received a performance overview 
containing RPI for task 1 and they then allocated a bonus for task 1 before they saw a 
performance overview containing RPI for task 2 and allocated a bonus for task 2. In such a 
context it is hard for a manager to judge the extent to which employees distort their effort 
allocations across tasks. Therefore, it is not that surprising that we do not find support for our 
hypothesis 4b (ceteris paribus, managers’ bonus allocation will be lower when employees 
performance deviates from the firm-preferred effort allocation) in experiment 2. If the 
managers would have received a performance overview containing RPI for both tasks, it seems 
more likely that managers would take employees’ distortions in effort allocation into account 
in their bonus allocation. However, in our first experiment managers had access to RPI for both 
tasks and we do not find support for hypothesis 4b in that experiment either. Finally, the order 
in which managers evaluated performance on each separate task in experiment 2 was fixed. 
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Managers always first evaluated performance on task 1 and then performance on task 2 and 
employees were aware of this order. In such a context employees may be inclined to overly 
focus on the first task in order to create a halo effect in their performance evaluation (Balzer & 
Sulsky, 1992).  
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General Conclusion 
 
 
In this general conclusion, we first summarize the dissertation’s main contributions to the 
literature, we then provide its implications for practice and we end with some of the limitations 
and opportunities for future research. 
 
Contribution to the literature 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on managers’ use of their decision-making 
power to evaluate and reward employees’ performance subjectively (Ahn et al., 2010; Bailey 
et al., 2011; Bol, 2008; Maas et al., 2012). Chapter1 provides an overview of academic research 
on subjective performance evaluation. Chapters 2 to 4 examine how managers use their 
decision-making power depending on MCS design elements such as: manager-employee 
compensation inequality and managerial discretion to freely decide on the bonus size (chapter 
2); the accuracy of the performance information on which managers base their evaluations and 
whether (or not) managers get the opportunity to write a justification on how they allocated 
employee bonuses (chapter 3), and relative performance information that measures 
performance of an employee in relation to that of one or more other employees (chapter 4). We 
use various experiments to investigate these issues. Previous academic literature indicates the 
importance of empirical studies on how (elements of) the MCS and information produced by 
the MCS affect the behavior and decisions of individuals (Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & 
Williamson, 2007). This dissertation intends to contribute to this literature. 
Our first experimental study examines how managerial discretion in determining employee 
bonus size and manager-employee compensation inequality influence the proportion of the 
bonus pool that a manager allocates to her employee (knowing that the manager can keep the 
rest for herself). This study contributes to the literature, documenting benefits and drawbacks 
of control systems with explicit incentives to mitigate employer opportunism (Fisher et al., 
2005). Previous academic research suggests that a reduction in managerial discretion in 
employee bonus size is beneficial, as it causes a manager to act less opportunistically, leading 
to higher employee effort and advantageous employee bonuses (Fisher et al., 2005). We 
demonstrate that high managerial discretion over employee bonus size can be beneficial to 
employees in situations with high compensation inequality because, in the presence of 
compensation inequality, managers with high discretion take fairness to a larger extent into 
account in their bonus decision than manager with low managerial discretion. This study 
further contributes to the literature on subjective performance evaluation by indicating how 
social preferences (reciprocity and fairness concerns) influence managers’ use of discretion in 
bonus allocations (Abernethy et al., 2013; Maas et al., 2012). More specifically, managers 
positively reciprocate employees’ effort with higher bonus allocations and managers that are 
concerned with fairness provide higher bonuses to their employees. Finally, the study 
contributes to the academic literature on the effect of compensation inequality on trust or 
employee effort (Anderson et al., 2006; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; Greiner et al., 2012; 
Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Smith, 2011), as this study finds no 
effect of compensation inequality on employee effort and trust. 
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Our second study researches how performance information accuracy and process 
accountability (whether managers get the opportunity to write a justification for their bonus 
allocation)  influence managers’ differentiation in bonus allocations between employees. This 
study adds to the performance evaluation literature by indicating that different elements of the 
management control system jointly influence evaluation behavior (Bol et al., 2016; Libby et 
al., 2004). This study further contributes to the literature on compressed rating behavior by 
providing more details about the underlying process leading to this rating behavior (Ahn et al., 
2010; Bailey et al., 2011; Bol, 2011; Bol et al., 2016; Golman & Bhatia, 2011; Levin, 2003; 
MacLeod, 2003; Moers, 2005; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). We show that a combination of 
highly accurate performance information and process accountability increases managers’ 
estimates of employees’ procedural fairness perceptions and employee acceptance of 
differentiation in bonus allocations, which consequently leads to less compressed bonus 
allocations. Furthermore, we provide additional empirical evidence for the informativeness 
principle (Holmström, 1979) by demonstrating that accurate performance information 
increases differentiation in bonus allocations. Finally, the study adds to the literature on 
accountability in performance evaluations by showing that the effect of accountability differs 
depending on the level of accuracy of the performance measurement system (Kennedy, 1993; 
Mero et al., 2003; Mero et al., 2007; Shore & Tashchian, 2002).  
Our third study investigates how task complexity and distortion in effort allocation across 
tasks away from the firm-preferred effort allocation affect employee performance in a 
multitasking context. Additionally, the study examines how a management control system 
providing detailed relative performance information (RPI) and a discretionary bonus affects 
employees’ effort allocation across tasks. This study contributes to the literature investigating 
effort allocation concerns in a multitasking setting (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Brüggen & 
Moers, 2007; Hannan et al., 2013, 2017; Hecht et al., 2012) by documenting how performance-
contingent monetary incentives and detailed RPI can affect employees’ allocations and levels 
of effort among various tasks (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Hannan et al., 2013, 2017). Many 
studies focus on rank information instead of detailed RPI (Farkas, 2013; Hannan et al., 2013), 
or do not provide performance-dependent pay (Hannan et al., 2013; Kramer et al., 2016). Our 
study demonstrates that, in the first period, employees will focus on the task for which they 
have the highest skills or find easiest in order to perform at least well on that task. Furthermore, 
we show that managers’ bonus allocation is in line with the detailed RPI and that after the 
provision of RPI and the performance evaluation, employees reallocate their time across tasks 
such that they focus more (less) on tasks for which they under(out)performed relative to their 
colleague, consistent with social comparison theory and expectancy theory (Festinger, 1954; 
Vroom, 1964). Our findings further indicate that a distorted allocation of effort across tasks 
leads to lower employee overall performance, consistent with Hannan et al. (2013). However, 
the effect of distorted allocation of effort across tasks on overall employee performance on 
both tasks is less negative in a work environment consisting of complex tasks than in a work 
environment with simple tasks. 
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Implications for practice 
Given the omnipresence of subjectivity in bonus plans, this dissertation on the use and 
consequences of subjective performance evaluation in supervisor-employee relationships is 
highly relevant for practice (WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting, 2012). 
Our first study indicates that firms should consider the level of manager-employee 
compensation inequality when deciding on the level of managerial discretion. Depending on 
the extent of managerial discretion in combination with compensation inequality, managers’ 
mindset towards fairness changes such that they balance concerns for long-term self-interest 
versus fairness in a different way. More specifically, in the presence of compensation 
inequality, managers with high discretion take fairness to a larger extent into account in their 
bonus decision than managers with low managerial discretion. This finding is important, given 
the attention manager-employee compensation inequality receives in the current debate on 
performance rewards (Anderson et al., 2006; Bloomberg, 2014; Brülhart & Usunier, 2012; 
Greiner et al., 2012; Guo et al., 2017; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2013; Johnson & Mislin, 2011; 
Reuters, 2013, 2014; Smith, 2011; The Economist, 2009). 
Our second study pinpoints that firms should consider process accountability, next to 
information accuracy, when allocating bonuses. Highly accurate performance information 
leads directly to more differentiation in bonus allocations, which is desirable for organizations. 
After all, more differentiation leads to advantageous outcomes for organizations such as higher 
employee incentives, productivity, performance and performance improvement and better 
recognition of which employees might be eligible for promotion or additional training (Ahn et 
al., 2010; Baker et al., 1988; Bol, 2011; Golman & Bhatia, 2012). However, extra investments 
in more accurate performance information are often expensive. Our results indicate that adding 
a system of process accountability will lead to even more differentiation than the impact of 
accuracy of information in itself. As such, if organization make the costly investments related 
to higher data quality, they might as well provide managers with process accountability for a 
better - more differentiated – bonus allocation: process accountability will encourage managers 
to spend time and effort on information processing and will strengthen the pay-for-performance 
relationship. However, if organization do not invest in more accurate performance information, 
process accountability is not worthwhile, as it wastes the manager’s valuable productive time 
without altering the degree of differentiation in the bonus allocation. 
Our third study indicates that relative performance information (RPI) and bonus allocations 
attached to detailed RPI are able to steer employees’ effort allocations across tasks towards 
firm preferences, leading to higher employee performance. Time management is an important 
part of employees’ job (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012; Farkas, 2013; Gonzalez & Mark, 2004; 
Kushleyeva et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2007). If organization can design management control 
systems that motivate the appropriate level and allocation of effort across tasks according to 
what the firm values based on its strategy, objectives or just the direct revenues related to each 
task, this will obviously impact firm’s performance positively (Farkas, 2013).  
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research 
Although this dissertation provides contributions to the literature and practice, as all 
academic research, it is subject to a number of limitations. However, at the same time, these 
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limitations provide interesting avenues for future research. In all experiments, we research how 
solely one or two MCS design elements, in isolation, (jointly) affect how managers use their 
decision-making power in a particular, simplified performance evaluation setting. In practice 
many more design elements may impact managers’ use of their managerial discretion. It can 
be questioned whether stylized, computer-based settings mimic all relevant aspects of 
performance evaluations in reality. 
For example, in our second study, managers received the possibility to justify their bonus 
allocation, but solely to their employees. It seems likely that managers’ rating behavior will be 
affected by whether they justify solely towards their employees, towards their superior or 
towards both the superior and the employees. In our first study, in contrast, managers did not 
receive the possibility to justify their bonus allocation. However, a manager’s justification 
towards the employee could possibly have reduced conflicts, misinterpretations and faulty 
attributions, which could have motivated employee effort. An employee’s justification of his 
behavior towards the manager or a manager’s justification of his behavior towards its superior 
could have reduced managers’ opportunistic behavior as well.  
Next, the management control system in our experiments was imposed on the participants, 
was already installed and was not subject to discussion or alteration. However in reality the 
MCS might be questioned from time to time and both managers and employees may be 
involved in the design of the MCS (empowerment). Alternative MCS may lead to different 
evaluating behavior of managers. Furthermore, in reality managers and employees can choose 
to join a company with a MCS that fits their preferences or they can choose to leave a company 
that does not (longer) fit their preferences. This choice may affect their fairness perceptions or 
behavior. In the experiments, managers were not able to fire employees and employees were 
not able to resign. In practice, employees’ potential threat to leave the company in case of 
insufficient or unfair bonus allocations and the managers’ potential threat of dismissal in case 
of insufficient employee effort or in case of distortion in employee effort away from firm 
preferences, put a cap on employees’ and managers’ opportunistic behavior in practice. 
Finally, all three experiments were computer-based, anonymous experiments, which rules 
out face-to-face conflicts and lasting, negative consequences. Furthermore, in the computer-
based experiments, most performance information, payoffs and decisions were rather explicit 
and transparent. In reality this process is more ambiguous and secret, affecting managers’ 
performance evaluations and employees behavior as well.  
This interesting topic provides many more opportunities for future research. I am looking 
forward to tackle these issues in future research projects!  
 
 
  
 121 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abernethy, M. A., Hung, C. Y., & van Lent, L. (2013). Status and Discretionary Bonus Payments: Evidence 
from a Chinese Hospital. Working paper. 
Adams, J. S. (1963). Towards an understanding of inequity. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67(5), 422. 
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 267-299. 
Adler, R. F., & Benbunan-Fich, R. (2012). Juggling on a high wire: Multitasking effects on 
performance. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 70(2), 156-168. 
Ahn, T. S., Hwang, I., & Kim, M. I. (2010). The impact of performance measure discriminability on ratee 
incentives. The Accounting Review, 85(2), 389-417. 
Anderson, L. R., Mellor, J. M., & Milyo, J. (2006). Induced heterogeneity in trust experiments. Experimental 
Economics, 9(3), 223-235. 
Ashton, R. H. (1990). Pressure and performance in accounting decision settings: Paradoxical effects of 
incentives, feedback, and justification. Journal of Accounting Research, 28, 148-180. 
Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 3-25. 
Axelrod, R. (1981). The emergence of cooperation among egoists. American Political Science Review, 75(2), 
306-318. 
Axelrod, R. (1986). An evolutionary approach to norms. American political science review, 80(4), 1095-1111. 
Bailey, B. P., & Konstan, J. A. (2006). On the need for attention-aware systems: Measuring effects of 
interruption on task performance, error rate, and affective state. Computers in Human Behavior, 22(4), 685-
708. 
Bailey, W. J., Hecht, G., & Towry, K. L. (2011). Dividing the pie: The influence of managerial discretion extent 
on bonus pool allocation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(5), 1562-1584. 
Baiman, S., & Rajan, M. V. (1995). The informational advantages of discretionary bonus schemes. The 
Accounting Review, 70(4), 557-579. 
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: Practice vs. theory. The 
Journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616. 
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1994). Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive 
contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1125-1156. 
Balzer, W. K., & Sulsky, L. M. (1992). Halo and performance appraisal research: A critical 
examination. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77(6), 975. 
Bamberger, P., & Belogolovsky, E. (2010). The impact of pay secrecy on individual task 
performance. Personnel Psychology, 63(4), 965-996. 
Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989). Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance 
evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(1), 21-39. 
Banker, R. D., Chang, H., & Pizzini, M. J. (2004). The balanced scorecard: Judgmental effects of performance 
measures linked to strategy. The Accounting Review, 79(1), 1-23. 
BBC. (2013). Swiss vote no to capping bosses' pay at 12 times lowest paid. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
25076879 
Belogolovsky, E., & Bamberger, P. A. (2014). Signaling in secret: Pay for performance and the incentive and 
sorting effects of pay secrecy. Academy of Management Journal, 57(6), 1706-1733. 
 122 
 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 10(1), 122-142. 
Bernardin, H. J., & Villanova, P. (1986). Performance appraisal. In Generalizing from Laboratory to Field 
Settings, edited by E. A. Locke. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books D.C. Heath and Company. 
Biernat, M., & Sesko, A. K. (2013). Evaluating the contributions of members of mixed-sex work teams: Race 
and gender matter. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(3), 471-476. 
Bies, R. J., & Shapiro, D. L. (1988). Voice and justification: Their influence on procedural fairness 
judgments. Academy of Management Journal, 31(3), 676-685. 
Bloomberg. (2013). CEO-to-Worker Pay-Ratio Disclosure Proposed by Divided SEC. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-17/ceo-to-worker-pay-ratio-disclosure-proposal-to-be-issued-by-
sec.html 
Bloomberg. (2014). Staples Shareholders Vote Against Executive-Compensation Plan. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-03/staples-shareholders-vote-against-executive-
compensation-plan 
Bol, J. C. (2008). Subjectivity in Compensation Contracting. Journal of Accounting Literature, 27, 1-24. 
Bol, J. C. (2011). The determinants and performance effects of managers' performance evaluation biases. The 
Accounting Review, 86(5), 1549-1575. 
Bol, J. C., & Smith, S. D. (2011). Spillover effects in subjective performance evaluation: Bias and the 
asymmetric influence of controllability. The Accounting Review, 86(4), 1213-1230. 
Bol, J. C., Kramer, S., & Maas, V. S. (2016). How control system design affects performance evaluation 
compression: The role of information accuracy and outcome transparency. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 51, 64-73. 
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. The American 
Economic Review, 90 (1), 166-193. 
Bommer, W. H., Johnson, J. L., Rich, G. A., Podsakoff, P. M., & MacKenzie, S. B. (1995). On the 
interchangeability of objective and subjective measures of employee performance: A meta‐
analysis. Personnel Psychology, 48(3), 587-605. 
Bonner, S. E. (1999). Judgment and decision-making research in accounting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 385-
398. 
Bonner, S. E. (2008). Judgment and decision making in accounting. Prentice Hall. 
Bonner, S. E., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: 
theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(4), 303-345. 
Bonner, S. E., Hastie, R., Sprinkle, G. B., & Young, S. M. (2000). A review of the effects of financial incentives 
on performance in laboratory tasks: Implications for management accounting. Journal of Management 
Accounting Research, 12(1), 19-64. 
Borst, J. P., Taatgen, N. A., & van Rijn, H. (2010). The problem state: A cognitive bottleneck in 
multitasking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36(2), 363. 
Brüggen, A. (2011). Ability, career concerns, and financial incentives in a multi-task setting. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 23(1), 211-229. 
Brüggen, A., & Moers, F. (2007). The role of financial incentives and social incentives in multi-task 
settings. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 19(1), 25-50. 
Brülhart, M., & Usunier, J. C. (2012). Does the trust game measure trust?. Economics Letters, 115(1), 20-23. 
 123 
 
Brutus, S. (2010). Words versus numbers: A theoretical exploration of giving and receiving narrative comments 
in performance appraisal. Human Resource Management Review, 20(2), 144-157. 
Buckless, F. A., & Ravenscroft, S. P. (1990). Contrast coding: A refinement of ANOVA in behavioral analysis. 
The Accounting Review, 65(4), 933–945. 
Budde, J. (2007). Performance measure congruity and the balanced scorecard. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 45(3), 515-539. 
Bull, C. (1987). The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(1), 
147-159. 
Burney, L. L., Henle, C. A., & Widener, S. K. (2009). A path model examining the relations among strategic 
performance measurement system characteristics, organizational justice, and extra-and in-role 
performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(3), 305-321. 
Buser, T., & Peter, N. (2012). Multitasking. Experimental Economics, 15(4), 641-655. 
Campbell, D. J. (1988). Task complexity: A review and analysis. Academy of Management Review, 13(1), 40-
52. 
Cardinaels, E., & van Veen-Dirks, P. M. (2010). Financial versus non-financial information: The impact of 
information organization and presentation in a Balanced Scorecard. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 35(6), 565-578. 
Castilla, E. J. (2008). Gender, race, and meritocracy in organizational careers. American Journal of 
Sociology, 113(6), 1479-1526. 
Castilla, E. J. (2015). Accounting for the gap: A firm study manipulating organizational accountability and 
transparency in pay decisions. Organization Science, 26(2), 311-333. 
Chenhall, R. H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational context: findings from 
contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28(2), 127-
168. 
Choi, J., Hecht, G. W., & Tayler, W. B. (2012). Lost in translation: The effects of incentive compensation on 
strategy surrogation. The Accounting Review, 87(4), 1135-1163. 
Choi, J., Hecht, G., Tafkov, I. D., & Towry, K. L. (2015). Vicarious learning under implicit contracts. The 
Accounting Review, 91(4), 1087-1108. 
Christ, M. H., Emett, S. A., Tayler, W. B., & Wood, D. A. (2016). Compensation or feedback: Motivating 
performance in multidimensional tasks. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 50, 27-40. 
Christ, M. H., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2012). Sticks and carrots: The effect of contract frame on effort 
in incomplete contracts. The Accounting Review, 87(6), 1913-1938. 
Ciriolo, E. (2007). Inequity aversion and trustees' reciprocity in the trust game. European Journal of Political 
Economy, 23(4), 1007-1024. 
Colella, A., Paetzold, R. L., Zardkoohi, A., & Wesson, M. J. (2007). Exposing pay secrecy. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(1), 55-71. 
Coletti, A. L., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2005). The effect of control systems on trust and cooperation in 
collaborative environments. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 477-500. 
Colquitt, J. A. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: a construct validation of a 
measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(3), 386. 
Cox, J. C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 260-281. 
Cronqvist, H., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2013). CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 108(3), 659-674. 
 124 
 
Daily Mail. (2013). Swiss vote to impose world's strictest rules on executive pay after public outcry over fat cat 
bonuses. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2287432/Swiss-vote-impose-worlds-strictest-rules-
executive-pay-public-outcry-fat-cat-bonuses.html  
Day, N. E. (2007). An investigation into pay communication: is ignorance bliss?. Personnel Review, 36(5), 739-
762. 
De Standaard. (2013a). Bpost en Labille op ramkoers over loon CEO. 
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20131217_00891478 
De Standaard. (2013b). Loon voor opvolger Bellens blijft voorwerp van discussie. 
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20131210_00880595 
Dickinson, T. L. (1993). Attitudes about performance appraisal. Personnel Selection and Assessment: Individual 
and Organizational Perspectives, 141-161. 
Ding, S., & Beaulieu, P. (2011). The Role of Financial Incentives in Balanced Scorecard‐Based Performance 
Evaluations: Correcting Mood Congruency Biases. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(5), 1223-1247. 
Dossett, D. L., & Greenberg, C. I. (1981). Goal setting and performance evaluation: An attributional 
analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 24(4), 767-779. 
Du, F., Tang, G., & Young, S. M. (2012). Influence activities and favoritism in subjective performance 
evaluation: evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises. The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1555-1588. 
Duarte, N. T., Goodson, J. R., & Klich, N. R. (1994). Effects of dyadic quality and duration on performance 
appraisal. Academy of Management Journal, 37(3), 499-521. 
Duggan, G. B., Johnson, H., & Sørli, P. (2013). Interleaving tasks to improve performance: Users maximise the 
marginal rate of return. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 71(5), 533-550. 
Dulebohn, J. H., & Ferris, G. R. (1999). The role of influence tactics in perceptions of performance evaluations’ 
fairness. Academy of Management Journal, 42(3), 288-303. 
Dur, R., & Glazer, A. (2007). Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss. The Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, 24(1), 120-137. 
Dux, P. E., Tombu, M. N., Harrison, S., Rogers, B. P., Tong, F., & Marois, R. (2009). Training improves 
multitasking performance by increasing the speed of information processing in human prefrontal 
cortex. Neuron, 63(1), 127-138. 
Eichhorn, N. (2016). Relative Performance Information and Financial Incentives in Multidimensional Task 
Settings–A Conceptual and Experimental Analysis of Effects on Performance and Attention towards Task 
Dimensions. Junior Management Science, 1(1), 100-137. 
Elvira, M., & Town, R. (2001). The effects of race and worker productivity on performance 
evaluations. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 40(4), 571-590. 
Ewing, R. (2016). An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Contract Frame and Discretion in 
Performance Evaluation on Effort. Theses and Dissertations—Accountancy. University of Kentucky 
Uknowledge. 
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 293-315. 
Farkas, M. J. (2013). Multi-Task Setting Involving Simple and Complex Tasks: An Exploratory Study of 
Employee Motivation. University of South Florida. 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. The journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), 159-181. 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(3), 817-868. 
 125 
 
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (2004). Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model. The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 453-474. 
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: Experimental 
evidence. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 833-860. 
Ferreira, A., & Otley, D. (2009). The design and use of performance management systems: An extended 
framework for analysis. Management Accounting Research, 20(4), 263-282. 
Ferris, G. R., Munyon, T. P., Basik, K., & Buckley, M. R. (2008). The performance evaluation context: Social, 
emotional, cognitive, political, and relationship components. Human Resource Management Review, 18(3), 
146-163. 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117-140. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental 
Economics, 10(2), 171-178. 
Fisher, J. G., Maines, L. A., Peffer, S. A., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2005). An experimental investigation of employer 
discretion in employee performance evaluation and compensation. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 563-583. 
Franco-Santos, M., Lucianetti, L., & Bourne, M. (2012). Contemporary performance measurement systems: A 
review of their consequences and a framework for research. Management Accounting Research, 23(2), 79-
119. 
Frey, B. S. (2007). Awards as compensation. European Management Review, 4(1), 6-14. 
Frink, D. D., & Ferris, G. R. (1999). The moderating effects of accountability on the conscientiousness-
performance relationship. Journal of Business and Psychology, 13(4), 515-524. 
Garcia, S. M., & Tor, A. (2009). The N-effect: More competitors, less competition. Psychological 
Science, 20(7), 871-877. 
Ghosh, D., & Lusch, R. F. (2000). Outcome effect, controllability and performance evaluation of managers: 
some field evidence from multi-outlet businesses. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 25(4), 411-425. 
Gibbins, M., & Newton, J. D. (1994). An empirical exploration of complex accountability in public 
accounting. Journal of Accounting Research, 32 (4),165-186. 
Gibbs, M., Merchant, K. A., Stede, W. A. V. D., & Vargus, M. E. (2004). Determinants and effects of 
subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 409-436. 
Gillie, T., & Broadbent, D. (1989). What makes interruptions disruptive? A study of length, similarity, and 
complexity. Psychological Research, 50(4), 243-250. 
Giraud, F., Langevin, P., & Mendoza, C. (2008). Justice as a rationale for the controllability principle: A study 
of managers' opinions. Management Accounting Research, 19(1), 32-44. 
Golman, R., & Bhatia, S. (2012). Performance evaluation inflation and compression. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 37(8), 534-543. 
González, V. M., & Mark, G. (2004). Constant, constant, multi-tasking craziness: managing multiple working 
spheres. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems (pp. 113-120). 
ACM. 
Govindarajan, V. (1984). Appropriateness of accounting data in performance evaluation: an empirical 
examination of environmental uncertainty as an intervening variable. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 9(2), 125-135. 
Greiner, B., Ockenfels, A., & Werner, P. (2012). The dynamic interplay of inequality and trust—an 
experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(2), 355-365. 
 126 
 
Guo, L., Libby, T., & Liu, X. K. (2017). The effects of vertical pay dispersion: Experimental evidence in a 
budget setting. Contemporary Accounting Research, 34(1), 555-576. 
Guymon, R. N., (2008). The Effect of Explanations and Monetary Incentives on Effort Allocation Decisions . 
AAA 2009 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1193142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1193142 
Hales, J., & Williamson, M. G. (2010). Implicit employment contracts: The limits of management reputation for 
promoting firm productivity. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(1), 147-176. 
Hannan, R. L., McPhee, G. P., Newman, A. H. & Tafkov, I., (2017). Designing a Performance Feedback System 
in a Multi-Task Environment: Relative Performance Information Detail Level and Temporal Aggregation in 
a Multi-Task Environment (February 3, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911072 
Hannan, R. L., McPhee, G. P., Newman, A. H., & Tafkov, I. D. (2013). The effect of relative performance 
information on performance and effort allocation in a multi-task environment. The Accounting 
Review, 88(2), 553-575. 
Hargreaves Heap, S. P. H., Tan, J. H., & Zizzo, D. J. (2013). Trust, inequality and the market. Theory and 
Decision, 74(3), 311-333. 
Hartmann, F., & Slapničar, S. (2009). How formal performance evaluation affects trust between superior and 
subordinate managers. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6), 722-737. 
Hartmann, F., & Slapničar, S. (2012). The perceived fairness of performance evaluation: The role of 
uncertainty. Management Accounting Research, 23(1), 17-33. 
Hartmann, F., Naranjo-Gil, D., & Perego, P. (2010). The effects of leadership styles and use of performance 
measures on managerial work-related attitudes. European Accounting Review, 19(2), 275-310. 
Harvard Business Review. (2009). Why Sky-High CEO Pay Is Bad Business. https://hbr.org/2009/06/why-high-
ceo-pay-is-bad-business/ 
Hecht, G., Tafkov, I., & Towry, K. L. (2012). Performance spillover in a multitask environment. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 29(2), 563-589. 
Heneman, R. L., & Wexley, K. N. (1983). The effects of time delay in rating and amount of information 
observed on performance rating accuracy. Academy of Management Journal, 26(4), 677-686. 
Hermans, T., Cools, M., & Van den Abbeele, A. (2013). Subjective performance measurement: a literature 
review. Rev Bus Econ Lit, 58(4), 308-342. 
Hermans, T., Cools, M., & Van den Abbeele. (2017). A. Subjective performance evaluation: the role of 
information accuracy and accountability –working paper. 
Hoffman, V. B., & Patton, J. M. (1997). Accountability, the dilution effect, and conservatism in auditors' fraud 
judgments. Journal of Accounting Research, 35(2), 227-237. 
Hogan, E. A. (1987). Effects of prior expectations on performance ratings: A longitudinal study. Academy of 
Management Journal, 30(2), 354-368. 
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 74-91. 
Holmström, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, 
and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 7, 24-52. 
Höppe, F., & Moers, F. (2011). The choice of different types of subjectivity in CEO annual bonus contracts. The 
Accounting Review, 86(6), 2023-2046. 
Horngren, C. T., Datar, S. M., & Rajan, M. V. (2015). Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis. Fifteenth 
Edition. Pearson education. 
 127 
 
Humphreys, K. A., & Trotman, K. T. (2011). The balanced scorecard: The effect of strategy information on 
performance evaluation judgments. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 23(1), 81-98. 
Indjejikian, R. J., & Matĕjka, M. (2011). Accounting decentralization and performance evaluation of business 
unit managers. The Accounting Review, 87(1), 261-290. 
Itoh, H. (2004). Moral hazard and other‐regarding preferences. The Japanese Economic Review, 55(1), 18-45. 
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., & Meyer, M. W. (2003). Subjectivity and the weighting of performance measures: 
Evidence from a balanced scorecard. The Accounting Review, 78(3), 725-758. 
Ivancevich, J. M. (1983). Contrast effects in performance evaluation and reward practices. Academy of 
Management Journal, 26(3), 465-476. 
Jacobs, R., & Kozlowski, S. W. (1985). A closer look at halo error in performance ratings. Academy of 
Management Journal, 28(1), 201-212. 
Janssen, C. P., Brumby, D. P., Dowell, J., Chater, N., & Howes, A. (2011). Identifying optimum performance 
trade‐offs using a cognitively bounded rational analysis model of discretionary task interleaving. Topics in 
Cognitive Science, 3(1), 123-139. 
Jasmand, C., Blazevic, V., & de Ruyter, K. (2012). Generating sales while providing service: A study of 
customer service representatives' ambidextrous behavior. Journal of Marketing, 76(1), 20-37. 
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 
865-889. 
Judge, T. A., & Ferris, G. R. (1993). Social context of performance evaluation decisions. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(1), 80-105. 
Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S., Nainar, S. K., & Shehata, M. (2012). The impact of empowering investors on 
trust and trustworthiness. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(3), 566-577. 
Kane, J. S., Bernardin, H. J., Villanova, P., & Peyrefitte, J. (1995). Stability of rater leniency: Three 
studies. Academy of Management Journal, 38(4), 1036-1051. 
Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1992). The balanced scorecard--measures that drive performance. Harvard 
Business Review, 70(1), 71-79. 
Ke, B., Petroni, K., & Safieddine, A. (1999). Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to 
accounting performance measures: Evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance companies. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 28(2), 185-209. 
Keeley, M. (1977). Subjective performance evaluation and person-role conflict under conditions of 
uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 20(2), 301-314. 
Kennedy, J. (1993). Debiasing audit judgment with accountability: A framework and experimental 
results. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 231-245. 
Klimoski, R., & Inks, L. (1990). Accountability forces in performance appraisal. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 45(2), 194-208. 
Konig, C. J., Buhner, M., & Murling, G. (2005). Working memory, fluid intelligence, and attention are 
predictors of multitasking performance, but polychronicity and extraversion are not. Human 
Performance, 18(3), 243-266. 
Kramer, S., & Maas, V. S. (2014). Information Search and Information Processing in Subjective Performance 
Evaluation: Evidence from an Eye-Tracking Experiment. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2457941 
Kramer, S., Maas, V. S., & Van Rinsum, M. (2016). Relative performance information, rank ordering and 
employee performance: A research note. Management Accounting Research, 33, 16-24. 
 128 
 
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated 
prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245-252. 
Krishnan, R., Luft, J. L., & Shields, M. D. (2005). Effects of accounting-method choices on subjective 
performance-measure weighting decisions: Experimental evidence on precision and error covariance. The 
Accounting Review, 80(4), 1163-1192. 
Kushleyeva, Y., Salvucci, D. D., & Lee, F. J. (2005). Deciding when to switch tasks in time-critical 
multitasking. Cognitive Systems Research, 6(1), 41-49. 
Lahno, B. (1995). Trust and strategic rationality. Rationality and Society, 7(4), 442-464. 
Landy, F. J., Barnes, J. L., & Murphy, K. R. (1978). Correlates of Perceived Fairness and Accuracy of 
Performance Evaluation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63(6), 751-754. 
Lawler, E. E. (1967). The multitrait-multirater approach to measuring managerial job performance. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 51(5p1), 369. 
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. Oxford University Press on Demand. 
Ledyard, J. 0. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton: 111-194. 
Lenton, P., & Mosley, P. (2011). Incentivising trust. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 890-897. 
Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological 
Bulletin, 125(2), 255. 
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory?. In Social exchange (pp. 27-55). Springer US. 
Levin, J. (2003). Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review, 93(3), 835-857. 
Libby, T., Salterio, S. E., & Webb, A. (2004). The balanced scorecard: The effects of assurance and process 
accountability on managerial judgment. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 1075-1094. 
Lipe, M. G., & Salterio, S. (2002). A note on the judgmental effects of the balanced scorecard's information 
organization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(6), 531-540. 
Lipe, M. G., & Salterio, S. E. (2000). The balanced scorecard: Judgmental effects of common and unique 
performance measures. The Accounting Review, 75(3), 283-298. 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). Work motivation and satisfaction: Light at the end of the 
tunnel. Psychological Science, 1(4), 240-246. 
Lohman, C., Fortuin, L., & Wouters, M. (2004). Designing a performance measurement system: A case 
study. European Journal of Operational Research, 156(2), 267-286. 
Luft, J. (2016). Cooperation and competition among employees: Experimental evidence on the role of 
management control systems. Management Accounting Research, 31, 75-85. 
Luft, J. L. (1997). Fairness, ethics and the effect of management accounting on transaction costs. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 9, 199. 
Luft, J., & Shields, M. D. (2003). Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-
consistent empirical research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28(2), 169-249. 
Maas, V. S., van Rinsum, M., & Towry, K. L. (2012). In Search of Informed Discretion: An Experimental 
Investigation of Fairness and Trust Reciprocity. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 617-644. 
MacLeod, W. B. (2003). Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. American Economic Review, 93(1), 
216-240. 
MacLeod, W. B., & Parent, D. (1999). Job characteristics, wages and the employment contract. Review, 81, 13-
28. 
 129 
 
Madjar, N., & Shalley, C. E. (2008). Multiple tasks' and multiple goals' effect on creativity: Forced incubation 
or just a distraction?. Journal of Management, 34(4), 786-805. 
Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 47(3), 534-559. 
Masschelein, S., Cardinaels, E., & Van den Abbeele, A. (2012). ABC information, fairness perceptions, and 
interfirm negotiations. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 951-973. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy 
of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734. 
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003). Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust 
games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52(2), 267-275. 
McFarlin, D. B., & Sweeney, P. D. (1992). Distributive and procedural justice as predictors of satisfaction with 
personal and organizational outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 35(3), 626-637. 
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2007). Management control systems: performance measurement, 
evaluation and incentives. Pearson Education. 
Merchant, K. A., Chow, C. W., & Wu, A. (1995). Measurement, evaluation and reward of profit center 
managers: a cross-cultural field study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20(7-8), 619-638. 
Mero, N. P., & Motowidlo, S. J. (1995). Effects of rater accountability on the accuracy and the favorability of 
performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(4), 517. 
Mero, N. P., Guidice, R. M., & Brownlee, A. L. (2007). Accountability in a performance appraisal context: The 
effect of audience and form of accounting on rater response and behavior. Journal of Management, 33(2), 
223-252. 
Mero, N. P., Motowidlo, S. J., & Anna, A. L. (2003). Effects of accountability on rating behavior and rater 
accuracy. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(12), 2493-2514. 
Moers, F. (2005). Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and 
subjectivity. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30(1), 67-80. 
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 134-140. 
Moore, D. A. (2007). Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its 
implications for theories of bias in social comparison. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 102(1), 42-58. 
Morse, A., Nanda, V., & Seru, A. (2011). Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?. Journal of 
Finance, 66(5), 1779-1821. 
Murphy, K. J., & Oyer, P. (2003). Discretion in executive compensation contracts. Working paper, University of 
Southern California and Stanford University. 
Murthy, U. S., & Schafer, B. A. (2011). The effects of relative performance information and framed information 
systems feedback on performance in a production task. Journal of Information Systems, 25(1), 159-184. 
Ockenfels, A. (2015). Tit for Tat. German Research, 37(3), 12-15. 
OECD. (2011a). An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings.  
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf 
OECD. (2011b). Board Practices: Incentives and Governing Risks.  http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf 
Otley, D. (1999). Performance management: a framework for management control systems 
research. Management Accounting Research, 10(4), 363-382. 
Payne, S. J., Duggan, G. B., & Neth, H. (2007). Discretionary task interleaving: Heuristics for time allocation in 
cognitive foraging. Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 136(3), 370. 
 130 
 
Pipino, L. L., Lee, Y. W., & Wang, R. Y. (2002). Data quality assessment. Communications of the ACM, 45(4), 
211-218. 
Prendergast, C. (1993). A Theory of" Yes Men". The American Economic Review, 83(4), 757-770. 
Prendergast, C., & Topel, R. (1993). Discretion and bias in performance evaluation. European Economic 
Review, 37(2-3), 355-365. 
Prendergast, C., & Topel, R. H. (1996). Favoritism in organizations. Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 958-
978. 
Pulakos, E. D., & Wexley, K. N. (1983). The Relationship Among Perceptual Similarity, Sex, and Performance 
Ratings in Manager-subordinate Dyads. Academy of Management Journal, 26(1): 129-139. 
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics. The American Economic Review, 
83(5): 1281.  
Rajan, M. V., & Reichelstein, S. (2006). Subjective performance indicators and discretionary bonus 
pools. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 585-618. 
Rajan, M. V., & Reichelstein, S. (2009). Objective versus subjective indicators of managerial performance. The 
Accounting Review, 84(1), 209-237. 
Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Dreber, A. (2013). It’s the thought that counts: The role of intentions in 
reciprocal altruism. Available at SSRN 2259407. 
Reis, H. T., & Gruzen, J. (1976). On mediating equity, equality, and self-interest: The role of self-presentation 
in social exchange. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12(5), 487-503. 
Ren, D., Zhou, H., & Fu, X. (2009). A deeper look at gender difference in multitasking: Gender-specific 
mechanism of cognitive control. In Natural Computation, 2009. ICNC'09. Fifth International Conference 
on (Vol. 5, pp. 13-17). IEEE. 
Reuters. (2013). COLUMN-Swiss outrage over executive pay sparks a movement in Europe. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/gumbel-switzerland-idUSL2N0J01LI20131115 
Reuters. (2014). Novartis keeps CEO pay steady, but incoming chairman pay drops. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-novartis-results-compensation-idUSBREA0S0QS20140129 
Roch, S. G. (2005). An investigation of motivational factors influencing performance ratings: Rating audience 
and incentive. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 20(8), 695-711. 
Rubinstein, J. S., Meyer, D. E., & Evans, J. E. (2001). Executive control of cognitive processes in task 
switching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27(4), 763. 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new 
directions. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25(1), 54-67. 
Salterio, S. E. (2015). Barriers to knowledge creation in management accounting research. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 27(1), 151-170. 
Schmidt, K. M., & Schnitzer, M. (1995). The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts. Economics 
letters, 48(2), 193-199. 
Segal, E. (2004). Incubation in insight problem solving. Creativity Research Journal, 16(1), 141-148. 
Shapiro, E. G. (1975). Effect of expectations of future interaction on reward allocations in dyads: Equity or 
equality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(5), 873. 
Shore, T. H., & Tashchian, A. (2002). Accountability forces in performance appraisal: Effects of self-appraisal 
information, normative information, and task performance. Journal of Business and Psychology, 17(2), 261-
274. 
 131 
 
Sloof, R., & Sonnemans, J. (2011). The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An 
experiment. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 573-594. 
Smith, A. (2011). Income inequality in the trust game. Economics Letters, 111(1), 54-56. 
Smith, R. H. (2000). Assimilative and contrastive emotional reactions to upward and downward social 
comparisons. Handbook of social comparison: Theory and research, 173-200. 
Speier, C., Valacich, J. S., & Vessey, I. (1999). The influence of task interruption on individual decision 
making: An information overload perspective. Decision Sciences, 30(2), 337-360. 
Speier, C., Vessey, I., & Valacich, J. S. (2003). The effects of interruptions, task complexity, and information 
presentation on computer‐supported decision‐making performance. Decision Sciences, 34(4), 771-797. 
Sprinkle, G. B. (2003). Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 28(2), 287-318. 
Sprinkle G.B. & Williamson M.G. (2007). Experimental research in managerial accounting. Handbook of 
Management Accounting Research, Chapman, C.S., Hopwood, A.G. & Shields, M.D (Eds.) (pp. 415-444). 
Oxford, UK: Elsevier. 
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 261-302. 
Stoet, G., O’Connor, D. B., Conner, M., & Laws, K. R. (2013). Are women better than men at multi-
tasking?. BMC Psychology, 1(1), 18. 
Tafkov, I. D. (2013). Private and public relative performance information under different compensation 
contracts. The Accounting Review, 88(1), 327-350. 
Tan, H. T., & Jamal, K. (2001). Do auditors objectively evaluate their subordinates' work?. The Accounting 
Review, 76(1), 99-110. 
Tayler, W. B. (2010). The balanced scorecard as a strategy-evaluation tool: The effects of implementation 
involvement and a causal-chain focus. The Accounting Review, 85(3), 1095-1117. 
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and 
cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), 684-707. 
Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L., & Boettger, R. (1989). Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: 
conformity, complexity, and bolstering. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(4), 632. 
The Economist. (2009). Attacking the corporate gravy train. http://www.economist.com/node/13726705 
The Guardian. (2013). Switzerland votes against cap on executive pay. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/switzerland-votes-against-cap-executive-pay  
The US News. (2013). What We Can Learn From Switzerland’s CEO Pay Cap Vote. 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/pat-garofalo/2013/11/25/the-importance-of-switzerlands-112-ceo-
pay-cap-vote  
Thompson, P., & Pronsky, J. (1975). Secrecy or disclosure in management compensation?. Business 
Horizons, 18(3), 67-74. 
Varma, A., & Stroh, L. K. (2001). The impact of same‐sex LMX dyads on performance evaluations. Human 
Resource Management, 40(4), 309-320. 
Vroom, V. (1964). Work and motivation. New York, NY: John Wiley. 
Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. (1973). New directions in equity research. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 25(2), 151. 
Wang, R. Y., & Strong, D. M. (1996). Beyond accuracy: What data quality means to data consumers. Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 12(4), 5-33. 
 132 
 
Wayne, S. J., & Liden, R. C. (1995). Effects of impression management on performance ratings: A longitudinal 
study. Academy of Management journal, 38(1), 232-260. 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(1, Part 2), 453-486. 
Wong-On-Wing, B., Guo, L., Li, W., & Yang, D. (2007). Reducing conflict in balanced scorecard 
evaluations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(4), 363-377. 
Wood, R. E. (1986). Task complexity: Definition of the construct. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 37(1), 60-82. 
Woods, A. (2012). Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: The influence of prior 
performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37(6), 403-425. 
WorldatWork & Vivient Consulting. (2012). Private Company Incentive Pay Practices Survey. 
http://www.worldatwork.org/waw/adimLink?id=58146 
Yim, A. T. (2001). Renegotiation and relative performance evaluation: Why an informative signal may be 
useless. Review of Accounting Studies, 6(1), 77-108. 
Zijlstra, F. R., Roe, R. A., Leonora, A. B., & Krediet, I. (1999). Temporal factors in mental work: Effects of 
interrupted activities. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 72(2), 163-185. 
  
 133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Economics and Business, see: 
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/doctoraatsverdediging/archief.htm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
